W.C. No. 3-104-578Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
June 18, 1997
CORRECTED FINAL ORDER
Due to clerical error, our Order of June 5, 1997 was not mailed to the parties listed on the Certificate of Mailing. Therefore, pursuant to § 8-43-302(1)(a), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.), we reissue our Order in its entirety to correct the error, and afford the parties their full appellate rights.
The claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Martinez (ALJ), which denied his claim for medical benefits subsequent to maximum medical improvement (MMI) in accordance with Grover v. Industrial Commission, 759 P.2d 705
(Colo. 1988). We affirm.
The pertinent facts are undisputed. The claimant suffered a compensable cervical injury on July 15, 1992, and was treated by Dr. Knackendoffel until August 17, 1992. Commencing September 9, 1992, the injury was treated by Dr. Schleusener. On April 28, 1993, Dr. Schleusener issued a “Physicians Report of Maximum Medical Improvement and Impairment” form in which he reported that the claimant reached MMI on April 20, 1993. However, Dr. Schleusener left blank the part of the form concerning whether the claimant requires additional treatment to maintain MMI. In a subsequent report dated June 3, 1996, Dr. Schleusener reiterated his determination of MMI and issued a permanent medical impairment rating.
The claimant did not seek further treatment until May 24, 1996, when he was examined by Dr. Root for complaints of neck and shoulder pain. Dr. Root opined that the claimant’s condition was related to the 1992 injury and recommended additional physical therapy. However, Dr. Rook noted that the claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 1995 which “could have exacerbated” his condition.
Thereafter, in a letter dated September 17, 1996, Dr. Knackendoffel agreed with Dr. Root’s treatment recommendations and opined that the claimant’s ongoing neck pain is “most likely” related to the 1992 injury. However, Dr. Knackendoffel also stated that “it is quite possible” the 1995 motor vehicle accident and the claimant’s current work as an air conditioner installer “aggravated his cervical condition.”
The ALJ determined that the claimant failed to sustain his burden to prove that his need for additional treatment was causally related to the 1992 injury. Therefore, the ALJ denied the claimant’s request for Grover benefits.
On review, the claimant’s sole argument is that the ALJ’s order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The claimant contends that Dr. Schleusener never issued an opinion concerning the need for Grover benefits and the uncontroverted medical opinions of Dr. Root and Dr. Knackendoffel are sufficient to establish that the need for further treatment is causally related to the industrial injury. We disagree.
Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence which a rational fact-finder would accept as adequate to support a conclusion, without regard to the existence of conflicting evidence. Durocher v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 905 P.2d 4
(Colo.App. 1995). In determining whether the ALJ’s order is supported by substantial evidence we are obliged to defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and his assessment of the weight and sufficiency of expert medical opinions. Monfort Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1993); Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). Furthermore, where the record is subject to conflicting inferences concerning the cause of the claimant’s condition, it is the ALJ’s sole province to determine the inference to be drawn, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ in this regard. City of Durango v. Dunagan, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. No. 96CA0973, May 1, 1997).
Here, the record was subject to conflicting inferences concerning whether the claimant’s need for further medical treatment is causally related to the original industrial injury. The opinions of Dr. Root and Dr. Knackendoffel were equivocal. Both doctors suggested that the claimant’s condition may be due to causes other than the 1992 injury. Therefore, we reject the claimant’s assertion that their opinions represent uncontroverted evidence that the industrial injury is the proximate cause of the claimant’s need for further treatment.
In any case, even if the opinions of Dr. Root and Dr. Knackendoffel are uncontroverted, they were not binding on the ALJ. Casa Bonita Restaurant v. Industrial Commission, 624 P.2d 1340 (Colo.App. 1981). To the contrary, the ALJ was free to reject their opinions in favor of Dr. Schleusener. See Colorado Springs Motors, Ltd. v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 504, 441 P.2d 21 (1968) (ALJ may credit all, part or none of witness’ testimony); Dow Chemical Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 843 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1992) (ALJ free to credit one medical opinion to the exclusion of a contrary medical opinion).
The ALJ gave Dr. Schleusener’s opinions the greatest weight because Dr. Schleusener provided the “bulk” of the treatment for the industrial injury. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that Dr. Schleusener did not indicate any need for ongoing treatment of the industrial injury.
Admittedly, Dr. Schleusener’s failure to fill in the April 28 MMI form concerning whether the claimant required further treatment could be construed as evidence that Dr. Schleusener had no opinion concerning the claimant’s need for ongoing treatment. However, it is also plausible to infer, as did the ALJ, that Dr. Schleusener did not make any comment concerning the claimant’s need for further treatment because he did not believe any further treatment was needed. Therefore, we reject the claimant’s argument that the record contains no opinion from Dr. Schleusener on the issue of Grover benefits.
Furthermore, the claimant’s arguments notwithstanding, the ALJ could plausibly infer that the claimant’s failure to seek further treatment within three years of reaching MMI is evidence that the request for further treatment was not prompted by the industrial injury. Moreover, we agree with the ALJ that this inference is buttressed by the evidence that the claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 1995, and that the claimant’s work as an air conditioner installer could have aggravated his industrial injury. Consequently, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that the claimant failed to establish a causal connection between the need for further treatment and the industrial injury, the claimant has failed to establish grounds which afford us a basis to disturb the ALJ’s order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order, dated November 20, 1996, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ David Cain
______________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate thisOrder is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14thAvenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with thecourt, with service of a copy of the petition upon the IndustrialClaim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20)days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to section8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed June 18, 1997 to the following parties:
Jeromy C. Smith, 625 W. Humboldt, Lot 402, Battle Mountain, NV 89820
Dennie Glass Enterprises, Inc., 119 N. Bower St., Palisade, CO 81526-8751
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Laurie A. Schoder, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
Thomas W. Blake, Esq., 744 Horizon Ct., Ste. 360, Grand Junction, CO 81506 (For the Respondents)
Clifford E. Eley, Esq., 1777 S. Harrison, Ste. 906, Denver, CO 80210 (For the Claimant)
By: ________________________________