No. 79CA0455Colorado Court of Appeals.
Decided March 12, 1981. Rehearing denied April 9, 1981. Certiorari denied June 15, 1981.
Appeal from the District Court of Mesa County, Honorable William M. Ela, Judge.
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J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Attorney General, Mary J. Mullarkey, Special Assistant Attorney General, William Morris, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Gregory Walta, Colorado State Public Defender, Cynthia C. Cederberg, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Division III.
Opinion by JUDGE TURSI.
[1] Defendant, Timothy Gene Evans, appeals his conviction by a jury of first degree sexual assault in violation of § 18-3-402, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). We reverse. [2] On May 18, 1978, the complaining witness reported that she had been sexually assaulted by a man who had given her a ride home from work. On the basis of information she supplied to the police, defendant was arrested the following day. [3] At a pretrial suppression hearing, defendant testified that, at the time he was arrested, he was placed in the back seat of an unmarked patrol car and interrogated. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, but the trial court found that the police questioning had continued after he had asked for an attorney. The court, therefore, suppressed defendant’s post-arrest statements from use in the People’s case-in-chief, ruling that they were obtained in violation of the Miranda decision. [4] The court also found that defendant’s statements were otherwise voluntary, the only basis for suppression being the failure to obtain an effective waiver of defendant’s right to counsel. Further, it ruled that “should the defendant take the witness stand and make conflicting statements, the statements made to the Deputy Sheriff will be admissible for impeachment purposes and, whatever substantive proof of the offense consequentially follows.” On the day of trial, prior to the calling of the jury, the People and defendant requested anPage 96
in limine clarification of the court’s suppression order. The court stated: “[A]ny statement that was made can be used for impeachment and, as I believe the statute says, for substantive purposes also.”
[5] I.
[6] Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the post-arrest statements obtained from him in violation of Miranda could be introduced in the State’s rebuttal case as substantive evidence of guilt as well as for impeachment purposes. He further contends that this erroneous ruling impermissibly burdened his right to testify in his own defense. We agree.
(1971) and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570
(1975), make it clear that statements obtained from a defendant in violation of his rights under Miranda, even though voluntary, may not be introduced as substantive evidence of guilt. Such statements, if otherwise admissible, may be considered by the jury only for impeachment purposes Harris v. New York, supra; Oregon v. Hass, supra. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) holds that illegally obtained evidence may be proper for impeachment “but is inadmissible in the government’s direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt.” (emphasis supplied) [10] The inconsistent statement of witness statute, § 16-10-201, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), does not permit a contrary result. When a defendant takes the stand in his own defense, he becomes a witness within the meaning of this section. See § 13-90-101, C.R.S. 1973; cf. People v. Layton, 200 Colo. 59, 612 P.2d 83 (1980). By its terms, § 16-10-201
provides that a prior inconsistent statement may be shown only by “otherwise competent evidence.” Prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda are competent only to the extent that they are introduced for purposes of impeachment; they are not admissible as substantive evidence of guilt. See People v. Velarde, 196 Colo. 254, 586 P.2d 6 (1978). Any other reading of this statute would violate a defendant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See People v. District Court, 195 Colo. 570, 580 P.2d 388 (1978). [11] The real issue in this case, however, is whether the trial court’s erroneous ruling impermissibly burdened defendant’s right to testify in his own defense. We conclude that it did. [12] A defendant in a state criminal trial has a right to testify in his own behalf. People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d 1362 (Colo. 1981); People v. Salazar, supra. Before an error affecting this constitutional right can be deemed harmless, an appellate court must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Germany v. People, 198 Colo. 337, 599 P.2d 904 (1979). [13] Applying this standard to the instant case, we cannot say that the burden placed on defendant’s right to testify was constitutionally harmless. Defendant was forced to forego his right to testify in order to
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prevent the prosecution from introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence against him as substantive proof of guilt. Had the jury had the benefit of defendant’s testimony pertaining to his affirmative defense of consent, it may well have rendered a different verdict, particularly in view of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have disbelieved defendant’s testimony and entered a verdict of guilty.
II.
[14] Defendant also contends that the trial court’s limitation of his cross-examination of the complaining witness abridged his right to confront his accusers. Because defendant is likely to pursue a similar line of cross-examination in his new trial, we will address his contention here.