W.C. No. 4-354-577Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
June 1, 1999.
FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of an order of the Director of the Division of Workers’ Compensation (Director), closing the claim for failure to prosecute. We affirm.
The claimant sustained a compensable back injury on August 29, 1997. Subsequently, the matter proceeded to hearing before Administrative Law Judge Erickson (ALJ), on the issues of compensability, medical benefits, and temporary disability benefits. In an order dated March 30, 1998, the ALJ determined that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement on September 2, 1997, and that the claimant’s subsequent symptoms were related to pre-existing back problems. Consequently, the ALJ denied the claim for temporary disability benefits and medical benefits after September 2. This order was not appealed.
On April 22, 1998, the respondent filed a Final Admission of Liability admitting for medical benefits in accordance with the ALJ’s order, but denying liability for all other benefits. The claimant timely contested this admission, but took no further action to prosecute the claim.
On November 3, 1998, the respondent filed a “Motion for Entry of Show Cause Order” alleging that “no significant activity” had occurred for a period in excess of six months. The Director entered a “Show Cause Order” on November 18, 1998, requiring the claimant to “show good cause as to why your claim should not be closed.”
The claimant filed a “Response to Order to Show Cause” on December 10, 1998. The response states that the claimant had ongoing back problems after April 22, and includes medical records documenting medical treatment after April 22. However, on January 5, 1999, the Director entered an “Order” granting the respondent’s request to close the claim. The Director observed that the ALJ’s order “finalized the issue of medical benefits after September 1997,” and the claimant failed to appeal the order. Therefore, the Director concluded the claimant failed to show good cause for permitting the claim to remain open.
The claimant did not file a brief in support of her petition to review the Director’s order. However, the petition to review alleges that the Director was “biased and unfair.” The claimant also asserts that the claim should not have been closed considering her need for ongoing medical treatment, and that she is unsure of what “issue” was closed by the Director’s order. We find no error.
Section 8-43-207(1)(n), C.R.S. 1998, provides for dismissal of “all issues” in a case, except for issues previously resolved and benefits received, “for failure to prosecute the case unless good cause is shown why such issues should not be dismissed.” Rule of Procedure X (A) (2) (b), 7 Code Colo. Reg. 1101-3 at 37, authorizes the Director to consider responses to orders to show cause and “determine whether the claim should remain open.”
Under these provisions the Director has discretionary authority to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the claimant has shown good cause for failure to prosecute the claim over a six-month period. Because the determination is discretionary, we may not interfere with the Director’s order unless an abuse is shown. An abuse exists if the Director’s order is beyond the bounds of reason, as where it is unsupported by the evidence or contrary to law. Rosenberg v. Board of Education of School District No. 1, 710 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1985).
Here, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the Director’s decision to order closure of the claim. The claimant’s only explanation for failure to prosecute after the respondent’s final admission was that she continued to receive medical treatment. However, the ALJ had already determined that the claimant’s need for medical treatment after September 2, 1997, was attributable to pre-existing conditions. The claimant does not point to any document or other evidence which calls into question the correctness of the ALJ’s decision. Under these circumstances, the Director could logically conclude that the claimant had no legal or factual basis for claiming additional benefits as a result of the August 1997 injury, and therefore, there was no reason to leave the claim open. Because the Director’s conclusion is reasonable, there was no abuse of discretion.
Moreover, we have no difficulty in understanding the effect of the Director’s order. The order closes the entire claim. Therefore, the order encompasses “all issues” in accordance with §8-43-207(1)(n).
The claimant cites no specific evidence in support of her assertion that the Director was “biased and unfair,” and we perceive no basis for this argument. To the contrary, administrative officials are entitled to a presumption of integrity, honesty, and impartiality when acting in their quasi-judicial roles. Ski Depot Rentals, Inc. v. Lynch, 714 P.2d 516 (Colo.App. 1985). The mere fact that the Director ruled against the claimant is insufficient to justify a finding of bias Cf. In re Marriage of Johnson, 40 Colo. App. 250, 576 P.2d 188
(1977).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Director’s Order dated January 5, 1999, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Robert Socolofsky
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.
Copies of this decision were mailed June 1, 1999 the following parties:
Luella M. Wheelhouse, 11161 Harlan St., Westminster, CO 80020
King Soopers, Attn: Kris Flores, W.C. Dept. 827, P. O. Box 5567 T. A., Denver, CO 80217
Lawrence D. Blackman, Esq., 1515 Arapahoe St., Tower 3, #600 Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondent)
BY: A. Pendroy