W.C. No. 4-337-428.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
November 29, 1999.
FINAL ORDER.
The respondent seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Atencio (ALJ) insofar as it imposed penalties for failure timely to admit or deny liability. We reverse.
The claimant sustained a compensable injury on August 28, 1995, and sought medical treatment for the injury. It is not disputed that the employer was aware of the injury and the claimant’s need for medical treatment. However, the claimant did not miss time from work as a result of the injury.
On May 15, 1997, the claimant filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The respondent was notified of the claim by letter dated May 16, 1997. The respondent did not file a final admission of liability until November 20, 1997, within twenty days of learning that the claimant sustained permanent medical impairment.
The ALJ concluded that the respondent was required to file an admission or denial of liability within twenty days of receiving the notice of the claim, or by June 5, 1997. Because the respondent did not do so, the ALJ assessed a penalty of $20 per day for the period of June 6, 1997 until November 20, 1997. The total penalty was $3,340. The ALJ stated that the penalty was imposed “pursuant to § 8-43-203(2)(a),” which provides that failure to admit or deny liability as required by subsection (1) of that statute renders the employer liable for a penalty of up to one day’s compensation for each day’s failure to notify.
On review, the respondent contends that under § 8-43-203(1)(a) there was no obligation to admit or deny liability based on the filing of the claim. Rather, the respondent asserts the obligation to admit or deny liability arises when the employer has knowledge of an injury which causes lost time or permanent physical impairment. The respondent states she had no such knowledge until November 1997, and then filed a timely admission. Under the circumstances present here, we agree with the respondent.
The first sentence of § 8-43-203(1)(a) provides that the employer, or the insurance carrier, must notify the Division of Workers’ Compensation and the claimant “within twenty days after notice or knowledge of an injury to an employee which disables said employee for more than three shifts or three calendar days or results in permanent physical impairment or death of said employee, whether liability is admitted or contested.” The last sentence of the subsection states that:
Where the employer’s report of injury shows that the employee is temporarily disabled for three days or less and medical attention as provided by § 8-42-101, if required, has been afforded at the expense of the employer or the insurance carrier, then no admission or denial of liability need be filed until the employer or, if insured, the employer’s insurance carrier has knowledge of or notice of claim for compensation benefits and then within twenty days from the date of such knowledge or notice.
When interpreting statutes the objective is to implement the legislative intent. In order to do so, the we must first examine the statutory language and afford the words their plain and ordinary meanings. Weld County School District v. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550 (Colo. 1998). If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction. City of Thornton v. Replogle, 888 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1995). Where possible, we should avoid forced, subtle, or strained construction of statutory language. Miller v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 985 P.2d 94 (Colo.App. 1999).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the first sentence of §8-43-203(1)(a) is that the employer’s duty to admit or deny liability does not arise under this statute unless the employer has notice that the claimant has sustained more than three days of lost time from work, permanent impairment, or death. The last sentence creates an exception to the first sentence, delaying the employer’s obligation to file an admission or denial of liability under certain circumstances. Specifically, if the employer has filed a first report of the injury which shows the claimant has lost three days or less, and medical attention has been provided, the employer need not file an admission or denial of liability until a claim for compensation benefits is filed.
Here, the second sentence of the statute has no application because the employer did not file a first report of the injury and did not pay medical benefits. Cf. Hanson v. Industrial Commission, 716 P.2d 477 (Colo.App. 1986). Consequently, the respondent’s obligation to admit or deny liability did not arise under this statute until she obtained knowledge which should reasonably have lead her to believe the claimant had a permanently impairing injury. As the respondent argues, nothing contained in the claim, or the filing of the claim for benefits, triggered such knowledge.
It follows that the ALJ erred in concluding the filing of the claim obligated the respondent to admit or deny liability under §8-43-203(1), subjecting the respondent to the penalty provided in § 8-43-203(2). Consequently, the award of penalties under that statute must be reversed. In reaching this result we recognize the existence of Rule of Procedure IV (A) (2), 7 Code Colo. Reg. 1101-3 at 4. However, the claimant did not seek a penalty for violation of that rule, and the ALJ’s order did not address that issue. Consequently, we have not considered whether a penalty could be appropriate under other provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated March 19, 1999, is reversed insofar as it assessed penalties of $3,340 pursuant to § 8-43-203(2)(a) for failure timely to admit or deny liability.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
_____________________________ David Cain
_____________________________ Bill Whitacre
NOTICE This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate theOrder is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14thAvenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to reviewwith the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon theIndustrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, withintwenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to§§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1999.
Copies of this decision were mailed November 29, 1999 to the following parties:
Pauline Ruggio, 1760 W. 85th Ave., #203, Denver, CO 80221.
Cindy Lofing d/b/a City Cafe, 8501 Grant St., Thornton, CO 80229-4800.
Shawn P. Langley, Esq., 1115 11th Ave., Greeley, CO 80631 (For Claimant).
Roger Fraley, Jr., Esq., 517 E. 16th Ave., Denver, CO 80203 (For Respondent).
Kathleen Pennucci, Special Funds Unit, Division of Workers’ Compensation — Interagency Mail.
Jill M. M. Gallet, Esq., Office of the Attorney General, 1525 Sherman St., 5th floor, Denver, CO 80203.
BY: A. Pendroy