No. 98CA2102Colorado Court of Appeals.
June 24, 1999
Appeal from the District Court of Douglas County, Honorable Scott W. Lawrence, Judge, No. 97CV739.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
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McGihon Leffert, P.C., Anthony L. Leffert, James X. Quinn, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
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Elzi Gurr, Kathryn A. Elzi; New Century Energies, Lisa A. Lett, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
Division III
Casebolt and Tursi[*] , JJ., concur
Opinion by JUDGE MARQUEZ
[1] Plaintiffs, Mark and Erica Van Wyk, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, appeal the dismissal of their action against defendant, Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. [2] In 1989, PSCo filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to upgrade the Daniels Park Electrical Transmission Line (Daniels Park Line) located in Douglas County from 115 kilovolts (kV) to 230kV. Following a hearing, the PUC granted PSCo’s application subject to certain conditions not pertinent here. [3] The PUC’s decision was ultimately approved by the supreme court. See Douglas County Board of Commissioners v. Public Utilities Commission, 829 P.2d 1303 (Colo. 1992) (approving the upgrade and remanding the cause for further findings). In a subsequent appeal by Douglas County, the supreme court again approved the PUC’s decision. See Douglas County Board of Commissioners v. Public Utilities Commission, 866 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1994). Plaintiffs were not parties to either of these decisions. [4] In October 1997, the upgrade to 230kV was completed and the lines were energized. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed this action alleging the following four claims for relief: 1) inverse condemnation/unlawful taking; 2) trespass; 3) nuisance; and 4) negligence. [5] According to their complaint, plaintiffs’ claims are typical of all property owners who own property adjacent to the electrical line or within 300 feet of it. Plaintiffs allege that, when the lines became fully energized, the property owners immediately noticed continued and unreasonably loud electrical noises coming from the power lines. During times of high humidity, including rain or snow, the electrical noise allegedly intensifies and becomes much louder. They also allege upon information and belief that the power line emits a high amount of radiation and that the electromagnetic field created by the power line encroaches upon the property owners’ land. [6] PSCo moved to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The judgment entered granting that dismissal is the subject of this appeal.I.
[7] Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in determining that the PUC’s approval of the upgrade of the Daniels Park Line precluded them from asserting claims for inverse condemnation, trespass, and nuisance. We agree that PUC approval is not dispositive.
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A.
[11] Plaintiffs contend that the trial court failed to recognize that regulatory approval is not dispositive of the questions whether there has been a taking of private property and whether the actions of PSCo constitute a nuisance or a trespass. We agree.
B.
[16] Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred in determining that they seek to relitigate a decision of the PUC. However, in light of our disposition above, it is unnecessary for us to address this contention.
II.
[17] Plaintiffs further contend that the trial court’s order only addressed their negligence claim and failed to address their inverse condemnation, nuisance, and trespass claims. As a preliminary matter, we note that plaintiffs do not specifically contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their negligence claim or otherwise address how the court erred in doing so. Thus, dismissal of the negligence claim should be affirmed.
A.
[18] As to inverse condemnation, plaintiffs assert that PSCo knew that the upgraded Daniels Park Line would produce an unreasonable amount of noise in violation of Colorado’s noise abatement statute and knew the amount of electromagnetic radiation associated with the 230kV transmission line. Thus, they contend that PSCo failed to commence a condemnation action to compensate them properly and fairly for their damages. We conclude that plaintiffs have averred material facts sufficient to withstand a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion.
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by a governmental entity. A taking also occurs if an owner is required to forego the economically beneficial use of his or her property. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175
(Colo. 1993); Clare v. Florissant Water Sanitation District, 879 P.2d 471 (Colo.App. 1994).
B.
[27] Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims for nuisance and trespass because the noise and electromagnetic radiation emanating from the power line unreasonably interfere with their quiet use and enjoyment of their property. We agree.
1.
[28] Damages available on trespass and nuisance claims can include not only diminution of market value or costs of restoration and loss of use of the property, but also discomfort and annoyance to the property owner as the occupant. Webster v. Boone, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. No. 97CA0816, Feb. 18, 1999).
(Colo.App. 1992) (affirming damages on nuisance claim based on effects of dust, smell, and waste disposal from neighboring hog farm.) [30] In support of their trespass claim, plaintiffs allege the conduct of PSCo in upgrading the power line and increasing the voltage has caused noise, radiation, and electromagnetic particles to enter upon and above the surface of the real estate of the property owners without the permission of the property owners. [31] Without citing any authority, PSCo contends that intangible intrusions such as noise do not constitute trespass and that, because plaintiffs do not allege the type of physical invasion that is required to sustain a claim for trespass, their claim was properly dismissed. In light of the case law above, however, we reject PSCo’s contention.
2.
[32] We also reject PSCo’s contention that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for
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nuisance because its conduct is not intentional or unreasonable.
[33] A private nuisance is a non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of his or her land. To demonstrate its existence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant unreasonably and substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs’ property. Further, liability for nuisance may rest upon either intentional or negligent invasion of a person’s property interest or upon conduct that is so dangerous to life or property and so abnormal or out of place in its surroundings as to fall within the scope of strict liability. Lowder v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., 43 Colo. App. 225, 601 P.2d 657(1979). [34] Liability predicated on intentional conduct assumes a knowing affirmative act on the part of the defendant. Knowledge, actual or constructive, is an essential ingredient of liability based upon the negligent maintenance of a nuisance. Baughman v. Cosler, 169 Colo. 534, 459 P.2d 294 (1969). [35] PSCo claims that it did not act to cause noise or know that any increased noise level was substantially certain to result, and it argues, therefore, that plaintiffs’ nuisance claim must fail. However, to establish liability under a nuisance theory plaintiff must only demonstrate that defendant possessed knowledge of the affirmative act which, here, is increasing the voltage in the line. See Lowder v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., supra. [36] In their claim for relief based on nuisance, plaintiffs have alleged that PSCo’s actions in transmitting 230kV of electrical power throughout the power line and the resulting noise, radiation, and electromagnetic field constitute an intentional invasion of their rights as property owners and unreasonably interfere with their right to use and enjoy their property. [37] Consequently, because we must accept these statements as true, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for trespass and nuisance. [38] Accordingly, the judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for inverse condemnation, trespass, and nuisance is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Inasmuch as the dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claim is not appealed, that portion of the judgment is affirmed. [39] JUDGE CASEBOLT and JUDGE TURSI concur.