No. 89SA262 No. 89SA344Supreme Court of Colorado.
Decided October 16, 1989.
Original Proceeding in Discipline
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George S. Meyer, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
EN BANC
JUSTICE MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
[1] In this proceeding, we consolidated two attorney grievance cases involving the respondent, George Joseph McMahill. In each case, the Supreme Court Grievance Committee has recommended that we disbar McMahill. We placed McMahill on immediate suspension by an order dated March 9, 1989, and we now accept the committee’s recommendations that he be disbarred. I.
[2] McMahill was admitted to practice law in Colorado in 1954 and is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this court and its Grievance Committee. McMahill defaulted in both grievance proceedings and the following facts are deemed proven by clear and convincing evidence.
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judgment for their protection. He actively deceived his clients and neither made the required full disclosure nor obtained the consent of his clients.
[7] The second finding of misconduct involved McMahill’s neglect of a personal injury action involving James Arnold, who fell and broke his hip in 1986. Arnold asked McMahill to represent him in a claim of negligence against the property owner but the respondent failed to take any action. The committee found that McMahill neglected a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) by failing to pursue Arnold’s claim. [8] McMahill failed to cooperate with the grievance committee in its investigation of the Arnolds’ complaint in violation of C.R.C.P. 241.6(7) (failure to respond to committee request without good cause). Finally, the committee concluded that the respondent’s conduct in the three instances violated DR 1-102(A)(1) (violation of a disciplinary rule) and C.R.C.P. 241.6 (misconduct constituting grounds for discipline). [9] McMahill’s misconduct in the second case is similar to that described in the first case. J. B. Trauscht was a long term client who had been represented by McMahill in various matters over a twenty-five year period. In early 1986, McMahill persuaded Trauscht to lend him $10,000 for the Thomas Kearney estate. In return, McMahill gave Trauscht a promissory note for $10,000 signed by “Estate of Thomas Kearney — Michael Kearney, personal representative.” The loan was never repaid and, upon investigation, Trauscht learned that there was no Thomas Kearney estate. [10] The committee concluded in this case that McMahill violated DR 1-102(A)(1) (violation of a disciplinary rule), DR 1-102(A)(4) (engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and DR 5-104(A) (requiring lawyer to make disclosures and obtain client consent before entering into business transactions where each has differing interests). Because McMahill failed to cooperate with its investigation and failed to notify the clerk of this court of his current address, the committee found that he violated C.R.C.P. 241.6(7) and C.R.C.P. 227(A)(2). II.
[11] The respondent has filed no objection to the committee’s two recommendations of disbarment and we agree that disbarment is appropriate. Disbarment is the recommended sanction under three relevant standards of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986). Standard 4.11 states that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” Standard 4.31(a) provides for disbarment when a lawyer, without the informed consent of his clients, “engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer’s interests are adverse to the client’s with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client.” Standard 4.61 states that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a client.” In addition to these standards recommending disbarment, several aggravating factors are present under Standard 9.22 because McMahill had a dishonest or selfish motive, his victims were vulnerable, and a pattern of misconduct was involved. He also had over thirty years of experience practicing law and made no attempt to make restitution. No mitigating factor is present.
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from the practice of law and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice in this state. It is further ordered that the respondent pay restitution in the amount of $50,000 to J. Jean Arnold and James H. Arnold and in the amount of $10,000 to J. B. Trauscht. Such restitution awards are to bear interest from the date of this order pursuant to section 5-12-106(2), 2 C.R.S. (1988 Cum. Supp.). It is further ordered that the respondent pay combined costs for the two cases in the amount of $559.91 within thirty days of the date of this order to the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, Suite 500-S, 600 17th Street, Denver, Colorado 80202-5435.