No. 93SA294Supreme Court of Colorado.
Decided December 6, 1993
Original Proceeding in Discipline
ATTORNEY DISBARRED
Linda Donnelly, Disciplinary Counsel, Kenneth B. Pennywell, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Complainant
Philip E. Lowery, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Attorney-Respondent
EN BANC
PER CURIAM
[1] JUSTICE KIRSHBAUM does not participate. [2] The respondent[1] in this disciplinary proceeding and the assistant disciplinary counsel entered into a stipulation, agreement, and conditional admission of misconduct. See C.R.C.P. 241.18. The assistant disciplinary counsel recommended, and the respondent consented to, the imposition of disbarment as a disciplinary sanction for the respondent’s misconduct which involved the conversion of client funds. An inquiry panel of the Supreme Court Grievance Committee approved the stipulation. We accept the stipulation and agreement, and order that the respondent be disbarred and be assessed costs.I
[3] The stipulation and agreement recites the following facts:
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[12] i. Respondent was appointed conservator for the estate of married couple C [sic] in March, 1992. [13] j. Respondent took approximately $73,000.00 of couple C’s money without their knowledge or consent and used it to meet his firm’s operating expenses. [14] k. A discrepancy in the account was discovered and Respondent resigned as conservator on October 29, 1992. [15] l. Prior to providing the successor conservator with the estate accounts, Respondent took $55,000.00 from client D’s [sic] account to replenish the above described estate account and eliminate the discrepancy. [16] m. These funds from client D’s account were restored together with interest thereon and re-delivered to client D by Respondent. [17] n. Complainant has been provided proof that in all four instances, full restitution, plus interest, has been made by Respondent. II
[18] The respondent’s conversion of client funds violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). When a lawyer knowingly converts client funds, disbarment is `virtually automatic,’ at least in the absence of significant factors in mitigation. People v. Kearns, 843 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. 1992). See, e.g., People v. Robnett, No, 92SA488, slip op. at 14 (Colo. Oct. 4, 1993) (attorney disbarred for conversion of client funds and deception of client); People v. Finesilver, 826 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Colo. 1992) (conversion of trust funds and forging of court document warrants disbarment); People v. Whitcomb, 819 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1991) (conversion of trust funds warrants disbarment); People v. Kramer, 819 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991) (lawyer disbarred for obtaining loans by means of false and fictitious “investment plans”); People v. Mulligan, 817 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1991) (attorney disbarred for conversion of client funds); People v. Calt, 817 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1991) (assisting client in fraudulent scheme to obtain funds from the client’s employer warrants disbarment of the lawyer); People v. Grossenbach, 814 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1991) (conversion of client funds and knowing deception of clients warrants disbarment).
III
[20] It is hereby ordered that Richard E. Young be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the list of attorneys authorized to practice before this court, effective immediately upon the issuance of this opinion. It is further ordered that Young pay the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $45.06 to the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, 600 Seventeenth Street, Suite 920-S, Dominion Plaza, Denver, Colorado 80202.
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