W.C. No. 4-164-997Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
August 25, 2000
ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Vigil (ALJ Vigil) which determined the claimant is entitled to continuing medical benefits in accordance with Grover v. Industrial Commission, 759 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1988). We dismiss the petition to review without prejudice.
A brief review of the procedural history of this case is necessary in order to understand our resolution of the respondents’ appeal. In an order dated December 29, 1997, ALJ Henk determined the claimant needed ongoing medical treatment as a result of a 1992 occupational disease which she sustained while employed by respondent Crowley County Nursing Center. ALJ Henk expressly rejected the respondents’ defense that the claimant sustained a subsequent aggravation of the disease while working for another employer. Consequently, ALJ Henk entered a general award of Grover-style medical benefits requiring the respondents to pay “continuing medical benefits for treatment of this work injury, and at the instance of her authorized providers.”
In June 1999 the respondents filed an application for hearing concerning their continuing obligation to pay Grover-style medical benefits. The claimant testified that, although she had no authorized providers, she believed she needs some type of medication for treatment of the 1992 injury. (Tr. pp. 74-75). The respondents produced expert medical opinion that the claimant may need treatment for her condition, but any need for treatment is related to an aggravation of her condition in subsequent employment.
In an order dated January 10, 2000, ALJ Vigil found the claimant “requested medical treatment similar to that which she was prescribed in 1997.” Further, ALJ Vigil found the claimant’s need for treatment is related to the 1992 occupational disease, and ordered the respondents to pay for the claimant’s “continuing medical benefits.” Issues not specifically addressed were reserved for future determination. The respondents appealed arguing the ALJ misapplied the rules of law governing liability for medical benefits in cases of occupational disease.
Pursuant to § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 1999, a party may file a petition to review an order “which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant a benefit or penalty.” Orders which do not award or deny benefits or penalties are interlocutory and not subject to review. Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App. 1989). Further, the court has interpreted the statute as incorporating the principle that the “amount of damages must be determined following a finding of liability before a judgment is final and appealable.” United Parcel Service, Inc., v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 988 P.2d 1146 (Colo.App. 1999) (order determining respondents were liable for penalties was not reviewable absent determination of the amount of penalties to be paid). Consequently, we have consistently held that a finding of liability for medical benefits is not final and reviewable absent an award of specific medical benefits. Poole v. Rocky Mountain Nurses, W.C. No. 4-349-438 (April 13, 1998); Tilton v. ABC Truf Care, W.C. No. 3-105-542 (August 18, 1994).
Here, the ALJ’s order does not deny the claimant any benefit or penalty. Moreover, it does not require the respondents to pay any particular medical benefits. Although the claimant generally asserts that she needs treatment, including medication, the parties did not litigate the issue of specific medical benefits. Instead, the ALJ’s order simply determines that the claimant’s symptoms and apparent need for treatment are related to the 1992 injury, without determining what specific medical benefits are reasonable and necessary to treat the condition. Indeed, if the claimant submits a request for specific medical benefits, the respondents might successfully challenge the reasonableness of a particular treatment, even if they are ultimately unsuccessful in litigating the causation issue. See Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337 (Colo.App. 1997). Consequently, we hold the ALJ’s order is not final and reviewable.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that they respondents’ petition to review ALJ Vigil’s order dated January 10, 2000, is dismissed without prejudice.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
An action to modify or vacate the Order may be commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Araphoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202, and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1999.
Copies of this decision were mailed August 25, 2000 to the following parties:
Maria T. Rios, P. O. Box 12394, Denver, CO 80212
Scott Nelson, NHA, Crowley County Nursing Center, 401 Idaho Ave., Box 488, Ordway, CO 81063
Sharon Thompson, Support Services, Inc., P. O. Box 3513, Englewood, CO 80155-3513
Michael W. Seckar, Esq., 402 W. 12th St., Pueblo, CO 81003 (For Claimant)
William A. Richardson, Esq., 400 Sussex Bldg., 1430 Larimer Square, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy