W.C. No. 4-214-745Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
June 11, 1997
FINAL ORDER
The respondent-Helen Echols (Echols) seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Wheelock (ALJ) dated October 21, 1996. Echols contends that the ALJ erroneously granted “summary judgment” dismissing the Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority (CCIA) as a party to the claim. We disagree, and therefore, affirm.
A brief procedural history is necessary to understand the argument on appeal. The claimant originally filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against Echols and Don Skotty (Skotty). The claimant worked as a full-time domestic aide for Echols, and worked part-time cleaning offices for Skotty. In a final order dated October 31, 1994, the ALJ found that the claimant suffered two compensable injuries while employed by Echols, one of which was an occupational disease to her wrists on December 1, 1993. Consequently, the ALJ dismissed the claim against Skotty and ordered Echols to provide medical benefits. On October 24, 1995, the ALJ ordered Echols to pay medical impairment benefits and increased the claimant’s compensation based on Echols’ failure to carry workers’ compensation insurance.
In 1996, Echols obtained an order joining the CCIA at a party, and applied for a hearing on the issue of insurance coverage. The application was based upon Echols’ contention that the CCIA is liable for the claimant’s occupational disease, because Skotty purchased a workers’ compensation insurance policy from the CCIA which covered the claimant’s employment for Echols.
At the commencement of a hearing on October 21, 1996, the CCIA moved for an order of summary judgment dismissing it from the claim. The ALJ granted the CCIA’s motion and vacated the October 21 hearing. Echols filed a Petition for Review dated October 3, 1996.
On review, Echols contends that the she was denied due process of law by the ALJ’s failure to afford her an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the CCIA’s motion to dismiss. Given the procedural posture of the claim, we disagree.
As argued by Echols, the fundamental tenets of due process require that the parties be afforded an evidentiary hearing where the administrative adjudication turns on a question of fact Hendricks v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 809 P.2d 1076
(Colo.App. 1990). However, the ALJ is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and judgment may be entered as a matter of law. Service Supply Co. v. Vallejos, 169 Colo. 14, 452 P.2d 387 (1969).
Initially, we note that the ALJ did not issue specific findings of fact in support of her summary judgment as required by § 8-43-301(5), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.). The purpose of this statutory requirement is to insure that the ALJ articulates the basis of her order.
Here, the basis of the ALJ’s order is clear from her oral findings of fact. Cf. CAN-USA Construction, Inc. v. Gerber, 767 P.2d 765 (Colo.App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, at 783 P.2d 269 (1989) (the ALJ’s oral findings may be considered to interpret the ALJ’s written findings). The ALJ determined that the insurance coverage issue was previously adjudicated, and that Echols is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue. See
(Tr. pp. 17, 20-21, 31, 37-38). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that there was no material issue of fact which entitled Echols to an evidentiary hearing.
The parties agree that the ALJ’s order is based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Furthermore, we agree with the ALJ that the pertinent issue is a question of law. See Schrieber v. Brown Root, Inc., 888 P.2d 274 (Colo.App. 1993) (where undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion the issue is a question of law). Under these circumstances, no purpose is served by remanding the matter for specific findings of fact, and therefore, we decline to do so before considering Echols’ substantive arguments.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from litigating an issue actually adjudicated in a previous hearing if the following requirements are met: 1) the issue in question is identical to the issue actually litigated and necessarily adjudicated; 2) the party against whom estoppel is sought was a party to, or in privity with, a party in the previous proceeding; 3) there was a final judgment in the previous proceedings; and 4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the previous hearing Lindner Chevrolet v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 914 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, Askew v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 927 P.2d 1333 (Colo. 1996).
Here, Echols argues that she is not collaterally estopped from litigating the insurance coverage issue because she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue at the hearings in 1995. She further contends that the question of whether the claimant’s injury was covered in a workers’ compensation insurance policy purchased from the CCIA was not previously before the ALJ. We disagree.
On August 2, 1995 and October 4, 1995, the matter came before the ALJ on the issues of permanent disability, average weekly wage, medical benefits and penalties. Based upon the evidence presented at those hearings the ALJ entered her order of October 24, 1995, which awarded the claimant medical impairment benefits increased by fifty percent because Echols was “admittedly an uninsured” employer.
Under the statutory language currently codified at §8-43-408(1), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.) an award of permanent partial disability benefits shall be increased by fifty percent if the employer has not complied with the insurance requirements of §8-44-101 C.R.S. (1996). That statute requires the employer to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees by being self-insured, or the purchase of coverage from the CCIA or another insurer.
It follows that the fifty percent increase in benefits provided by § 8-43-408(1) is not applicable if the employer has insurance coverage with the CCIA. Thus, the ALJ’s finding that Echols was “uninsured” demonstrates that the insurance issue was litigated in the prior proceeding. Moreover, in view of the statutory consequence of failure to insure, Echols had substantial incentive to fully litigate the issue. Thus, we reject the argument that she did not have a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the coverage issue.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s finding that Echols was uninsured was crucial to the award of medical impairment benefits in an amount greater than the benefits due under § 8-42-107(8)(d), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.). However, Echols did not appeal the ALJ’s finding that she was “uninsured.” Rather, Echols only appealed the ALJ’s determination of her medical impairment and the ALJ’s imposition of penalties for the failure to pay medical benefits. We affirmed the award of medical impairment benefits including the fifty percent increase in compensation, and no appeal was taken from that portion of our order. Consequently, the ALJ’s October 24 finding that there was no workers’ compensation insurance coverage for the claimant’s injury became a final order which cannot be relitigated except in accordance with the reopening provisions at § 8-43-303 C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.). See Brown Root, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 833 P.2d 780 (Colo.App. 1991) (an order becomes final by the exhaustion of, or failure to exhaust review proceedings and once final no further benefits may be awarded absent an order reopening the claim).
As of October 21, 1996, the record did not contain a Petition to Reopen which alleged an “error” or “mistake” in the ALJ’s prior finding that Echols was “uninsured.” Therefore, we agree with the ALJ that Echols established no material issue of fact. See Peterson v. Halsted, 829 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1992) (a material fact is simply a fact that will affect the outcome of the case). Further, these circumstances compel a conclusion that Echols is collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of insurance coverage. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in granting summary judgment on the CCIA’s motion to be dismissed from the claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated October 21, 1996, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ David Cain
______________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate thisOrder is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14thAvenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with thecourt, with service of a copy of the petition upon the IndustrialClaim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20)days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to section8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed June 11, 1997 to the following parties:
Elouise Sprueil, 5080 Marabou Way, Security, CO 80911
Don Skotty, 1229 Lake Plaza Dr., Colorado Springs, CO 80906
Helen S. Echols, 35 Upland Road, Colorado Springs, CO 80906
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Laurie A. Schoder, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
William C. Jolliffe, Esq., 90 S. Cascade, Ste. 300, P.O. Box 2940, Colorado Springs, CO 80901-2940 (For the Claimant)
W. Thomas Beltz, Esq., 316 N. Tejon St., Colorado Springs, CO 80911 (For Helen S. Echols)
Ralph Ogden, Esq., 1750 Gilpin St., Denver, CO 80218 (For Helen S. Echols)
By: ________________________________