W.C. No. 4-415-403Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
March 2, 2001.
ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Henk (ALJ) which determined Dr. Allison Fall is an authorized treating physician. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order.
On December 28, 1998, the claimant suffered a compensable injury. The respondents referred the claimant to Concentra Medical Centers for treatment. Concentra referred the claimant to Dr. Fall effective March 24, 1999. On September 2, 1999, Dr. Fall placed the claimant at maximum medical improvement (MMI) with zero permanent impairment. The respondents filed a final admission of liability consistent with Dr. Fall’s determination of MMI and medical impairment rating.
The ALJ found Dr. Fall became an authorized treating physician effective March 24, 1999. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the claimant’s change of physicians did not deauthorize Dr. Fall. Therefore, the ALJ determined Dr. Fall was an authorized treating physician for purposes of §8-42-107(8)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2000, at the time she placed the claimant at MMI.
On appeal, the claimant contends the ALJ erroneously found Dr. Fall to be an authorized treating physician. The claimant also contends Dr. Fall improperly determined MMI.
The respondents contend the ALJ’s order is interlocutory and not currently subject to review. We agree.
Under § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 2000, a party dissatisfied with an order “which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant a benefit or penalty,” may file a petition to review. Orders which do not require the payment of benefits or penalties, or deny the claimant benefits or penalties are interlocutory and not subject to review. Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App. 1989). Furthermore, orders which determine liability for benefits, without determining the amount of benefits, do not award or deny benefits as contemplated by this statute, and consequently, are not subject to review. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo.App. 1989); CF I Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 144 (Colo.App. 1986).
“Authorization” refers to the physician’s legal authority to treat, and is distinct from whether treatment is “reasonable and necessary” within meaning of § 8-42-101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2000. Mason Jar Restaurant v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 862 P.2d 1026
(Colo.App. 1993). Thus, a finding that treatment is “authorized” is not itself a “medical benefit.” One Hour Cleaners v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 914 P.2d 501 (Colo.App. 1995). Accordingly, we have previously held that an order which determines a physician’s “authorization” but does not award or deny payment for that physician’s treatment is not a final order for purposes of appellate review. See Matthews v. United Parcel Service, W.C. No. 4-325-652 (December 15, 1997); Fernandez v. City and County of Denver, W.C. No. 4-122-784 (February 7, 1996) Churchill v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., W.C. No. (April 17, 1995). We adhere to our previous conclusions.
Here, the ALJ’s order does not award or deny the claimant any particular medical benefit. Rather, the ALJ expressly reserved all other issues for future determination.
Moreover, the ALJ did not purport to determine whether the claimant was in fact at MMI as asserted in the respondents’ final admission of liability. To the contrary, at the commencement of the hearing, claimant’s counsel stated that the issue of MMI was not ripe because the claimant requested a Division-sponsored independent medical examination to contest Dr. Fall’s finding of MMI. (See Tr. pp. 4, 19). The claimant also admitted that if the ALJ found Dr. Hall was an authorized treating physician, all other claims for benefits and penalties were not ripe for adjudication. (Tr. pp. 3, 5-6, 29). Therefore, no benefit issues were before the ALJ for adjudication.
It follows that regardless of whether the ALJ’s determination of “authorization” supports the respondents’ denial of permanent disability benefits, the ALJ’s order does not award or deny a benefit within the meaning of § 8-43-301(2). Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s order is interlocutory and not currently subject to review. Director of Division of Labor v. Smith, 725 P.2d 1161 (Colo.App. 1986).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claimant’s petition to review the ALJ’s order dated March 7, 2000, is dismissed without prejudice.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
____________________________________ Robert M. Socolofsky
NOTICE
An action to modify or vacate this Order may be commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2000. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed March 2, 2001 to the following parties:
Nancy Sholund, 992 S. Dearborn Way, #4, Aurora, CO 80012
Janette Smith, Argenbright Security, 3333 Quebec St., #4080, Denver, CO 80207
Zurich Insurance Company, P. O. Box 20048, Kansas City, MO 64195
Carol Wetherell, Frank Gates USA, P. O. Box 9300, Albuquerque, NM 87119
Chris L. Ingold, Esq., 501 S. Cherry St., #500, Denver, CO 80246 (For Claimant)
Marsha A. Kitch, Esq., Bergen Park Business Plaza, 1202 Bergen Pkwy., #311, Evergreen, CO 80439 (For Respondents)
BY A. Pendroy