W.C. No. 4-312-061Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
August 21, 2000
FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Friend (ALJ) which denied his claim for the alleged occupational diseases of hypertension and stress-related anxiety. The claimant contends the evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings concerning the medical evidence. The claimant also disputes the reliability of the transcript. We affirm.
The claimant alleged that his job as a police officer caused stress-related anxiety and hypertension. The events forming the basis of the claim occurred during the period of time which preceded the claimant’s termination from employment in May 1981.
However, relying on the medical report of Dr. Schiff, the ALJ found the claimant suffers from somatoform disorder, alcohol dependence, paranoid personality, and organic mental disorder. The ALJ further credited Dr. Schiff’s opinion that these diseases did not result from the conditions of the claimant’s employment, and cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate cause. The ALJ also found the claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered any occupational disease as a result of his employment. Therefore, the ALJ dismissed the claim.
I.
On review, the claimant disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant failed to prove a compensable occupational disease. Specifically, the claimant challenges Finding of Fact 3, in which the ALJ stated that Dr. Harris, in a report dated May 20, 1981, “did not comment on whether the uncontrolled hypertension was related to [the claimant’s] employment as a police officer.” The claimant also alleges the ALJ erroneously relied on Dr. Schiff’s opinion because Dr. Schiff did not examine the claimant until June 1988. We find no error.
As the ALJ recognized, an occupational disease is defined as a disease which results directly from the conditions under which the work was performed, follows as a natural incident of the work, and can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause. Section 8-40-201(14), C.R.S. 1999 [formerly § 8-41-108(3)]. Under the law applicable to this claim, the claimant was entitled to recover for stress-related diseases causally related to his employment . See City of Boulder v. Streeb, 706 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1985).
The question of whether the claimant has proven the existence of a disease directly and proximately caused by the employment is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claims Office, 989 P.2d 251 (Colo.App. 1999). Because the issue is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ’s order if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 1999. Thus, we must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, his credibility determinations, and the plausible inferences he drew from the record. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claims Office, supra.
The weight and credibility of expert medical evidence concerning the issue of causation is a matter entirely within the ALJ’s fact-finding authority. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). To the extent a particular expert’s medical opinion is subject to conflicting interpretations, the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Colorado Springs Motors, Ltd. v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 504, 441 P.2d 21 (1968). Further, it is for the ALJ to determine whether an expert received sufficient medical history to render a credible opinion Industrial Commission v. Albo, 167 Colo. 467, 447 P.2d 1006
(1968).
Here, the ALJ credited Dr. Schiff’s opinion that the claimant’s psychological conditions are not related to his employment as a police officer. Although Dr. Schiff did not examine the claimant until several years after the claimant’s discharge from employment, he reviewed the claimant’s medical records, took a medical history, and reviewed other relevant documents. Under the circumstances, we may not interfere with the ALJ’s decision to credit Dr. Schiff’s opinions.
Neither do we perceive any error in the ALJ’s findings concerning the May 20, 1981, report of Dr. Harris. Our review of the report reveals that Dr. Harris stated the claimant was suffering from “uncontrolled hypertension.” In the next sentence, Dr. Harris reported the “possibility of a personality disorder is raised in view of [the claimant’s] anxiety resulting from job-related activities.” As the ALJ found, Dr. Harris does not express a direct opinion concerning the cause of the “uncontrolled hypertension,” and does not link that condition to the claimant’s “anxiety resulting from job-related activities.” Although it is possible the ALJ might have interpreted the report to mean that Dr. Harris found a causal relationship between the hypertension and work-related stress, the ALJ was not compelled to draw such an inference.
We find the claimant’s remaining arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to be without merit.
II.
The claimant next alleges the ALJ and the court reporter “tampered” with the evidence by “altering the court transcript so it would favor the respondent by deleting the true testimony in this case.” We find no error.
A presumption of integrity, honesty, and impartiality rests with the ALJ in the conduct of his official duties, and we must assume the ALJ acted accordingly unless the contrary is shown Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186 (Colo.App. 1995) Ski Depot Rentals, Inc. v. Lynch, 714 P.2d 516 (Colo.App. 1985). Further, when the reporter certifies the transcript to be a “correct statement of the evidence in the proceedings,” we are obliged to accept the transcript as the evidence in the case. Section 8-43-214, C.R.S. 1999. We have held a properly certified transcript is entitled to a presumption of regularity. Hatton v. PCL Construction Services, W.C. No. 4-104-2 40 (September 29, 1992).
Here, the claimant’s bald assertions are insufficient to set aside the presumption that the ALJ and the reporter acted properly in preparing, certifying, and transmitting the record. Indeed, the claimant makes no specific allegations concerning the nature of the allegedly deleted testimony, and offers no affidavits or other evidence of impropriety. Consequently, there is no basis for interfering with the order.
III.
Finally, the claimant asserts the respondent admitted the compensability of the claim because it declined to call witnesses or submit additional evidence following the claimant’s testimony. However our review of the record reflects the respondent’s position was that the evidence and testimony offered by the claimant were insufficient to meet the burden of proof. The respondent’s tactical decisions concerning whether or not to present additional evidence cannot be construed as an admission of liability.
Insofar as the claimant makes other arguments, we find them to be without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated May 3, 1999, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 1999. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed August 21, 2000 to the following parties:
Raymond Snell, P. O. Box 39778, Denver, CO 80239
City County of Denver, Olivia L. Hudson, Esq., Assistant City Attorney, Worker’s Compensation Unit, 1445 Cleveland Place, #200, Denver, CO 80202
BY: A. Pendroy