W.C. No. 4-844-627.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
November 22, 2011.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Broniak dated June 23, 2011, that denied and dismissed his claim. We affirm.
The claimant sought a determination that he sustained a compensable injury to his left foot and that he was entitled to medical benefits. According to the ALJ’s findings, the claimant has diabetes and he failed to adequately control it. On November 4, 2010, the claimant dropped a large, plywood sheet on his left foot and toe. The claimant had minimal pain and bruising and continued to work, which required him to walk, stand, climb, lift, and carry. Some medical records showed the claimant had minimal or no symptoms until around December 18, 2010. During the weekend of December 17 to 19, 2010, the claimant drove to Idaho and back, after which he reported swelling and soreness in his left foot. He still performed his work duties, but developed a large blister or lesion on the bottom of his left foot. The claimant treated the blister himself and was no longer able to work due to pain and swelling in his foot.
Dr. Quach, a podiatrist, opined that the claimant had a fractured left big toe caused by blunt trauma that “likely seeded the secondary deep tissue infection that has led to severe soft tissue abscess that needed surgical amputation and hospitalization.” Dr. Paz, on the other hand, opined that infection was not present in the claimant’s left foot until he tried to care for a lesion on his own. Dr. Paz further opined that it was inconsistent for the claimant to be able to perform standing, walking, and climbing activities with a fracture. Furthermore, Dr. Paz stated that based on a reasonable medical probability, the claimant’s left foot infection and subsequent amputation of his left big toe were not a direct result of the work-related trauma to the toe. Moreover, it was not
Page 2
medically probable that a fracture of the claimant’s big toe “is clinically consistent with the alleged work exposure on November 4, 2010.” The ALJ credited Dr. Paz’s opinions and found the claimant failed to establish that the impact of the plywood sheet on the claimant’s foot contributed to the need for medical treatment. The ALJ also rejected the claimant’s contention that he developed a cut on the bottom of his toe from dropping plywood on the top of his foot. Dr. Paz had stated it was medically improbable that the bottom of the claimant’s big toe would rupture secondary to trauma on top of his big toe. Dr. Paz’s opinions as found by the ALJ are fully supported by his report. Exhibit G. The ALJ concluded that the claimant “failed to establish that it is more probably true than not that the abscesses, fracture and infections on his left foot were caused by the work-related event on November 4, 2010.” The ALJ therefore denied and dismissed the claim.
Pursuant to § 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S., a disability is compensable if it is shown that it was “proximately caused by an injury . . . arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employment.”See also § 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. “For an injury to occur `in the course of’ employment, the claimant must demonstrate that the injury occurred within the time and place limits of [his] employment and during an activity that had some connection with [his] work-related functions.” Madden v. Mountain W. Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861, 863 (Colo. 1999). To establish that an injury arose out of an employee’s employment, “the claimant must show a causal connection between the employment and injury such that the injury has its origins in the employee’s work-related functions and is sufficiently related to those functions to be considered part of the employment contract.” Id. We agree with the claimant that the ALJ was persuaded he had an accident during the course of his employment. However, the ALJ was not persuaded that the claimant’s injuries arose out of his employment. The ALJ was careful to state that the claimant’s medical difficulties were not due to his “work-related event” of dropping a plywood sheet on his foot.
The claimant refers to special hazards and asserts that his injury was not unexplained. The ALJ did not refer to special hazards, but it is apparent from her order that she was persuaded that the claimant’s medical conditions were related to his underlying diabetes and the claimant’s self-treatment, and not to his accident at work. The ALJ credited Dr. Paz’s opinion that if the plywood had shattered the claimant’s big toe, he would not have been able to perform his job duties for almost two months as he did without limitation or restriction. The ALJ was further persuaded by Dr. Paz’s opinion that the infection in the claimant’s foot was not present until after the claimant attempted to care for the lesion on his foot by himself. The ALJ also noted that the claimant had previously developed lesions and foot infections due to non-work activities. Thus, the ALJ was not persuaded that dropping the plywood sheet on the claimant’s foot caused or combined with his diabetes to result in his need for medical treatment. The
Page 3
ALJ determined that the claimant’s medical issues did not arise from dropping a plywood sheet on his foot at work.
In reaching her conclusions, the ALJ credited the opinions of Dr. Paz over those of Dr. Quach. We have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the credibility of the various medical experts or the resolution of conflicting expert testimony. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 55 P.3d 186 (Colo. App. 2002); Gelco Courier v. Industrial Commission, 702 P.2d 295 (Colo. App. 1985).
In addition, we must uphold the ALJ’s determinations if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. see Lori’s Family Dining, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 907 P.2d 715 (Colo. App. 1995). This standard of review requires us to defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra. The ALJ’s findings are supported by the record and we find no basis for disturbing the ALJ’s determination that the claimant failed to establish that he sustained a compensable injury.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated June 23, 2011 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
_______________________ John D. Baird
_______________________ Kris Sanko
Page 4
MIGUEL RINCON, WESTMINSTER, CO, (Claimant).
REEVES SPECIALTY SERVICES, INC., Attn: DEBRA REEVES, AURORA, CO, (Employer).
PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Attn: HARVEY D. FLEWELLING, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (Insurer).
LAW OFFICE OF VINCENT M. BALKENBUSH, L.L.C., Attn: VINCENT M. BALKENBUSH, ESQ., ENGLEWOOD, CO, (For Claimant).
RITSEMA LYON., Attn: ROBERT V. WREN, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).
Page 1