W.C. No. 4-832-892.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
October 12, 2011.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Walsh (ALJ) dated April 18, 2011, that denied his claim for benefits. We affirm.
The claimant sought to establish that he sustained compensable injuries as a result of receiving an electrical shock while cleaning a machine. The ALJ found that the claimant had received an electrical shock by making contact with exposed wiring while cleaning a machine used to cut keys. The ALJ recited the claimant’s testimony and recorded statements outlining his alleged symptoms and injuries, but did not find the claimant’s testimony to be credible. Instead, the ALJ credited the opinions of several physicians and determined that the claimant’s alleged symptoms and injuries did not follow from being shocked. The ALJ therefore denied and dismissed the claim.
The claimant asserts that the ALJ made factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence See § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (Panel may only set aside order where findings are not sufficient to permit appellate review, where conflicts in the evidence are not resolved, where findings are not supported by substantial evidence, where findings do not support the order, or where the order is not supported by applicable law) see also Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411, 415 (Colo. App. 1995) (Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence rational fact finder would accept as adequate to support a conclusion without regard to existence of conflicting evidence).
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In particular, the claimant argues that the ALJ found Dr. Wilson and Dr. Healy to state opinions that are not supported by the record. The ALJ found that “Dr. Wilson questions whether the Claimant’s complaints of loss of vision are real, and goes further to question whether any of the Claimant’s complaints are real or can be linked to the electrical shock episode.” Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Order) at 4, ¶ 12. Dr. Wilson testified as an expert in neuro-ophthalmology and provided opinions regarding the claimant’s alleged loss of vision. Exhibit H at 1, 5; Tr. at 93-94, 98. He indicated in his testimony that any defect in the claimant’s eye was not organic or real. Tr. at 98-99, 111.
During the course of his examination of the claimant and his condition Dr. Wilson considered the claimant’s other alleged medical issues in the context of whether the claimant had actual indications of medical problems. For instance, he noticed that the claimant’s arms were not atrophied even though there were some claims that the claimant had atrophy, which made Dr. Wilson wonder if he was dealing with non-organic problems or “not a real problem.” Tr. at 101. In addition, there were reports of balance problems although the claimant denied dizziness, and such inconsistencies caused Dr. Wilson to question whether the claimant’s alleged vision loss was due to non-organic causes. Tr .at 102-03. Dr. Wilson’s concerns about such inconsistencies are also reflected in his written report. Exhibit H.
It is not entirely clear from the ALJ’s findings recited above whether the ALJ is addressing only Dr. Wilson’s consideration of the claimant’s vision or if the ALJ is referring to the claimant’s complaints about other alleged medical conditions. Nonetheless, we must uphold the ALJ’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. This standard of review requires us to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and the plausible inferences he drew from the record. Metro Moving and Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411, supra. Given Dr. Wilson’s discussion of whether several of the claimant’s alleged conditions are non-organic or inconsistent, the ALJ could reasonably infer from Dr. Wilson’s report and testimony that he questioned whether the claimant’s several complaints were organic or real.
Moreover, concerning the claimant’s alleged medical conditions other than his vision, the ALJ relied on the reports of other physicians, such as Dr. Oliveira. Order at 3, ¶ 10 and at 5, ¶ 5. Dr. Oliveira found inconsistencies in the claimant’s complaints and suggested a “clinical picture . . . of the nonorganic type, very much in keeping with malingering.” Exhibit G at 3.
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The claimant further argues that the ALJ misconstrued Dr. Healy’s opinions when he found Dr. Healy testified that “normally with this type of episode, one would see some indication of burn or marking on the body from the electric shock.” Order at 4, ¶ 13. Dr. Healy testified as an expert in neurology, pain management, and occupational medicine. Tr. at 58-59. Dr. Healy noted that every ophthalmologist who had examined the claimant failed to find anything that could be tied to an electrical shock: “All of them do not find any objective or any hard neurological findings. There’s no abnormalities that they’re able to state are related to this electrical shock.” Tr. at 63. Dr. Healy opined that the mechanism of the claimant’s injury was the claimant suffering “essentially a whiplash injury from a shock.” Tr. at 64.
Concerning the matter of burns from a shock, respondents’ counsel asked Dr. Healy if there was any significance to the fact there was no physical trauma, such as burned skin. Tr. at 83. Dr. Healy responded “Yes. I — usually you might expect that with a severe electrical injury or burn.” He then added “But I’ve seen cases where that was not the case.” Tr. at 84. He was later asked about seeing cases where there are no burns in severe electrocution and Dr. Healy answered “Well, not in severe electrocutions.” Tr. at 90. Dr. Healy indicated that the claimant said he was sent back six feet from the shock. Tr. at 84. Under the circumstances, the ALJ made a permissible inference that Dr. Healy testified that normally there would be an indication of burns or markings on the body from the electric shock. See Kroupa v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 53 P.3d 1192, 1197 (Colo. App. 2002) (the ALJ resolves conflicts in the evidence, makes credibility determinations, determines the weight to be accorded to expert testimony, and draws plausible inferences from the evidence).
In order to prove a compensable injury the claimant must bear the burden to establish that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S.; Madden v. Mountain West Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1999). The parties presented expert medical testimony and the weight and credibility to be assigned to such testimony is a matter within the discretion of the ALJ. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 55 P.3d 186 (Colo. App. 2002). Furthermore, the potential for the ALJ to have reached contrary conclusions is immaterial on review Mountain Meadows Nursing Center v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 990 P.2d 1090 (Colo. App. 1999). The ALJ considered the findings of several physicians who were not able to objectively relate the claimant’s complaints to the mechanism of his alleged injuries. The ALJ was not persuaded that the claimant sustained a compensable injury due to being electrically shocked while cleaning a machine. The claimant’s assertions on appeal do not provide a basis for disturbing the ALJ’s order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated April 18, 2011, is affirmed.
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INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ John D. Baird
______________________________ Brandee DeFalco-Galvin
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QUINTIN WILLIAMS, 3562 COLORADO SPRINGS, CO, (Claimant).
MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL, INC., Attn: SCOTT TUCKER, DENVER, CO, (Employer).
SEDGWICK CMS, Attn: ANITA MONTOYA, C/O: ESIS/PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO, TAMPA, FL, (Insurer).
MCDIVITT LAW FIRM, P.C., Attn: MATTHEW C. GIZZI, ESQ., COLORADO SPRINGS, CO, (For Claimant).
CONDIT CSAJAGHY, LLC, Attn: CHRISTOPHER CONDIT, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).
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