W.C. No. 4-465-204Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
October 5, 2001
ORDER OF REMAND
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Coughlin (ALJ) which denied and dismissed her claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The claimant contends the ALJ erred in holding the claim was not compensable because she failed to prove a “special hazard” of employment. We set the order aside and remand for further proceedings.
The claimant was employed at a grocery store and was required to “clock out” at the end of her shift. The employer’s time clock was located at the top of two flights of stairs. On May 26, 2000, the claimant completed her shift and clocked out shortly after 5 PM. The ALJ found the claimant “lost her footing while descending stairs at work in haste and fell.” (Finding of Fact 1).
The ALJ concluded the claimant’s injuries did not arise out of her employment because the claimant failed to prove that the “slip and fall” was the result of a “circumstance or special hazard peculiar to her work environment.” Consequently, the ALJ denied the claim.
On review, the claimant contends the ALJ erroneously applied the “special hazard” doctrine. The claimant argues the facts, as found by the ALJ, establish the injury arose out of employment because it was connected with circumstances associated with her employment. We agree, and reverse the ALJ’s order. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2001 (panel may set aside order not supported by applicable law).
Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. 2001, requires that at the time of the “injury” the claimant be “performing service arising out of and in the course of” the employment. An injury “arises out of” employment when its origin is in the claimant’s work-related functions and is sufficiently related thereto as to be considered part of the employee’s service to the employer in connection with the contract of employment Popovich v. Irlando, 811 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1991). Here, the ALJ concluded the injury did not arise out of the claimant’s employment because the claimant slipped and fell, and therefore was required to prove a “special hazard.”
Where the claimant’s injury is initiated or precipitated by an event or condition “associated with the employment,” the claimant is not required to prove a “special hazard” in order to recover benefits. H H Warehouse v. Vicory, 805 P.2d 1167 (Colo.App. 1990). Proof of a “special hazard” is required only when the claimant’s fall is precipitated by a preexisting idiopathic disease or condition. National Health Laboratories v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 844 P.2d 1259 (Colo.App. 1992) Ramsdell v. Horn, 781 P.2d 150 (Colo.App. 1989). This is true because if the fall is precipitated by a preexisting condition which is personal to the claimant, the requirement of work connection is not fulfilled unless a special hazard of the employment contributes to the accident or the injuries sustained. National Health Laboratories v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra; Gates Rubber v. Industrial Commission, 705 P.2d 6
(Colo.App. 1995).
Here, the ALJ did not find the claimant’s fall was precipitated by a preexisting condition. Neither did the ALJ find that the fall was “unexplained.” To the contrary, the ALJ found the claimant “clocked out” and fell when she slipped on the stairs. In our view, these findings establish that at the time of the injury the claimant was performing an activity which bore a direct causal relationship to her employment (descending the stairs after clocking out), and suffered a compensable “injury” within the meaning of § 8-41-301(1)(b). Indeed, the terms “accident” and “injury” are synonymous and include “disability or death resulting from accident.” Section 8-40-201(2), C.R.S. 2001. The term “accident” includes an “unforseen event occurring without the will or design of the person whose mere act causes it; an unexpected, unusual, or undesigned occurrence.” Section 8-40-201(1), C.R.S. 2001. Thus, we have upheld a finding of compensability in circumstances nearly identical to those presented here. Reinhard v. Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
W.C. No. 4-114-050 (May 20, 1993).
Moreover, this is not a situation, such as occurred in Rice v. Dayton Hudson Corp., W.C. No. 4-386-678 (July 29, 1999), where the ALJ found that the claimant collapsed and fell to the floor, and was “unable to provide any explanation for her fall.” In Rice, we held the claimant’s fall was truly “unexplained” because, based on the ALJ’s findings, the fall could not be associated with the circumstances of the claimant’s employment nor with any preexisting idiopathic condition. We reversed the award of compensation holding that Colorado law creates no presumption that injuries which occur in the course of employment necessarily arise out of employment. See Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968). Here, the claimant testified that she sustained an accidental event when she slipped on the stairs, and the ALJ credited this testimony. Thus, the fall was not unexplained.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated November 22, 2000, is set aside, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
________________________________ David Cain
________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
Copies of this decision were mailed October 5, 2001 to the following parties:
Billie Warm, R. R. 4, Box 392, Ava, MO 65608
Safeway Stores, 451 W. Wonder View Ave., Estes Park, CO 80517
Safeway Stores, Inc., 5918 Stoneridge Mall Rd., Pleasanton, CA 94588
Gregory W. Heron, Esq., 1199 Bannock St., Denver, CO 80204 (For Claimant)
Richard A. Bovarnick, Esq., and Harvey D. Flewelling, Esq., 5353 W. Dartmouth Ave., #400, Denver, CO 80227 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy