No. 86SC393Supreme Court of Colorado.
Decided March 14, 1988. Rehearing Denied April 11, 1988.
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Philip R. Cockerille, P.C., Philip R. Cockerille for Child-Petitioner.
Duane Woodard, Attorney General, Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, Cynthia D. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
EN BANC
CHIEF JUSTICE QUINN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
[1] The question presented in this case is whether the Colorado Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to commit a “repeat-juvenile offender” who is also a “mandatory sentence offender” to the Department of Institutions (department) for a two-year term consecutive to a two-year commitment imposed in a separate delinquency adjudication.[1] The court of appeals upheld the consecutive commitment imposed by the juvenile court, and we granted S.G.W.’s petition for certiorari. We now reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.I.
[2] S.G.W., who was seventeen years of age at the time of the imposition of the challenged commitment, had numerous contacts with the juvenile court since the age of nine. He had been adjudicated a
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delinquent child on four prior occasions, had run away from court-imposed detention several times, and had a discouraging treatment record.[2]
[3] On January 25, 1985, S.G.W. appeared before the Denver Juvenile Court for a dispositional hearing on two delinquency petitions. Previously, on May 14, 1984, S.G.W., who at all times was represented by counsel, admitted the allegations of the delinquency petition alleging second degree burglary and theft committed on April 30, 1984, and a disposition hearing was scheduled on September 6, 1984. In the interim, however, S.G.W., who had been in the custody of the department on a prior delinquency adjudication, left the department’s school program and burglarized a building on October 25, 1984. When S.G.W. appeared in court for a dispositional hearing on January 25, 1985, a second delinquency petition had been filed based on the burglary of October 25, 1984. S.G.W. admitted the allegations of the second petition. Because of his prior delinquency adjudications, he qualified under the Children’s Code as both a “repeat juvenile offender,” §19-1-103(23.5), and a “mandatory sentence offender,” § 19-1-103(19.5). [4] Based on S.G.W.’s admissions to the first petition alleging second degree burglary and theft on April 30, 1984, the juvenile court adjudicated him a delinquent child for the fifth time and committed him to the department for a term of two years commencing on the day of the disposition, January 25, 1985. The court then adjudicated S.G.W. a delinquent child for the sixth time on the second delinquency petition alleging second degree burglary on October 25, 1984, and committed him to a second two-year term, subject to the following proviso: that S.G.W. was to be retained in a juvenile institution for not less than one year and ten months; and that the commitment was to be stayed until January 25, 1987, at which time it would commence and would expire on December 12, 1988, when S.G.W. would reach twenty-one years of age.[3] In functional effect, the juvenile court’s second order of commitment amounted to a consecutive term. [5] S.G.W. appealed to the court of appeals. Relying on its prior decision in People in the Interest of S.A.E., 724 P.2d 100 (Colo.App. 1986), which upheld a consecutive term of commitment as consistent with the purposes of the Children’s Code, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court. We thereafter granted S.G.W.’s petition for certiorari to consider whether the Children’s Code authorizes the consecutive commitment which the juvenile court ordered in this case.II.
[6] Before directly addressing the issue before us, we believe it will be helpful to set forth those basic precepts of statutory interpretation, along with the pertinent statutory provisions applicable to this case, which will guide our analysis.
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A.
