IN RE ZIMMERMAN, W.C. No. 4-018-264 (8/23/95)


IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF ORVILLE ZIMMERMAN, Claimant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, Employer, and LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE, Insurer, Respondents.

W.C. No. 4-018-264Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
August 23, 1995

FINAL ORDER

The claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ) which denied his request for a change in the authorized treating physician. We affirm.

The claimant sustained an injury to his low back and left hip in April 1991. The claimant was initially treated by Dr. Ladwig who prescribed physical therapy and an MRI. However, by August 1991, the claimant’s care had been assumed by Dr. Jones. Dr. Jones prescribed a long course of conservative treatment which included physical therapy.

In April 1992, the claimant was examined by Dr. Odom. Dr. Odom obtained a discogram which revealed degenerative changes in the lumbosacral spine.

In August and September 1994, the claimant was examined by Dr. Ryan. This examination was prompted because of a disagreement between Dr. Odom and Dr. Jones concerning whether the claimant should return to his pre-injury employment as a delivery driver. Dr. Ryan opined that the claimant could return to work provided he did not need additional maintenance treatment, physical therapy, or chiropractic care. Dr. Ryan also stated that if the claimant needed additional care, it was indicative of a worsening of condition which would preclude further work. (Ryan report, September 20, 1994). Dr. Odom believed the claimant could return to work.

On September 22, 1994, Dr. Jones opined that the claimant was at maximum medical improvement. Dr. Jones did not believe the claimant should return to work at his pre-injury employment, and declined to provide further treatment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, Dr. Jones referred the claimant back to Dr. Ladwig in the event he needed additional treatment. Dr. Jones also recommended four specialists who could treat the claimant.

Meanwhile, Dr. Odom again examined the claimant in August 1994. He recommended that the claimant return to work at his pre-injury employment. He also prescribed chiropractic treatments to relieve the claimant’s “occasional” back spasms.

Under these circumstances, the ALJ denied the claimant’s request to authorize Dr. Odom as the treating physician. The ALJ stated that he was “entirely persuaded” by the opinions of Dr. Ryan and Dr. Jones that the claimant should not receive additional medical treatment other than an exercise routine. The ALJ explicitly resolved the conflict between Dr. Odom and the other physicians, and found that the claimant should not receive chiropractic treatment. The ALJ also concluded that there was no reason that Dr. Ladwig could not provide additional treatment should this be necessary.

On review, the claimant contends that the ALJ erred, as a matter of fact and law, in denying the request for a change of physician to Dr. Odom. The claimant asserts that there is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant does not need further treatment. The claimant also argues that the ALJ gave insufficient weight to the evidence that Dr. Ladwig lacks the ability to treat the claimant’s injuries. We reject these arguments.

Under § 8-43-404(5)(a), C.R.S. (1994 Cum. Supp.), the ALJ has the authority to change the authorized treating physician upon a “proper showing.” We have previously held that this statute gives the ALJ substantial discretion in determining whether there should be a change of physician. Mann v. City of Colorado Springs, W.C. No. 4-148-995, 4-169-965, June 21, 1995; Carson v. Wal Mart, W.C. No. 3-964-079, April 12, 1993.

Because the ALJ has broad authority under the statute, we may not interfere with his order unless there was an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion exists only if the order is beyond the bounds of reason, as where it is contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence Coates, Reid Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1993). In determining whether there is substantial evidence, we must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, his credibility determinations, and the plausible inferences which he drew from the evidence. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1994 Cum. Supp.); Metro Moving and Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo.App. 1995).

The claimant’s arguments notwithstanding, there was no abuse of discretion here. The record contains conflicting medical evidence concerning whether or not the claimant was in need of additional medical treatment of the type recommended by Dr. Odom. The ALJ resolved this conflict against the claimant, and we are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for his concerning the weight of the expert medical opinions Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990).

Further, this is not a case in which the respondents refused to refer the claimant to an authorized medical provider after Dr. Jones declined to provide further treatment. To the contrary, Dr. Jones referred the claimant to Dr. Ladwig, and the respondents have indicated their willingness to pay for Dr. Ladwig’s treatment, as well treatment by one of the specialists recommended by Dr. Jones.

It is true that the evidence might have permitted contrary findings and conclusions. However, this fact is immaterial on review and provides no basis for finding an abuse of discretion. May D F v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 752 P.2d 589 (Colo.App. 1988).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order, dated April 27, 1995, is affirmed.

INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL

___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Bill Whitacre

NOTICE

This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver,Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, withservice of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Officeand all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Orderwas mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).

Copies of this decision were mailed August 23, 1995 to the following parties:

Orville Zimmerman, 9797 Jellison St., Westminster, CO 80021

United Parcel Service, Attn: Ethel Oatman, 5020 Ivy St., Commerce City, CO 80022

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance, Attn: Stephen Pingree, 13111 E. Briarwood Ave., #100, Englewood, CO 80112

Curtis R. Spencer, Jr., Esq., 1999 Broadway, #2440, Denver, CO 80202

(For the Claimant)

John M. Connell, Esq., 1290 Broadway, #705, Denver, CO 80203

(For the Respondents)

By: ____________________