W.C. No. 4-122-839Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
July 17, 1998
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Rumler (ALJ), which denied his claim for permanent total disability benefits on account of a January 1992 industrial injury. The claimant contends that, contrary to the ALJ’s order, he proved a causal relationship between the injury and his permanent total disability. We affirm.
The claimant sustained a compensable low back injury in January 1992. At that time, the claimant was already suffering from ankylosing spondylitis (AS). The claimant had also sustained two prior industrial back injuries which occurred in December 1978 and December 1982. After each of these injuries the claimant was diagnosed with a herniated disk and given a permanent impairment rating.
It is now undisputed that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled as a result of back pain and leg pain. However, the ALJ found that the claimant failed to prove that the January 1992 injury “is a significant or substantial contributing factor” to his permanent total disability. In support, the ALJ found that the claimant suffered from preexisting AS and a preexisting degenerative back condition. Consequently, the ALJ was unpersuaded that the claimant’s current condition is related to the 1992 injury rather than the preexisting conditions.
On review, the claimant contends the ALJ gave insufficient weight to the opinions of Dr. MacCarter and Dr. Talbot. The claimant points out that both of these physicians opined that the January 1992 injury aggravated his preexisting degenerative back condition, and contributed to his ongoing disability. (Talbot report, August 21, 1996; MacCarter depo. p. 25). We are not persuaded.
The claimant was required to prove a direct causal relationship between the 1992 industrial injury and his permanent total disability. Seifried v. Industrial Commission, 736 P.2d 1262 (Colo.App. 1986). The question of whether the claimant proved the requisite causal relationship was one of fact for determination by the ALJ. See City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1997). Because the issue is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ’s order if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 1997.
Under the substantial evidence test, we are required to defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, her resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and the plausible inferences which she drew from the record. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo.App. 1995). In this regard, it was for the ALJ to determine the weight and credibility of the expert medical witnesses on the issue of causation. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). The ALJ was not obliged to credit any expert’s opinion, even if it was uncontroverted. Cary v. Chevron, U.S.A., 867 P.2d 117 (Colo.App. 1993).
The claimant’s argument notwithstanding, the ALJ did not err in declining to credit Dr. MacCarter’s testimony concerning causation. As the ALJ recognized, Dr. MacCarter was less than specific in explaining the mechanism by which the January 1992 injury allegedly caused or aggravated the claimant’s condition. Moreover, Dr. MacCarter conceded the claimant had a degenerative back condition prior to the 1992 injury, and MacCarter had a less than complete understanding of the claimant’s history of back problems before January 1992. (MacCarter depo. pp. 14-16).
It follows the ALJ was not obliged to rely on Dr. MacCarter’s testimony. The ALJ was free to weigh MacCarter’s testimony against evidence that the claimant had preexisting AS, a degenerative back condition, and two prior industrial injuries. Under these circumstances, the ALJ could infer that the claimant’s permanent total disability was not the result of the January 1992 injury, but rather the progression of the preexisting conditions Seifried v. Industrial Commission, supra.
The claimant also cites the report of Dr. Talbot as evidence of causation. However, the ALJ did not comment on Dr. Talbot’s report, and was obviously not persuaded by it. The failure to address every piece of evidence is not error so long as the basis of the order is apparent from the findings and conclusions. See Riddle v. Ampex Corp., 839 P.2d 489 (Colo.App. 1992).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED the ALJ’s order dated March 20, 1997, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ David Cain
______________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate theOrder is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14thAvenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to reviewwith the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon theIndustrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, withintwenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to§§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C. R. S. 1997.
Copies of this decision were mailed July 17, 1998 to the following parties:
Ray A. Williams, 5451 Chandler Way, Denver, CO 80239
Court House, Inc., 4121 S. Julian Way, Denver, CO 80236-3101
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Carolyn A. Boyd, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
Division of Workers’ Compensation, Subsequent Injury Fund, Attn: Barbara Carter (Interagency Mail)
Raymond F. Callahan, Esq., 3464 S. Willow St., Denver, CO 80231-4566 (For the Respondents)
Steven H. Gurwin, Esq., 1777 S. Harrison St., #906, Denver, CO 80210 (For the Claimant)
Andrew Katarikawe, Esq., Office of the Attorney General, Civil Litigation, 1525 Sherman St., 5th Flr., Denver, CO 80203 (For SIF)
By: _______________________