W.C. No. 4-695-317.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
September 17, 2007.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Harr (ALJ) mailed on March 9, 2007, that denied and dismissed the claimant’s claim for compensation. We affirm.
A hearing was held on the issues of the compensability of the claim and whether the claimant proved that he was entitled to medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits. Following the hearing the ALJ entered findings of fact that for the purposes of this order may be summarized as follows. The claimant worked for the employer as an assembler in its facility that manufactured batteries. On August 14, 2006, approximately a month after the claimant’s discharge from employment, he filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging that he had injured his neck and shoulder in April 2006. The ALJ credited the testimony of the claimant’s direct supervisor, Darrell Palmer, who described the claimant’s job operating automatic mixers that combined the ingredients used in manufacturing batteries. The claimant’s job duties sometimes involved tapping on the equipment with a hammer or pushing on it in order to facilitate the movement of the ingredients. On May 10, 2006, the claimant reported to Palmer that he was experiencing soreness in his arm from pressing on the manufacturing equipment. The claimant’s actions were necessitated by a malfunctioning switch and Palmer gave the claimant a length of wood to use to trigger the switch. The claimant testified that his job duties, especially hammering and pressing on the
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malfunctioning equipment, caused pain in his neck and right shoulder in March 2006. He stated that he reported the pain to Palmer in May 2006 and they met with the safety manager to attempt to relocate the claimant to another job. After May 10th Palmer asked the claimant how his shoulder was feeling and the claimant responded that it was better. The claimant neither stated that he could not perform his job, nor did he request medical treatment. The claimant was being treated by Dr. Willig for another condition; however, contrary to the claimant’s testimony, the ALJ found that he did not report to Dr. Willig either in March or April 2006, that he was suffering neck or shoulder pain. He first reported neck and arm pain to Dr. Willig in May 2006. The claimant’s employment was terminated on July 10, 2006, when Palmer discovered him sleeping on the job, after having been warned not to do so. Dr. Steinmetz performed an independent medical examination on November 6 and 10 and reported that the claimant’s clinical presentation and subjective complaints were inconsistent with his activities shown on a surveillance tape, which the claimant was unaware was being prepared. Dr. Steinmetz testified that the activities performed by the claimant on the surveillance tape included lifting and carrying items weighing more than his reported limits, driving, and using his shoulder in a manner that would not have been possible had the claimant had a shoulder injury.
The ALJ weighed the evidence and concluded that the claimant failed to carry his burden of showing that he injured his neck and shoulder on the job. Accordingly, he denied and dismissed the claim for compensation.
The claimant appealed the ALJ’s order. The petition to review contains only general allegations of error, derived from (8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2006. Moreover, the claimant has not filed a brief in support of his petition to review and, therefore, the effectiveness of our review is limited. Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 734 P.2d 642 (Colo.App. 1986). We are statutorily authorized to correct, set aside, or remand an order only on the limited grounds that the findings of fact are not sufficient to permit review, that conflicts in the evidence are not resolved, that the findings are not supported by the evidence, that the findings do not support the order, or that the award or denial of benefits is not supported by applicable law. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2006. We have reviewed the transcript of the hearing and the remainder of the record and we conclude that the order does not suffer from any of the enumerated deficiencies. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the order.
The claimant had the burden to prove that his alleged disability was proximately caused by an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 2006. Whether the claimant met that burden of proof is a factual question for resolution by the ALJ, and, as noted, his determination must be upheld if supported by substantial
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evidence in the record. Dover Elevator Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 961 P.2d 1141 (Colo.App. 1998). Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence which a rational fact finder would accept as adequate to support a conclusion without regard to the existence of conflicting evidence. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411, 415 (Colo.App. 1995).
Under this standard of review it is the ALJ’s sole prerogative to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the probative value of the evidence. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ unless the testimony the ALJ found persuasive is rebutted by such hard, certain evidence that it would be error as a matter of law to credit the testimony. Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1986). The existence of evidence which, if credited, might permit a contrary result also affords no basis for relief on appeal. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 55 P.3d 186 (Colo.App. 2002). Moreover, the ALJ’s order is sufficient for purposes of review if the legal and factual bases of the order are apparent from the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo.App. 2000).
Here, there is ample evidence supporting the ALJ’s factual findings, which in turn support his conclusion that the claimant failed to show that he had sustained a compensable injury. Dr. Steinmetz, for example, testified at the hearing that he had examined the claimant, reviewed his medical records, and viewed the respondents’ surveillance tape. When asked by the respondents’ attorney for his opinion whether the claimant sustained a shoulder injury at work the doctor responded that there was “absolutely no chance.” Tr. at 79. The doctor then explained that the history given by the claimant “doesn’t make any sense” and that “the objective findings don’t support any injury.” Tr. at 79. The ALJ expressly credited Dr. Steinmetz’s opinions as credible and, additionally, rejected the claimant’s testimony as not persuasive. Further, we note that the ALJ is not required to articulate the basis for his credibility determinations. Wells v. Del Norte School District C-7, 753 P.2d 770 (Colo.App. 1987). Rather, the ALJ’s credibility determinations must merely be sufficient to adequately inform a reviewing authority how the ALJ resolved conflicts in the evidence Regional Transportation District v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 1190 (Colo.App. 1991). However, here the ALJ explained in considerable detail the basis for his credibility determinations, noting that in several significant respects the claimant’s testimony contained inconsistencies or internal conflicts. We certainly are in no position to reweigh the evidence and draw inferences contrary to those reached by the ALJ. Under the circumstances of this case, we perceive no basis on which to disturb the order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order mailed on March 9, 2007, is affirmed.
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INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL ____________________________________ John D. Baird
____________________________________ Curt Kriksciun
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JAMES STAFFNEY, 10025 E. GIRARD AVE., DENVER, CO, (Claimant)
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC. dba OPTIMUM BATTERY, Attn: ANGELA WILSON, AURORA, CO, (Employer)
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Attn: RUTH GATES, GRAND PRAIRIE, TX, (Insurer)
BLACKMAN LEVINE, LLC, Attn: TAMA L. LEVINE, DENVER, CO, (For Respondents)
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC. dba OPTIMUM BATTERY, MILWAUKEE, WI, (Other Party)