W.C. No. 3-689-668Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
May 19, 1999.
FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Erickson (ALJ) which denied the claimant’s request for additional medical treatment allegedly caused by a 1982 industrial injury. We affirm.
In 1982 the claimant sustained a compensable injury to her left upper extremity. She underwent surgery on the left elbow and was placed at maximum medical improvement in February 1984. At that time the treating physician diagnosed pain and possible tendonitis of the left shoulder, tendonitis of the left posterior thorax, a fracture of the left radial head with subsequent excision, and significant residual pain and restricted motion.
By 1993 the claimant was reporting significant pain in the right upper extremity. She attributed the pain to overuse of the right upper extremity caused by injury-related restriction of the left upper extremity. The claimant then came under the care of Dr. Parry, who agreed that the claimant was suffering from an overuse syndrome related to the 1982 injury. Dr. Parry prescribed extensive therapies including Aston-Patterning treatment, massage therapy, a health club membership, and numerous other modalities. These treatments were continuing at the time of the 1998 hearings.
The respondents presented the reports and testimony of Dr. Centeno, an independent medical examiner, who saw the claimant in April 1997. Dr. Centeno opined that the treatments prescribed by Dr. Parry were not causally related to the 1982 industrial injury, but most probably related to intervening injuries. In any event, Dr. Centeno testified that the therapies were not reasonably necessary to treat the 1982 injury, but were maintained because the claimant was “psychologically addicted” to them. After viewing a videotape of the claimant’s activities, Dr. Centeno also opined that the claimant is malingering.
Crediting Dr. Centeno’s testimony, as well as medical records indicating that the claimant suffered several intervening injuries between 1982 and 1998, the ALJ found that the claimant failed to prove that her “present condition and complaints” relate to the 1982 injury. The ALJ expressly discredited the claimant’s testimony insofar as it would support a contrary conclusion. Thus, the ALJ denied any further treatment except for a pain-blocking modality such as a CES, MENS, or TENS unit.
I.
On review, the claimant first contends that the ALJ was “biased” against her. In support of this proposition the claimant points out the ALJ entered numerous findings of fact which are adverse to her position. The claimant also relies on the ALJ’s denial of a motion for late endorsement of Dr. Parry. We find no error.
ALJ’s are presumed to be competent and unbiased until the contrary is shown. Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186
(Colo.App. 1995). Generally, a party must allege that the ALJ had a “personal, financial, or official stake in the decision which would evidence a conflict of interest on his part.” Neoplan USA Corp. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 778 P.2d 312
(Colo.App. 1989). Here, the claimant made no showing whatsoever that the ALJ was biased against her. The mere fact the ALJ decided evidentiary issues contrary to the claimant’s view of the case is insufficient to support a finding of bias. See In Re Marriage of Johnson, 40 Colo. App. 250, 576 P.2d 188 (1977).
Neither does the ALJ’s refusal to grant the late endorsement of Dr. Parry evidence bias. Rule of Procedure VIII (A) (5), 7 Code Colo. Reg. 1101-3 at 21, provides a party may not add a witness after the filing of the application for hearing except by agreement of the parties “or approval of an administrative law judge for good cause shown.” At the hearing, the claimant conceded that Dr. Parry was never endorsed as a witness, and the claimant did not offer to show good cause for a late endorsement. Thus, the ALJ’s refusal to permit Dr. Parry’s testimony was a proper exercise of discretion, not evidence of bias. (Tr. February 9, 1998, pp. 7-8).
II.
The claimant next contests numerous findings of fact as unsupported by the evidence. Essentially, the claimant argues that the ALJ should have credited her testimony, the reports of Dr. Parry, and other evidence tending to establish a causal link between the 1982 injury and the treatment modalities for which the claimant sought compensation. The claimant also asserts that Dr. Centeno’s testimony was “biased to the point of untruth.” We perceive no error.
The claimant had the burden of proof to establish a causal relationship between the 1982 injury and the need for medical treatment. Cooper v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. No. 98CA1343, March 18, 1999). The question of whether the claimant established the requisite causal relationship is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1997).
Because the issues are factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ’s order if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 1998. In applying this standard of review we must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, his credibility determinations, and the plausible inferences he drew from the evidence. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo.App. 1995). In this regard, we note that the weight and credibility to be assigned expert medical testimony on the issue of causation is solely within the province of the ALJ as fact finder. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990).
The claimant’s arguments notwithstanding, the evidence cited by the ALJ, including the testimony of Dr. Centeno, fully supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant failed to prove that any need for further medical treatment is causally connected to the 1982 industrial injury. As the ALJ recognized, the record contains substantial evidence that the claimant suffered several intervening injuries which affected her back, neck, and right upper extremity. Although some evidence suggests that these intervening injuries were not the cause of the claimant’s symptoms, Dr. Centeno expressed a contrary opinion. (Tr. April 13, 1998, p. 89). In any event, Dr. Centeno opined that to the extent claimant continues to receive treatment for the 1982 injury, this treatment is “contraindicated.” Finally, the ALJ discredited the claimant’s testimony that she needs treatment.
It is true that some evidence could support contrary findings and conclusions. Further, the ALJ might have discredited Dr. Centeno’s testimony. However, on this record, we have no basis to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence, or the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. Thus, the order must be upheld. City of Durango v. Dunagan, supra.
III.
The claimant also suggests that it was error for the ALJ to allow respondents’ counsel to prepare the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, it is permissible for the ALJ to sign specific findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by a party. Uptime Corp. v. Colorado Research Corp., 161 Colo. 87, 420 P.2d 232 (1966). This is particularly true where, as here, the ALJ prepared a summary order indicating his conclusions concerning the evidence.
Insofar as the claimant makes other arguments, we find them to be without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated the June 15, 1998, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Bill Whitacre
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.
Copies of this decision were mailed May 19, 1999 the following parties:
Zona L. Tooke, 8901 W. 51st Ave., Arvada, CO 80002
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 65657 Highway 85, Carr, CO 80612
Twin City Fire Insurance Co., Tom Corrigan, ITT Specialty Risk Services, Inc., P. O. Box 221700, Denver, CO 80222
Tama L. Levine, Esq., 1515 Arapahoe St., Tower 3, #600, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy