W.C. No. 4-374-250Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
April 7, 1999.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Wheelock (ALJ) which determined the claimant failed to prove a compensable injury and therefore, the ALJ denied and dismissed the claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.
The claimant alleged injuries to his knees, shin, feet and hip on March 4, 1998, when he fell on a slippery floor at the employer’s premises, while using a power hose. The respondents denied liability.
The issue before the ALJ was whether the injuries are compensable. On highly conflicting evidence the ALJ determined the claimant failed to prove a compensable injury.
On review the claimant contends that the ALJ’s order is insufficient to permit appellate review, and therefore, the claimant requests that we remand the matter for additional findings. In support, the claimant contends that the ALJ’s findings of fact do not identify the evidence the ALJ found credible and persuasive, and that the ALJ erroneously failed to cite the legal authority she relied upon in denying the claim. We disagree.
The ALJ is not held to a crystalline standard in articulating her findings of fact. George v. Industrial Commission, 720 P.2d 624 (Colo.App. 1986). To the contrary, the ALJ’s findings are sufficient to permit appellate review if the basis for the ALJ’s decision is apparent from the order. Riddle v. Ampex Corp., 839 P.2d 489 (Colo.App. 1992); Boice v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 800 P.2d 1339 (Colo.App. 1990)
Furthermore, the ALJ is not required to cite any “legal authority” or “law” in her Conclusions of Law. See Dravo Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 40 Colo. App. 57, 569 P.2d 345 (1977) (ALJ presumed to have considered the relevant statutory factors). To the contrary, the ALJ’s order is sufficient if it reflects the ALJ’s consideration of the correct legal standard and the order is consistent with the applicable law. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 1998.
Workers’ compensation benefits are only payable for compensable injuries. A compensable injury is one which arises out of and in the course of the employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. 1998; Price v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 919 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1996). Furthermore, the claimant bears the burden to prove a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 8-43-201, C.R.S. 1998; Younger v. City and County of Denver, 810 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1991).
The claimant’s arguments notwithstanding, the ALJ’s order reflects her consideration of the applicable legal standard. In Conclusions of Law 1 and 4 the ALJ explicitly stated her determination that the claimant:
“failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he suffered an injury on March 4, 1998, arising out of and in the course of his employment with the employer.”
Further, we have no difficulty ascertaining the basis for the ALJ’s conclusions of law. The ALJ made detailed findings of fact concerning the claimant’s testimony, but found “too many inconsistencies” in the testimony. The ALJ also found that the claimant’s testimony was contracted by the medical records. (Conclusions of Law 1, 2). Therefore, the ALJ determined that the claimant’s testimony concerning how the injuries occurred was “incredible” and not “persuasive.” (Conclusions of Law 1, 2, 4). Instead, the ALJ credited the testimony of the employer’s witnesses Ron Schill and Donna Scaggs, who denied the claimant’s report of an injury on March 4, 1998, and contradicted the claimant’s testimony concerning his work history and the reason he was discharged on March 9, 1998. (Findings of Fact 11, 14, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 31; Conclusions of Law 3).
Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s order is sufficient to permit appellate review. Consequently, it is unnecessary to remand the matter for additional findings.
Moreover, the ALJ’s findings of fact support the denial of benefits. Consequently, the claimant has failed to establish grounds for appellate relief.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated August 26, 1998, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ Kathy E. Dean
______________________________ Robert M. Socolofsky
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.
Copies of this decision were mailed April 7, 1999
the following parties:
Lawrence Wolff, PO Box 4214, Pueblo CO 81003
G. Ron Schill, Gen Mgr, Hed Land Enterprises/Freedom Ford, PO Box 713, Pueblo, CO 81003
Vicki Fiebig, Farmers Insurance group, Mile High Service Ctr, PO Box 378230, Denver, CO 80237
Joseph W. Ruppert, 226 West “B” Street, PO Box 8087, Pueblo, CO 81002 (For Claimant)
Richard M. Lamphere, Esq, Ritsema Lyon, PC, 111 S. Tejon, Ste. 700 Colorado Springs, CO 80903 (For Respondents)
BY: AP