W.C. No. 4-568-016Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
May 4, 2004
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mattoon (ALJ) which determined the claimant suffered a compensable occupational disease and awarded temporary disability benefits. We affirm.
The claimant alleged an occupational disease affecting her left hand, which was diagnosed as de Quervain’s tenosynovitis. The respondents denied liability and argued the injury was caused by the claimant’s pre-existing condition from a 1998 motor vehicle accident. On conflicting evidence the ALJ found the claimant sustained her burden to prove the de Quervain’s tenosynovitis was caused by the repetitive activities required of her employment as a hot food prep cook for the respondent-employer.
On review the respondents contend the ALJ failed to identify the specific repetitive activities which caused the occupational disease and failed to find whether the de Quervain’s tenosynovitis came from a hazard to which the claimant was equally exposed outside the employment. Therefore, the respondents argue the ALJ’s findings of fact are insufficient to permit appellate review. We disagree.
The claimant sustains an occupational disease when the injury is the incident of the work, or a result of exposure occasioned by the nature of the work and does not come from a hazard to which the worker would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. Section 8-40-201(14), C.R.S. 2003. Once the claimant establishes a causal connection between the employment and her disability, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove a non-work related cause of the disease. Masdin v. Gardner-Denver-Cooper Industries, Inc., 689 P.2d 714 (Colo.App. 1984).
The question of whether the claimant proved a compensable occupational disease is one of fact for resolution by the ALJ, and therefore, the ALJ’s findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2003; Delta Drywall v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 868 P.2d 1155 (Colo.App. 1993). Further, an ALJ is not held to a crystalline standard in articulating the basis for her order. George v. Industrial Commission, 720 P.2d 624 (Colo.App. 1986). Rather, the ALJ’s order is sufficient if the basis for her determinations is apparent from the findings. Riddle v. Ampex Corp., 839 P.2d 489
(Colo.App. 1992).
The claimant testified that her job as a hot food prep cook required her to cook hot meals like gravies, ribs, corns, and rice and then move big kettles of food to buffet tables. (Tr. p. 7). She stated that during her work for the respondent-employer she began to experience a pinching pain in her left wrist when she picked up something heavy. (Tr. pp. 8, 9).
Implicitly crediting the claimant’s testimony the ALJ found the claimant’s job duties with the respondent-employer required her to stir and prepare food, pick up large pots or kettles of food and then move the pots from the stove to a cart, and from a cart to the buffet. (Finding of Fact 1). It follows the ALJ implicitly determined these were the repetitive activities that caused the claimant’s occupational disease.
We also note that an ALJ is presumed to have considered the proper legal standard but is not required explicitly to discuss particular evidence or theories before rejecting them as unpersuasive. Uptime Corp. v. Colorado Research Corp., 161 Colo. 87, 420 P.2d 232 (1966); Jefferson County Public Schools v. Dragoo, 765 P.2d 636 (Colo.App. 1988); cf. Dravo Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 40 Colo. App. 57, 569 P.2d 345 (1977). Thus, the absence of any finding concerning whether the claimant was exposed to the hazards of the disease outside this employment reflects the ALJ’s determination that the respondents’ failure to sustain their burden of proof on this issue.
The respondents also argue there is insufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of a compensable injury. Again we disagree.
The claimant is not required to present medical evidence to prove the cause of her condition. See Lymburn v. Symbios Logic, 952 P.2d 831
(Colo.App. 1997); Apache Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 717 P.2d 1000
(Colo.App. 1986). To the contrary the claimant’s testimony, if credited, may be sufficient to establish the requisite nexus between the industrial injury and the disability for which benefits are sought. Savio House v. Dennis, 665 P.2d 141 (Colo.App. 1983). However, to the extent expert medical testimony is presented, it is the ALJ’s sole prerogative to assess its weight and sufficiency. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). Insofar as the medical testimony is inconsistent or subject to conflicting interpretation, we are bound by the ALJ’s resolution of those inconsistencies and the plausible inferences the ALJ drew from the conflicts. See Colorado Springs Motors, Ltd. v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 504, 441 P.2d 21 (1968). This is true because the ALJ is considered to possess expert knowledge which renders her competent to evaluate medical evidence and draw plausible inferences from it. Wierman v. Tunnell, 108 Colo. 544, 120 P.2d 638
(1941).
As stated above, the ALJ implicitly credited the claimant’s testimony. The respondents’ arguments notwithstanding, there is substantial evidence in the claimant’s testimony to establish a causal connection between the employment and the occupational disease. Insofar as the claimant’s testimony was inconsistent with other evidence, it was the ALJ’s sole prerogative to resolve the conflict by crediting the claimant’s hearing testimony and we have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ in this regard. General Cable Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 878 P.2d 118 (Colo.App. 1994).
Moreover, the claimant’s testimony is buttressed by the opinions of Dr. Bird. Admittedly, Dr. Bird did not specifically articulate what “repetitive work” caused the claimant’s injury. However, read in context, Dr. Bird’s report reflects Dr. Bird’s opinion that the claimant’s condition was caused by repetitive activities performed at “work” for the respondent-employer.
Under these circumstances, it is immaterial there is some medical evidence which, if credited, might support a contrary result. See F.R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo.App. 1985) (substantial evidence is probative evidence which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences). Therefore, we need not consider the medical evidence cited by the respondents.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated October 30, 2003, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ David Cain
______________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to §8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2003. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this order were mailed to the parties at the addresses shown below on May 4, 2004 by A. Pendroy.
Jin Young, 27 Stovel Cir., Colorado Springs, CO 80916
Selective HR Solutions, Inc., 221 So. 8th St., Colorado Springs, CO 80905
Selective HR Solutions, Inc., 6920 Professional Pkwy. East, Sarasota, FL 34240
National Fire of Hartford, P. O. Box 17369, Denver, CO 80217-0369
Stephen M. Johnston, Esq., 125 W. “B” St., Pueblo, CO 81003 (For Claimant)
Scott M. Busser, Esq., 300 S. Jacksoon St., #570, Denver, CO 80209 (For Respondents)