W.C. No. 4-462-581Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
August 5, 2002
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mattoon (ALJ) which denied and dismissed the claim for medical benefits. The claimant argues the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant failed to prove causation. We affirm.
The claimant experienced an episode of hyperventilation on May 23, 2000, and sought compensation for an emergency room visit to treat this condition. The hyperventilation occurred after the claimant was denied a break and while he was making a delivery. The claimant theorized the hyperventilation was caused by recurring back pain attributable to a prior industrial injury, stress caused by an ongoing labor dispute with the employer, or the employer’s refusal to grant the break, or some combination of these factors.
However, the ALJ found the claimant failed to prove the episode of hyperventilation was caused by any of these factors. In support, the ALJ noted the claimant testified he did not know what caused the incident, but did not believe it was anger at the employer. Further, the ALJ found there was no persuasive medical evidence on the issue of causation. Consequently, the ALJ denied the claim.
The ALJ also opined this case is subject to the special proof requirements of the mental impairment statute found at § 8-41-301(2), C.R.S. 2001. However, the ALJ concluded issues raised by that statute are moot in light of her findings on the issue of causation.
On review, the claimant contends the respondents did not argue causation. Further the claimant argues the ALJ’s findings concerning causation are not supported by substantial evidence. We find no error.
Because this was a fully contested case, the claimant had the burden to prove as an element of the claim that the hyperventilation was proximately caused by an injury or disease arising out of and in the course of his employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 2001; Faulkner v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 12 P.3d 844 (Colo.App. 2000). The question of whether the claimant proved causation is an issue of fact for determination by the ALJ, and we must uphold the ALJ’s determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claims Office, 989 P.2d 251 (Colo.App. 1999).
The substantial evidence standard mandates that we defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claims Office, supra. Where, as here, the record contains some medical evidence bearing on the issue of causation, the weight to be assigned such evidence is within the ALJ’s province as the finder of fact. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.3d ___ (Colo.App. No. 01CA0852, February 28, 2002). The ALJ was not required to credit the medical evidence, even if it was unrebutted. Cary v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 867 P.2d 117 (Colo.App. 1993).
Here, the record contains some medical evidence from which it might be inferred that the hyperventilation was caused by the conditions of the claimant’s employment or by back pain. For instance, Exhibit 5, the hyperventilation “aftercare instructions,” states hyperventilation “may be caused by pain, medical problems, anxiety, or stress.” The claimant testified the emergency room physician advised him “there are a lot of things that can bring on hyperventilation — you know, injury, stress.” (Tr. p. 45). However, none of this evidence constituted a direct opinion, based on full knowledge of the claimant’s professional and personal circumstances, that the hyperventilation was actually caused by the claimant’s employment. Indeed, these remarks and statements are themselves general in nature. Moreover, as the ALJ found, the claimant’s own testimony was equivocal concerning the cause of the incident. (Tr. pp. 55-56).
Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s finding that the claimant failed to carry the burden of proof on the issue of causation constitutes a plausible interpretation of the evidence and must be upheld on review. The mere fact there was some evidence which, if credited, would support a contrary result, does not permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra.
Because the record supports the ALJ’s determination concerning causation, she correctly determined that the issue surrounding the applicability of § 8-43-301(2)(a) is moot. Hence, we need not reach the claimant’s arguments on this question.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated December 18, 2001, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
________________________________ David Cain
________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to §8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2001. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed August 5, 2002 to the following parties:
Victor White, 321 Grace, Pueblo, CO 81004
United Parcel Service, 5020 Ivy St., Commerce City, CO 80022-4403
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 13111 E. Briarwood Ave., #100, Englewood, CO 80112
Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, P. O. Box 168208, Irving, TX 75016-8208
David A. Roth, Esq., 1836 Vinewood, #200, Pueblo, CO 81005 (For Claimant)
John M. Connell, Esq., 6750 Stapleton Drive South, #200, Denver, CO 80216-6621 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Hurtado