W.C. No. 4-213-182Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
December 29, 1995
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Rumler (ALJ) which denied and dismissed his claim for additional medical benefits. We affirm.
The claimant suffered an admitted back injury on October 16, 1986. Crediting the testimony of Dr. Burgess, the ALJ found that the claimant’s need for medical treatment commencing May 25, 1994 is unrelated to the 1986 injury. Consequently, the ALJ denied and dismissed the request for additional medical benefits.
On review, the claimant contends that the ALJ erred as a matter of law and fact in finding that the 1986 industrial injury was a “muscle sprain.” Rather, the claimant asserts that the 1986 injury was a “much more severe injury,” and caused his need for further medical treatment. In support, the claimant cites the 1987 physical therapy discharge summary report from St. Luke’s Hospital which states that the claimant has a “posteriorly rotated immobile left ilium and mild left scapular winging.” The claimant also asserts that his testimony of continuing back pain since the 1986 industrial injury is unrefuted. Further, the claimant contests the ALJ’s determination to credit the opinions of Dr. Burgess. We reject the claimant’s argument.
The determination of the cause of the claimant’s ongoing medical condition and need for treatment is a question of fact. Therefore, we are bound by the ALJ’s determinations which are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.) F.R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo.App. 1985). In determining whether the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence and her assessment of the sufficiency and probative value of the evidence Monfort Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1993). We are also bound by the ALJ’s credibility determinations unless the testimony credited by the ALJ is rebutted by such hard, certain evidence to the contrary that it would be error as a matter of law to believe that testimony. Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1986). This is not the case here.
The ALJ found, and the record reveals that Dr. Edwards originally diagnosed the claimant’s 1986 injury as a “muscle sprain.” The medical records also indicate that x-rays taken of the claimant’s lumbar spine in November 1986 were normal, that the claimant was conservatively treated for the injury until 1987, and thereafter, did not seek additional treatment until 1994. (Tr. pp. 9, 18). Dr. Burgess testified that it was unlikely the claimant’s 1994 back pain was related to the 1986 injury due to the lack of significant findings in 1986 and the nature of the claimant’s recovery from the 1986 injury. (Tr. pp. 24, 34). Further, Dr. Burgess stated that a “posteriorly rotated and immobile left ilium” is a “pelvic tilt,” which may have a variety of causes. However, Dr. Burgess did not believe the 1986 industrial accident was the cause of the claimant’s pelvic tilt due to the normal lumbar spine x-rays taken in November 1986. (Tr. p. 30).
This is substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s findings that the 1986 injury was a “muscle sprain” and that the claimant’s need for additional medical treatment is unrelated to that injury. Although there was conflicting evidence, it does not rise to the standard which would permit us to disturb the ALJ’s credibility determinations. See Halliburton Services v. Miller, supra. In this respect, we note also that the ALJ was not required to credit the claimant’s testimony, even if unrefuted. Levy v. Everson Plumbing Co., Inc., 171 Colo. 468, 468 P.2d 34 (1970); El Paso County Department of Social Services v. Donn, 865 P.2d 877 (Colo.App. 1993) (ALJ free to credit all, part or none of a witness’ testimony). Consequently, it is immaterial that the record contains evidence, which if credited, might support a contrary result. F.R. Orr Construction v. Rinta supra.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated April 6, 1995, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
____________________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO80203, by filing a petition for review with the court, with service of acopy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and allother parties, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order ismailed, pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed December 29, 1995 to the following parties:
Howard Younger, 6997 Weld County Rd. 49, Hudson, CO 80642
Public Service Company of Colorado, Attn: K. Costin, P. O. Box 840, #700, Denver, CO 80201-0840
Shelley P. Dodge, 1763 Franklin St., Denver, CO 80218
(For Claimant)
Michael A. Perales, Esq., 999 18th St., #3100, Denver, CO 80202
(For Respondent)
BY: _______________________