W.C. No. 4-529-550.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
November 2, 2006.
ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order following a remand dated May 26, 2006 of Administrative Law Judge Harr (ALJ) that denied and dismissed her claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.
This matter was previously before us. The ALJ entered an order dated March 7, 2005, in which he found that the claimant was involved in an automobile accident while on the way to a training session to obtain certification to work for the employer as a bartender. The ALJ concluded that the claimant was not in travel status on the way to the training session and therefore denied and dismissed the claim. Because we held that the claimant was in travel status as a matter of law, we remanded for further proceedings, including resolution of a then-pending motion to dismiss the claim as a sanction for alleged discovery violations. Following the remand the ALJ again denied and dismissed the claim and, additionally, awarded the insurer attorney fees on account of the claimant’s discovery violations.
The ALJ’s findings of fact following the remand may be summarized as follows. On November 30, 2001, the claimant was hired as a prospective employee to work as a part-time bartender. The employer informed the claimant that she would need to obtain certification as a bartender in order to work in the employer’s club. The employer scheduled two training sessions to permit the claimant to obtain the necessary certification. On December 19, 2001, the claimant arrived at the employer’s club for the second session, and was informed that its location had been changed to a nearby warehouse owned by Budweiser. On the way to the session the claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The claimant slowed her car because the car in front of her was turning and the claimant’s car was “rear-ended” by another prospective employee on the way to the bartending class. The accident was a “low impact” one, and the ALJ found that the vehicles sustained only minor damage with no injuries to any of the occupants.
The ALJ also found that the following day the claimant sought treatment at Penrose Hospital’s emergency room, where the physician examined her neck and found no tenderness or pain. She subsequently treated with Dr. Warwick, who referred her for physical therapy and for diagnostic studies of her cervical spine. The claimant failed to attend her physical therapy sessions and failed to obtain the x-ray studies. Her attorney referred her to Dr. Higgenbotham, who recommended that she work only half-time as a bartender because prolonged standing might aggravate her back. However, because Dr. Higgenbotham relief upon an “exaggerated” history of the motor vehicle accident, the ALJ rejected his opinions as not credible. The respondents referred the claimant to Dr. Ridings for an independent medical examination. The ALJ expressly credited Dr. Riding’s opinions that the claimant had exaggerated her symptoms and that she had not sustained any injury in the motor vehicle accident.
Based upon his factual findings the ALJ concluded that the claimant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an injury in the motor vehicle accident. Accordingly, he denied and dismissed the claim for compensation. Additionally, the ALJ awarded attorney fees to the respondents based upon the claimant’s violation of several discovery orders.
The claimant appealed; however, her petition to review contains no specific allegations of error and she has not filed a brief in support of her petition to review. Accordingly the scope of our review is limited. Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 734 P.2d 642
(Colo.App. 1986).
Where the claimant’s entitlement to benefits is disputed, the claimant has the burden to prove a causal relationship between a work-related accident and an injury, disease or condition for which benefits or compensation are sought. Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337 (Colo.App. 1997). Whether the claimant sustained her burden of proof is a factual question for resolution by the ALJ. City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1997). The ALJ’s factual determinations must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and plausible inferences drawn from the record. We have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the credibility of witnesses and we may not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Id.; Delta Drywall v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 868 P.2d 1155 (Colo.App. 1993).
Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence which a rational fact finder would accept as adequate to support a conclusion without regard to the existence of conflicting evidence. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411, (Colo.App. 1995). Under this standard of review it is the ALJ’s sole prerogative to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the probative value of the evidence. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ unless the testimony the ALJ found persuasive is rebutted by such hard, certain evidence that it would be error as a matter of law to credit the testimony Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1986). Testimony which is merely biased, inconsistent, or conflicting is not necessarily incredible as a matter of law. People v. Ramirez, 30 P.3d 807 (Colo.App. 2001). The existence of evidence which, if credited, might permit a contrary result also affords no basis for relief on appeal. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 55 P.3d 186 (Colo.App. 2002). Moreover, the ALJ’s order is sufficient for purposes of review if the legal and factual bases of the order are apparent from the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo.App. 2000).
Here, we have reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ’s findings are sufficient to permit appellate review and the ALJ resolved conflicts in the evidence based upon weighing of the evidence and his credibility determinations. Further, the ALJ’s findings are amply supported by substantial evidence in the record and the findings support the conclusion that the claimant failed to prove entitlement to benefits and compensation. After performing an independent medical examination, Dr. Ridings reported that “the patient had no significant injury in the motor vehicle accident of 12-19-01.” Report of Dr. Ridings at 4 (August 7, 2003). The ALJ could reasonably infer from the entire record in this case that the motor vehicle accident caused no injury to the claimant requiring medical treatment. The ALJ correctly applied the law and did not err in denying benefits. Accordingly, we perceive no basis on which to disturb the ALJ’s order.
Finally, we perceive no basis on which to disturb the ALJ’s order awarding attorney fees to the respondents on account of their protracted litigation of the discovery issues. We note that the ALJ did not enter findings concerning the amount of the fees awarded or the time expended by the respondents in litigating the discovery matters. Accordingly, it is necessary to remand this matter for such further proceedings as are necessary to resolve the amount of the attorney fees awarded.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated May 26, 2006, is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter is remanded for such further proceedings as are necessary to finally resolve the award of attorney fees.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ Curt Kriksciun
____________________________________ Thomas Schrant
Heather Shields, Highlands Ranch, CO, Colorado Springs Club Venture d/b/a Graham Central Station, Gerald Pare, Houston, TX, Pinnacol Assurance, Tom Noonan, Denver, CO, Charlotte A. Veaux, Esq., Colorado Springs, CO, (For Respondents).
Steven R. Waldmann, Esq., Colorado Springs, CO, (For Claimant).