W.C. No. 4-462-943Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
January 16, 2002
ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Snider (ALJ) dated March 5, 2001. We dismiss the petition to review without prejudice.
Under § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 2001, a party dissatisfied with an order “which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant a benefit or penalty,” may file a petition to review. Orders which do not require the payment of benefits or penalties, or deny the claimant benefits or penalties are interlocutory and not subject to review. Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App. 1989). An order which determines the employer’s liability for benefits but does not determine the amount of benefits is not an order requiring the payment of benefits. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo.App. 1989). For example, in CF I Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 144 (Colo.App. 1986), an order was entered which awarded the claimant permanent total disability benefits. However, the order did not determine whether the Subsequent Injury Fund was liable for a portion of the benefits, and thus, the order did not determine the amount of benefits to be paid by the employer. Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals held that the order was not was not a final order. 731 P.2d at 146.
Based on these principles, we have repeatedly concluded that an award of temporary disability benefits is not subject to review unless the order determines the claimant’s temporary disability rate. See Orozco v. Sno-White Linen and Uniform Rental Inc., W.C. No. 4-159-681, June 29, 1995; Theobald v. Fort Logan Mental Health Institute, W.C. No. 4-178-865, August 23, 1994. Furthermore, a finding that treatment is “authorized” is not itself a “medical benefit.” One Hour Cleaners v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 914 P.2d 501 (Colo.App. 1995). This is true because “authorization” refers to the physician’s legal authority to treat, which is distinct from whether treatment is “reasonable and necessary” and the respondents are only liable for authorized treatment that is reasonable and necessary to relieve the effects of the industrial injury. Mason Jar Restaurant v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 862 P.2d 1026 (Colo.App. 1993); Sims v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 797 P.2d 777 (Colo.App. 1990). Thus, orders which determine the identity of the authorized provider and contain a general award of medical benefits are not final and reviewable unless the reasonableness of specific medical treatment is resolved. Rosas v. DDC Interiors, Inc.,
W.C. No. 4-364-828 (August 18, 1999); Tilton v. ABC Turf Care,
W.C. No. 3-105-542 (August 18, 1994). We adhere to our prior conclusions.
This matter came before the ALJ for a full contest hearing. Based upon the evidence presented, the ALJ determined the claimant suffered compensable injuries on April 10, 1999 and February 18, 2000. The ALJ also determined the claimant was entitled to periods of temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits. Furthermore, the ALJ denied the respondents’ request for a reduction of disability benefits due to the claimant’s failure timely to report the injuries. However, there is no admission or stipulation concerning the claimant’s average weekly wage. Nor did the ALJ determine the claimant’s average weekly wage. Rather, the ALJ determined the claimant “reserved” the issue of the average weekly wage. Therefore, the amount of the temporary disability award has not been determined.
On the issue of medical benefits, the claimant requested authorization to treat with Dr. Tartaglia and requested payment for treatment on May 12, 2000. (Tr. p. 143). The ALJ determined Dr. Tartaglia is an authorized treating physician and ordered the respondents to pay for “medical treatment as may reasonably be needed to cure and relieve the Claimant from the effects” of the industrial injuries. However, the ALJ did not determine whether the treatment provided by Dr. Tartaglia on May 12 was reasonably necessary to treat the industrial injury. Instead, the ALJ explicitly reserved all other issues for future determination.
Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s order does not require the respondent to pay any specific benefit or penalty. Neither does the order deny the claimant a benefit or penalty. Therefore, the March order is not a final order within the meaning of § 8-43-301(2), and not currently subject to review. Director of Division of Labor v. Smith, 725 P.2d 1161 (Colo.App. 1986).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents’ petition to review the ALJ’s order dated March 5, 2001, is dismissed without prejudice
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
An action to modify or vacate this Order may be commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2001. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed January 16, 2002 to the following parties:
Tiffanie Sedlacek Rylant, 517 E. Trilby Rd., #20, Ft. Collins, CO 80525
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 7500 E. Crossroads Blvd., Loveland, CO 80538-8958
American Home Assurance Co., 160 Water St., New York, N Y 10038
Claims Management Inc., 3901 S.E. Adams Road, Bartlesville, OK 74006-8408
Erin Bishop, Claims Management, Inc., P. O. Box 1288, Bentonville, AR 72712-1288
Britton Morrell, Esq., 710 11th Ave., #203, Greeley, CO 80631 (For Claimant)
Richard A. Bovarnick, Esq., 5353 W. Dartmouth Ave., #400, Denver, CO 80227 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy