(480 P.2d 600)
No. 70-487Colorado Court of Appeals.
Decided January 26, 1971.
In action under auspices of Civil Rights Commission alleging discrimination in rental of housing, complainant filed bond. In action brought by defendants, the order of Civil Rights Commission ordering defendants to rent the premises to claimant was set aside, and subsequently, bond was ordered forfeited to defendants. Civil Rights Commission appealed.
Reversed
1. CIVIL RIGHTS — Statute — Requiring Bond — Claimant — Purpose — Protect Landlords — Unmeritorious Claims — Not Protect — Procedural Errors — Civil Rights Commission. The statutory requirement that the person claiming to be aggrieved by discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, rather than the Civil Rights Commission, must furnish security has as its purpose to protect landlords from the filing of unmeritorious claims by persons without probable cause, but it is not designed to protect them from procedural errors of the Commission over which the complainant has no control.
2. Discrimination Finding — Not Reversed — Procedural Errors — Civil Rights Commission — Injunction — Not “Wrongful” — Require Forfeiture — Bond of Claimant. Where the finding of the Civil Rights Commission that there was discrimination in the rental of housing was, at no time, reversed by trial court and where there is nothing in the record showing any wrongful act by complainant, the mere procedural errors committed by the Commission did not render the injunction issued on the basis of the complaint “wrongful” within the meaning of the statute so as to require forfeiture of bond posted by complainant.
Appeal from the District Court of Jefferson County, Honorable Daniel J. Shannon, Judge.
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Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, John P. Moore, Deputy, James E. Dotson, Assistant, for plaintiff-appellant.
No appearance for appellees.
Division I.
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN.
This appeal is from a district court order awarding damages of $280 to the defendants for having been wrongfully enjoined from renting an apartment after a complaint had been made under the Fair Housing Act, and ordering the forfeiture of a bond given to secure payment of such damages. The defendants make no appearance on appeal.
The facts are as follows. On March 11, 1969, one Gloria Gore, hereafter referred to as the complainant, filed a complaint with the Civil Rights Commission pursuant to 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 69-7-6(1)(a), alleging discrimination in the rental of housing by defendants because of the complainant’s race, in violation of 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 69-7-5(1)(b).
The Commission sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction under 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 69-7-6(6), prohibiting the rental of the apartment in question until a hearing could be held upon the allegation of discrimination. The District Court granted the temporary restraining order on March 27, 1969, and after a hearing, on April 7, 1969, issued a preliminary injunction. The complainant was ordered to and did
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file a bond in the amount of $280 pursuant to 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 69-7-6(6)(b) to secure the payment of such costs and damages as might be incurred by the defendants in the event they were later found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
In May 1969, the Commission held a hearing on the allegations of discrimination and found that an unfair housing practice had occurred in that defendants had refused to rent to the complainant because of her race. The Commission then ordered the defendants to rent the premises in question to the complainant.
In July 1969, defendants brought an action, (No. 33395) pursuant to C.R.S. 1963, 69-7-7, to review the action of the Commission. This was a separate action from the one in which the injunction was granted. After a hearing the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it held that the evidence before the Commission was conflicting on the issue of discrimination and it therefore refused to disturb the Commission’s findings of fact. However, the court set aside the order of the Commission solely on the ground that the failure of the Commission to record the decisions of its officials and of the Commission itself, as the case progressed, had denied defendants their full rights under the statute. No appeal was taken from that decision.
Thereafter, defendants filed a motion in the original action (in which the injunction had been granted) “for payment of security” under which they sought forfeiture of the $280 bond posted by the complainant. After a hearing the court entered findings of fact and ordered the funds held under
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the bond remitted to defendants to compensate for damages suffered by defendants as a result of the injunction.
The findings of fact of the trial court in regard to this motion are not supported by the record. The court found that, “The court in Case No. 33395 did determine that the procedural requirements of the applicable statute were not complied with to the deprivation of the defendants’ rights and that the proceedings against the defendants were wrongful.” (Emphasis supplied.) The above emphasized words were not included in the determination of Case No. 33395, i.e., the case brought by the defendants. The validity of the injunction was not an issue in that suit and was never questioned by defendants until they filed their motion for forfeiture of the bond.
The record discloses that the statutory requirements for issuance of the injunction were fully complied with. The statute, 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 69-7-6(6) provides that, if the Commission determines that probable cause exists for crediting the allegations of the complaint, it may seek an injunction of the type obtained here and that such an injunction may be issued after notice and hearing. The statute further requires that the person claiming to be aggrieved shall give security, “for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”
The order for the preliminary injunction states that proper notice had been given, that there was a hearing, and that a determination of probable cause had been made by the Commission. Security was ordered and provided by the complainant. The statutory requirements for the issuance of the
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injunction were thus complied with. This order was not appealed from.
Also the finding of the Commission that there was discrimination was not reversed by the court in either action. The only determination upon which defendants could rely to recover damages was the ruling in Case No. 33395 and that ruling was confined to procedural errors by and before the Commission. There is nothing in the record showing any wrongful act by the complainant.
[1] The statutory requirement that the person claiming to be aggrieved — not the Commission — should furnish the security is to protect landlords from the filing of unmeritorious claims by persons without probable cause. It is not designed to protect them from procedural errors of the Commission over which the complainant has no control. [2] The asserted errors of the Commission did not render the injunction which was issued on the basis of the validity of the complaint “wrongful” within the meaning of the statute.We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with directions that the security be released to the complainant.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE ENOCH concur.
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