IN RE SIMMONS, W.C. No. 4-222-793 (11/21/95)


IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF HAROLD E. SIMMONS, Claimant, v. WCHS OF COLORADO, Employer, and COLORADO COMPENSATION INSURANCE AUTHORITY, Insurer, Respondents.

W.C. No. 4-222-793Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
November 21, 1995

FINAL ORDER

The respondents seek review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Friend (ALJ), which determined that the claimant sustained a compensable occupational disease, and failed to apportion liability. We affirm.

The ALJ found that the claimant experienced “pain, stiffness, and spasm in this [sic] back throughout much of his life.” Further, in 1991, the claimant fell and injured his back. However, the ALJ found that the claimant received no treatment for his back between 1991 and August 1994.

The ALJ further found that, in August 1994, the claimant was hired by the respondent-employer. During his employment, the claimant was required to sit on a broken chair. This “caused the claimant’s back pain to worsen to the point that he required treatment and could no longer work at his job.”

Under these circumstances, the ALJ concluded that the claimant proved that sitting in the chair “caused his back pain to increase so as to require medical treatment and result in temporary disability.” The ALJ also found that sitting on the broken chair constituted a compensable occupational disease under the criteria set forth in § 8-40-201(14), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.).

On review, the respondents argue that the ALJ found that the claimant’s back condition resulted from “multiple causes.” Thus, the respondents assert that the ALJ was required to apportion disability under the principles set forth in Anderson v. Brinkhoff, 859 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1993). We find no error.

We assume, arguendo, that the ALJ found that the claimant suffers from a pre-existing back condition which constitutes a “cause” of the claimant’s “disease.” Under such circumstances, the following language from Anderson v. Brinkhoff, supra, is pertinent:

“The statute is equally clear in not requiring that hazardous conditions of employment be the sole cause of the disease or aggravation. Nevertheless, a claimant is entitled to recover only if the hazards of employment cause, intensify, or aggravate — to some reasonable degree — the disability for which compensation is sought.”

The Anderson decision goes on to state that where an occupational exposure to a hazard is not a necessary precondition to development of the disease, “the claimant suffers from an occupational disease only to the extent that the occupational exposure contributed to the disability.”

Here, the ALJ has expressly found that, although the claimant suffered from a pre-existing condition or disease, it was the industrial aggravation of that disease which caused the claimant’s disability and need for treatment. That finding is amply supported by evidence that the claimant did not receive any treatment for his back condition between 1991 and 1994, and that the aggravation developed immediately after the claimant’s job required him to sit in the broken chair for prolonged periods of time.

Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s findings are adequate to explain the basis of the order. Further, they support the award of benefits under the principles established by Anderson v. Brinkhoff, supra. See Lucero v. Jackson Ice Cream, W.C. No. 4-170-105, January 6, 1995; Chavez v. Longmont Foods, W.C. No. 4-204-349, December 20, 1994. Insofar as the respondents have made other arguments, we find them to be without merit.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order, dated December 2, 1994, is affirmed.

INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEAL PANEL

___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Dona Halsey

NOTICE

This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver,Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, withservice of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Officeand all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Orderwas mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).

Copies of this decision were mailed November 21, 1995 to the following parties:

Harold E. Simmons, 3600 S. Bannock St., #204, Englewood, CO 80110

WCHS of Colorado, 6060 Mission Gorge Rd., San Diego, CA 92120-4008

D. A. Thomas, Esq., Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority — Interagency Mail

Brad R. Irwin, Esq., 501 S. Cherry St., #500, Denver, CO 80222

(For Claimant)

By: _____________________________