W.C. No. 4-533-270.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
November 2, 2004.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ) which denied her petition to reopen the claim on grounds of a worsened condition. We affirm.
In September 2001 the claimant suffered admitted industrial injuries. Dr. Labosky diagnosed diffuse right elbow pain and right cubital tunnel syndrome. The claimant’s personal physician also diagnosed and treated the claimant for rheumatoid arthritis.
The claimant was placed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) for the industrial injury in January 2002, and released to return to regular employment. A Division-sponsored independent medical examination (DIME) physician diagnosed chronic right lateral epicondylitis and rheumatoid arthritis. The DIME physician assigned a scheduled disability rating for the right arm and opined the claimant required no additional treatment.
On January 31, 2003, ALJ Friend determined the claimant’s complaints of shoulder and neck pain were unrelated to the industrial injury and that the claimant’s need for ongoing treatment was caused by the non-industrial rheumatoid arthritis. Therefore, ALJ Friend denied the claimant’s request for medical benefits after MMI as provided by Grover v. Industrial Commission, 759 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1988).
In October 2003, the claimant returned to Dr. Labosky with complaints of right elbow pain. Dr. Labosky diagnosed right lateral epicondylitis and mild right cubital tunnel syndrome and did not expressly find a worsening of condition. In December 2003, the claimant sought additional treatment from Dr. Richman, who diagnosed right lateral epicondylar pain, right medial epicondylar pain and left ulna neuritis related to the September 2001 industrial injury.
Relying on the opinions of Dr. Labosky, the claimant filed a petition to reopen the claim and alleged a worsening of the industrial injury. The respondent refused voluntarily to reopen the claim.
In denying the petition to reopen the ALJ found the:
“Claimant may or may not be worse. If she is worse, that worsening may or may not be due to the September 20, 2001 work injury.” (Conclusions of Law).
The claimant contends these findings reveal the ALJ failed to resolve whether the claim should be reopened due to a worsening of the industrial injury. Therefore, the claimant argues the ALJ’s findings of fact are insufficient to permit appellate review. We disagree.
Initially, we note that the claimant’s Designation of Record includes the “complete” Division of Workers’ Compensation file. The record transmitted to us on appeal apparently does not include the complete Division of Workers’ Compensation file and our review is limited to the evidentiary record before the ALJ. Further, there is no evidence in the record which tends to suggest the claimant requested the ALJ to consider the entire Division of Workers’ Compensation file as part of the evidentiary record for the hearing. See City of Boulder v. Dinsmore, 902 P.2d 925 (Colo.App. 1995); Rules of Procedure, Part VIII(A)(6), 7 Code Colo. Reg. 1101-3 at 22. Consequently, we have not obtained or considered the Division of Workers’ Compensation file, but restricted our review to the record made at the hearing.
Section § 8-43-303(1), C.R.S. 2004, authorizes the ALJ to reopen a claim on the ground of a change in condition within six years of the injury. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we may not disturb the ALJ’s factual determinations. Osborne v. Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 63
(Colo.App. 1986). The appellate standard on review of an alleged abuse of discretion is whether the ALJ’s order exceeds the bounds of reason, as where it is contrary to the applicable law or not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Coates, Reid Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1993) ; Rosenberg v. Board of Education of School District #1, 710 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1985).
The substantial evidence standard requires that we defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, his credibility determinations and the plausible inferences which he drew from the evidence. Monfort, Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1993).
We also note that the ALJ is not held to a standard of absolute clarity in expressing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rather, it is sufficient for the ALJ to enter findings concerning the evidence he considered dispositive of the issues. Magnetic Engineering Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo.App. 2000). The ALJ is also presumed to have considered and applied the relevant legal principles. Shafer Commercial Seating, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 85 P.3d 619 (Colo.App. 2003).
The claimant’s arguments notwithstanding, we have no difficulty ascertaining the basis for the ALJ’s order. Further, we are not persuaded the ALJ misapplied the burden of proof by requiring the claimant to disprove the existence of an intervening injury. Consequently, we need not remand the matter for additional findings.
The ALJ acknowledged the possibility that the claimant may have a worsened condition related to the industrial injury. However, the ALJ determined the proof presented by the claimant, including medical records from Dr. Labosky and Dr. Richman, was insufficient to establish a direct causal connection between the alleged worsening and the industrial injury. Therefore, the ALJ determined the claimant failed to sustain her burden to prove by a “preponderance of evidence” that the claim should be reopened due to a worsening of the industrial injury. (See Finding of Fact 13). Moreover, the ALJ’s findings are plausible inferences drawn from the record, and support the denial of additional benefits.
Nevertheless, the claimant contends that under the law of the case doctrine ALJ Friend’s finding that the claimant did not require Grover-type medical benefits in January 2003, compels the conclusion the claimant’s ongoing need for treatment is the result of a worsened condition. Again we disagree.
The “law of the case” doctrine is a discretionary rule which provides that prior relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be followed. Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301 (Colo.App. 1982). The only purpose of the rule is efficiency of disposition. Further, the law of the case applies to decisions of law and not findings of fact. Mining Equipment Inc. v. Leadville Corp., 856 P.2d 81 (Colo.App. 1993).
Unlike the issue presented on review, ALJ Friend did not determine whether the claim should be reopened due to a worsened condition. Rather, the issues before ALJ Friend were whether the claimant suffered whole person impairment and whether the claimant required Grover-type medical treatment to maintain her condition. (See Respondents’ Hearing Exhibit G).
In any case, ALJ Friend did not determine the claimant required no further treatment. Instead, ALJ Friend found the claimant did not require additional treatment for the industrial injury. Thus, ALJ Friend’s findings are not dispositive of whether the claimant proved a worsened condition from the industrial injury caused the need for additional treatment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated, March 4, 2004, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________ David Cain
____________________ Kathy E. Dean
Donna Stave, Colorado Springs, CO, King Soopers, Inc., Colorado Springs, CO, Lori Hasty, Sedgwick CMS, Inc., Denver, CO, IME Coordinator, Division of Workers’ Compensation — Interagency Mail, William A. Alexander, Jr., Esq., Colorado Springs, CO, (For Claimant).
Kent D. Enwright, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Respondent).