W.C. Nos. 4-432-101, 4-416-145Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
February 15, 2001
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Corchado (ALJ) which denied the petition to reopen W.C. No. 4-416-145, and denied the claim for medical benefits in W.C. No. 4-432-101. The claimant contends substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings on the issue of causation. We affirm.
The issue in this case is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the claimant’s herniated cervical disc, and the consequent need for treatment, are not causally related to an industrial injury which the claimant sustained on June 18, 1998 (W.C. No. 4-416-145), or to a separate occupational disease sustained in the course of employment (W.C. No. 4-432-101). The ALJ, relying principally on the testimony of the claimant’s treating physician and the corroborating opinions of two other physicians, found the herniated disc was probably not caused by the duties of the claimant’s employment, but rather by natural degeneration, a 1997 automobile accident, and the claimant’s “years of soccer playing.” Consequently, the ALJ denied the petition to reopen W.C. No. 4-416-145, and denied the claim in W.C. No. 4-432-101.
On review, the claimant asserts the testimony of the claimant’s treating physician is incredible as a matter of law because it is not supported by the medical records and is contrary to the evidence in the case. In any event, the claimant argues the evidence supports a determination that his employment “aggravated” a preexisting disc condition. Finally, the claimant argues there is no “medical evidence” to support the ALJ’s finding that “years of soccer playing” contributed to the herniated disc. We reject these arguments.
Whether the claim for medical benefits is based on a worsening of condition stemming from the June 1998 injury, or a new occupational disease, the claimant was required to prove the herniated disc and need for treatment were proximately caused by his employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 2000; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claims Office, 989 P.2d 251 (Colo.App. 1999); Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 714 P.2d 1328 (Colo.App. 1985). The question of whether the claimant has proven causation is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Consequently, we must uphold the ALJ’s order if supported by substantial evidence in record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2000; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claims Office, supra.
When applying the substantial evidence test, we must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, his credibility determinations, and the plausible inferences he drew from the record Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claims Office, supra. Although expert medical opinion is not required to prove causation, where such evidence is presented it is the ALJ’s province to assess its weight and credibility. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182
(Colo.App. 1990). To the extent an expert’s testimony contains inconsistencies, the ALJ may resolve them by believing part or none of the testimony. Colorado Springs Motors, Ltd. v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 504, 441 P.2d 21 (1968). Finally, the ALJ need not make findings concerning every piece of evidence so long as the basis of the order is clear from those findings which are entered. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385
(Colo.App. 2000).
The claimant’s argument notwithstanding, the ALJ was not obliged to discredit the treating physician’s testimony concerning the 1991 injury because it is not corroborated by medical records. We agree with the respondents that the ALJ did not find the 1991 injury was a cause of the claimant’s herniated disc. In fact, the 1991 injury is not mentioned in the order. In any event, the treating physician testified without objection that he had viewed medical records concerning the 1991 injury. Thus, this argument is without merit.
Neither was the ALJ required to discredit the treating physician’s testimony that the 1997 automobile accident was a more likely cause of the claimant’s herniated disc than his employment. The treating physician testified at length concerning those medical records which he believes establish a causal relationship between the automobile accident and the herniated disc. (Tr. pp. 72-76). Under such circumstances, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the weight to be accorded the treating physician’s opinion, and we decline the claimant’s invitation to do so.
Neither did the ALJ err in failing to find the claimant sustained a compensable aggravation of a preexisting disc condition. The treating physician testified that, although the claimant’s employment may have elicited symptoms of the herniated disc, he did not believe the employment actually aggravated the condition. This testimony supports the ALJ’s conclusion the claimant did not prove a compensable aggravation of a preexisting condition. Cf. F. R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965
(Colo.App. 1985).
Finally, there was no error in the ALJ’s order insofar as it found the claimant’s history of soccer playing contributed to the herniated disc. The claimant testified that “heading” the soccer ball requires “snapping your head in a particular direction.” (Tr. p. 24). Although the claimant testified that he did not head balls, the ALJ found this testimony was not credible. (Finding of Fact 12). Under such circumstances, the ALJ could infer a relationship between soccer playing and the herniated disc without the benefit of expert testimony. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, supra.
Insofar as the claimant makes other arguments, we find them to be without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated September 4, 2000, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
________________________________ David Cain
________________________________ Robert M. Socolofsky
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to §8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2000. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed February 15, 2001 to the following parties:
Gideon Wendirad, 1416 16th Ave., Greeley, CO 80631
Judy O’Neil, Hewlett Packard, 700 71st Ave., Greeley, CO 80631
Lori Hasty, Sedgwick Claims Management, 1225 17th St., #2100, Denver, CO 80202-5534
Shawn Langley, Esq., 1115 11th Ave., Greeley, CO 80631 (For Claimant)
David J. Dworkin, Esq., and Margaret Bauder Garcia, Esq., 3900 E. Mexico Ave., #1300, Denver, CO 80210 (For Respondent)
BY: A. Pendroy