[7] Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative purpose underlying a statutory enactment E.g., People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1987); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986). “To discern that intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself, giving the statutory terms their commonly accepted and understood meaning.”Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975. The General Assembly expressly declared that the Colorado Children’s Code was enacted to effectuate the following purposes: to secure for each child such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of society; to preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible, including improvement of the home environment; to remove a child from the custody of his parents only when his welfare and the safety or protection of the public would otherwise be endangered and to require the courts to proceed with all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best interests of the child; and to secure for any child removed from the custody of his parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in becoming a responsible and productive member of society. § 19-1-102(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
(1967); J.T. v. O’Rourke, 651 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1982); People in the Interest of C.B., 196 Colo. 362, 585 P.2d 281 (1978), our prior decisions have consistently emphasized that a delinquency proceeding is not a criminal prosecution. People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 444, 435 P.2d 763, 766 (1967); accord S.A.S. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 58, 60 (Colo. 1981); People in the Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 433, 586 P.2d 46, 47 (1978). Indeed, it is precisely “to protect the young from the stigma frequently associated with criminal proceedings” that a petition in delinquency is classified as civil in character. S.A.S., 623 P.2d at 60; see also People in the Interest of T.M., 742 P.2d 905, 907 (Colo. 1987); People in the Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. at 433, 586 P.2d at 47. [9] Although a delinquency proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, we must be mindful that the commitment of a juvenile to the department does implicate in a substantial way the liberty interests of the committed child. If the Children’s Code is patently ambiguous with respect to a juvenile court’s authority to impose a consecutive term of commitment on an adjudicated delinquent, we believe that we may appropriately resort to the rule of lenity in resolving that ambiguity. The rule of lenity requires that an ambiguity in a penal statute be construed in a manner that favors the person whose liberty interests are affected by the statute. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); People v. Chavez, 659 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Colo. 1983); see People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261, 1267-68 (Colo. 1983). In our view, a statutory scheme involving the length of commitment applicable to an adjudicated delinquent child is clearly penal in character for purposes of the rule of lenity. See In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224
(D.D.C. 1955) (insofar as statute relating to delinquent children purports to restrain liberty interest of child, it should be construed in favor of child); Logan v. United States, 483 A.2d 664 (D.C. 1984) (same); Phillips v. State, 20 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Crim.App. 1929) (same).
B.
[10] The statutory provisions central to this case are those provisions of the Children’s Code relating to a juvenile court’s authority to commit a “repeat juvenile offender” and a “mandatory sentence offender” to the
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department. As pertinent here, a “repeat juvenile offender” is defined as a previously adjudicated delinquent child, who is adjudicated a delinquent child for an offense which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, § 19-1-103(23.5), and a “mandatory sentence offender” includes a child who has twice been adjudicated a delinquent and is subsequently adjudicated a delinquent child, § 19-1-103(19.5)(a)(I) and (b)(I). Section 19-3-113.1(2)(a) authorizes the juvenile court to commit a “repeat juvenile offender” to the department; and section 19-3-113.1(2)(b) requires the juvenile court to place or commit a “mandatory sentence offender,” less than eighteen years of age on the date of disposition, “out of the home for not less than one year.” Pursuant to section 19-3-114(3)(b), a commitment to the department must be for a determinate period not in excess of a total of two years. With the exception of the commitment of an “aggravated juvenile offender,” which may be for a determinate period of five years, § 19-3-113.2(1),[4] all other commitments of adjudicated delinquents to the department including a commitment of a “repeat juvenile offender” and a “mandatory sentence offender,” cannot exceed a total of two years. Section 19-3-114(3)(c) permits an extension of a two-year commitment under the following circumstances:
[11] “The department of institutions may petition the committing court to extend the commitment for an additional period not to exceed two years. The petition shall set forth the reasons why it would be in the best interest of the child or the public to extend the commitment. Upon filing the petition, the court shall set a hearing to determine whether the petition should be granted or denied and shall notify all interested parties.”III.
[12] Turning now to the validity of the consecutive term of commitment imposed on S.G.W., we conclude that the Children’s Code does not authorize a consecutive term of commitment in the case of a “repeat juvenile offender” who, as here, is also a “mandatory sentence offender.” Several considerations lead us to this result.
A.
[13] We initially note that the Colorado Children’s Code is silent on the authority of the juvenile court to impose a consecutive term of commitment. Section 19-3-113.1(2)(a)
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authorizes the court to commit a “repeat juvenile offender” to the department, and section 19-3-113.1(2)(b) authorizes an “out of home” commitment of a “mandatory sentence offender” for not less than one year. The statutory scheme is such that any commitment to the department cannot exceed a term of two years. § 19-3-114(3)(b). While this two-year commitment may be extended by court order, such extension must be based on the petition of the department and an appropriate showing that the best interests of the child or the public justify the extension. Section 19-3-114(3)(c) clearly contemplates that the juvenile court, in passing on a petition for extension of commitment, will focus primarily on the rehabilitative interests of the committed juvenile, as manifested by his conduct during the initial term of commitment. The fact that the juvenile court is authorized under appropriate circumstances to extend the term of an initial commitment does not translate into statutory authorization for the juvenile court to impose a consecutive term of commitment in the first instance.
