W.C. No. 4-188-889Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
December 29, 1995
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ) which awarded medical benefits. The respondents contend that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant’s need for medical treatment in 1993 and 1994 was causally connected to the 1988 industrial injury. We affirm.
The claimant sustained industrial injuries to both knees and his back when he fell through a roof in December 1988. As a result, the claimant received both medical and chiropractic treatment, but did not miss time from work. By June 1989, his symptoms had resolved.
In late 1992 the claimant again experienced pain in both knees and low back. As a result, the claimant consulted Dr. Schuler in December 1993.
In a report dated February 22, 1994, Dr. Schuler opined that the claimant’s need for treatment was one hundred percent attributable to the December 1988 industrial injury. This opinion was based, in part, on Dr. Schuler’s understanding that the claimant had no history of difficulty with either knee for at least two years prior to the 1988 industrial injury. However, as noted by the ALJ, the claimant underwent arthroscopic surgery on his left knee in July 1988.
Despite the “discrepancy” in Dr. Schuler’s February 22 report, the ALJ concluded that the claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his need for medical treatment was due to an “aggravation” of his knee problems caused by the December 1988 industrial injury. Consequently, the ALJ ordered the respondents to pay for Dr. Schuler’s treatment.
The question of whether the claimant carried his burden of proof to establish that his need for medical treatment was causally connected to the 1988 industrial injury was one of fact for resolution by the ALJ. F. R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo.App. 1985); Eisnach v. Industrial Commission, 633 P.2d 502 (Colo.App. 1981). Because the issue of causation is one of fact, we must uphold the ALJ’s determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.).
In applying the substantial evidence test, we must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, his credibility determinations and the plausible inferences which he drew from the evidence. Monfort, Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1993). Expert medical testimony concerning causation is not binding upon the ALJ, but to the extent such evidence is presented, it is for the ALJ to determine its weight and credibility. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). Moreover, the fact that a particular physician receives an incomplete or inaccurate history goes to the weight of his opinion, not its admissibility. Industrial Commission v. Albo, 167 Colo. 467, 447 P.2d 1006
(1968); cf. High v. Industrial Commission, 638 P.2d 818 (Colo.App. 1981).
The respondents’ argument notwithstanding, the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding concerning causation. Both of the reports issued by Dr. Schuler indicate that the December 1988 industrial injury played some causal role in the claimant’s need for treatment in 1993 and 1994. It is true that Dr. Schuler did not recognize that the claimant had under gone arthroscopic surgery on his left knee in July 1988. However, it was for the ALJ to weigh the significance of this fact in determining the overall weight to be accorded Dr. Schuler’s testimony. In this regard, we note that the 1988 left knee surgery would not account for the claimant’s right knee pain in 1993 and 1994. Further, the record indicates that the claimant was performing his regular duties in December 1988, and was not significantly impaired by his prior knee problems.
We recognize that the ALJ might have made contrary findings and conclusions on the issue of causation. However, the fact that the ALJ might have reached another result does not afford a basis for relief on appeal May D F v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 752 P.2d 589 (Colo.App. 1988). We decline the respondents’ invitation to reweigh the evidence and reach a different result.
Insofar as the respondents reassert their statute of limitations defense, we adhere to the views expressed in our Order of October 13, 1994.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order, dated April 18, 1995, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEAL PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver,Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, withservice of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Officeand all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Orderwas mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed December 29, 1995 to the following parties:
Paul Workman, 427 Via Cruz, Oceanside, CA 92057
Scotsman Manufacturing, Inc., 8211 Town Center Dr., Baltimore, MD 21236
Scotsman Manufacturing, Inc., 2419 1st St., Greeley, CO 80631-1502
Continental Divide Ins. Co., Attn: Rhonda Puls, 9290 W. Dodge Rd., Omaha, NE 68114
Karen R. Wells, Esq., 3900 E. Mexico, #1000, Denver, CO 80210
(For the Respondents)
David Lichtenstein, Esq., One Park Centre, Ste. 213, 1333 W. 120th Ave., Westminster, CO 80234
(For the Claimant)
By: _____________________