[14] Under the plain terms of the Children’s Code, therefore, any commitment of a “repeat juvenile offender” or a “mandatory sentence offender” to the department could only be for two years, with the possibility of an extension for an additional two years. See Rocha v. People, 713 P.2d 350, 353 (Colo. 1986). If the General Assembly intended to authorize a juvenile court to impose a consecutive term of commitment upon a “repeat juvenile offender” or a “mandatory sentence offender,” we must assume that it would have employed statutory terminology which clearly expressed that intent, as it has done under other circumstances when a consecutive sentence has been authorized. See § 16-11-309(1)(a), 8A C.R.S. (1986) (consecutive sentence expressly required for a person convicted of two separate crimes of violence arising out of same incident); § 18-1-408(3), 8B C.R.S. (1986) (court may, in its discretion, impose consecutive sentences when defendant is convicted of more than one offense arising out of same criminal episode and involving multiple victims); §18-8-209, 8B C.R.S. (1986) (consecutive sentence required for convictions relating to escape and various crimes committed while in custody). The failure of the General Assembly to incorporate into the Children’s Code statutory authorization for a consecutive term of commitment can only be construed as a deliberate legislative choice not to authorize such a sanction in the case of an adjudicated juvenile delinquent.[5] B.
[15] Construing the Children’s Code to authorize a consecutive term of commitment, particularly in light of the legislative silence on that matter, would be at odds with the beneficent purposes which the Code seeks to further. Since the enactment of the Colorado Children’s Code in 1967, our decisions have consistently emphasized that a delinquency proceeding is not a criminal prosecution directed towards the conviction and punishment of offenders but, rather, is a special statutory proceeding calculated to secure the best interests of the child in a manner consistent with the interests of society. The observations which this court made over twenty years ago in People ex rel. Terrell are no less appropriate today:
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`criminal’ proceeding and a `delinquency’ proceeding is `artless’ and but a play upon words, as in a given case the underlying misconduct could be the same. With this line of reasoning we do not agree. There is a very fundamental difference between a criminal proceeding and a delinquency proceeding, and in our view the clear legislative intent is that the handling of juvenile delinquents should be oriented towards rehabilitation and reformation, and not punishment as such, even though the actions of the child if committed by an adult would justify a criminal proceeding.”
[17] 164 Colo. at 444-45, 435 P.2d at 766; accord People in the Interest of T.M., 742 P.2d 905; S.A.S. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 58; People in the Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 586 P.2d 46. Except in those limited circumstances in which a child under the age of eighteen years of age may be prosecuted as an adult, see §§ 19-1-103(9) and 19-1-104(4), a child who is adjudicated a delinquent under the Colorado Children’s Code stands before the juvenile court not as a convicted criminal but as a child in need of reformation. The appropriateness of this orientation toward rehabilitation and reformation is highlighted in the Task Force Report on Juvenile Delinquency, President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 9 (1967) (quoted in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 546 n. 6 (1971)): [18] “[S]ocial protection itself demands constant search for alternatives to the crude and limited expedient of condemnation and punishment. . . . Rehabilitating offenders through individualized handling is one way of providing protection, and appropriately the primary way in dealing with children.”C.
[19] In upholding the validity of the consecutive commitment in this case, the court of appeals relied on its prior decision in People In the Interest of S.A.E., 724 P.2d 100. We view that reliance as misplaced, and we expressly overrule S.A.E.
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see Bell, 349 U.S. at 83; Chavez, 659 P.2d at 1384.
[23] We therefore hold that, in the absence of an express authorization in the Children’s Code for consecutive terms of commitment, a juvenile court lacks authority to impose such a sanction on a “repeat juvenile offender” who is also a “mandatory sentence offender.”[6] We accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court with directions to return the case to the juvenile court for resentencing of S.G.W. in a manner consistent with the views expressed herein.Page 93