W.C. No. 4-439-791Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
January 31, 2002
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Henk (ALJ) which determined that claimant Raquel Ibarra was the common-law spouse of the deceased employee (Ramos) and awarded 25 percent of the death benefits to the claimant. The respondents contend that because both the claimant and Ramos were minors at the time of the alleged common-law marriage, the ALJ erred as a matter of law in finding that a marriage occurred. The respondents further challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of a common-law marriage. We affirm.
Ramos was killed in a compensable automobile accident on August 30, 1999. The claimant sought workers’ compensation death benefits on the ground that she was the decedent’s spouse by way of a common-law marriage.
Ramos and the claimant began living together in February 1997 in the home of Ramos’ mother. The claimant testified that, henceforth, she considered herself married to Ramos. In February 1997 the claimant was 14 years old and Ramos was 16 years old.
In October 1997 the claimant had a son, Jonathan, and the birth certificate listed Ramos as the father. From February 1997 until his death, Ramos provided financial support to the claimant and to Jonathan after his birth. There was evidence that Ramos and the claimant referred to each other as husband and wife commencing in February 1997, and that members of both families considered Ramos and the claimant to be married. Further, in March 1998 Ramos applied for employment (using the name Luis Chavez because of incomplete immigration documentation) and filled out a W-4 form listing himself as married.
At the time of death the claimant was living with her mother and Ramos was living with his sister. However, the ALJ found this was a temporary circumstance arranged by Ramos so that he could save money to purchase or rent a home to live with the claimant and his son.
Under these circumstances, the ALJ concluded the claimant proved the existence of a common-law marriage by Ramos. The ALJ also held the provisions of § 14-2-106(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2001, establishing parental and judicial consent requirements in cases where one or both parties seeking a marriage license are under the age of 18, did not vitiate the creation of the common-law marriage. The ALJ stated that she “declined to add an element of proof to the requirements for common-law marriage that does not currently exist.”
I.
On review, the respondents argue the ALJ erred as a matter of law in concluding Ramos and the claimant created a valid common-law there age when both parties were minors at the time the marriage was allegedly formed in February 1997. In support of this argument the respondents point out that § 14-2-106(1)(a)(I) of the Uniform Marriage Act requires that, unless both parties have obtained the age of 18, a marriage license may not be issued unless the underage party or parties present proof of “the consent of both parents.” Further, the statute provides that if a party is under the age of sixteen the party must present proof of the consent of both parents and judicial approval as provided in § 14-2-108(1), C.R.S. 2001. The respondents reason that in light of these provisions the “legal fiction of common-law marriage cannot create a marital union where the state, the only entity that can recognize such a union, would require parental consent to obtain a license or certificate.” We are not persuaded.
The existence of a common-law marriage “is established by the mutual consent or agreement of the parties to be husband and wife, followed by a mutual and open assumption of a marital relationship.” People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 663 (Colo. 1987). Currently, recognition of the common-law marriage “serves mainly as a means of protecting the interests of parties who have acted in good faith as husband and wife.” Id. at 664. It is against this backdrop that we consider the respondents’ argument.
First, as the ALJ correctly observed, the respondents cite no cases from any jurisdiction which hold there is a specific age limitation on the formation of a common-law marriage. Certainly, we are aware of no such authority in Colorado. Consequently, we agree with the ALJ that the question of whether a minor had the capacity to consent to the marital relationship is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. See In Re Custody of Nugent, 955 P.2d 584, 588 (Colo.App. 1997) (determination of the existence of a common-law marriage turns on issues of fact and credibility). Thus, the ALJ did not err as a matter of law in evaluating the evidence and concluding the claimant and Ramos were capable of consenting to the marital relationship.
Further, the respondents’ reliance upon § 14-2-106(1)(I) does not persuade us to the contrary. Although this statute indicates it is the policy of Colorado to require parental consent, and in some cases judicial consent, to the marriage of a minor, the statute does not demonstrate that marriages by minors lacking the requisite consent are absolutely unlawful or “void” ab initio. Indeed, the provisions of §14-10-111, C.R.S. 2001, the annulment statute, refute this argument.
Section 14-10-111(1) divides marriages into two classifications. The first classification is invalid marriages, and the circumstances of such marriages are listed in § 14-10-111(1)(a) through (1)(f). The second classification is prohibited marriages, the circumstances of which are listed in § 14-10-111(1)(g)(I) through (g)(IV). See Estate of Fuller, 862 P.2d 1037 (Colo.App. 1993). Section 14-10-111(1)(c) provides the district court shall enter a decree declaring the invalidity of a marriage where “a party was under the age as provided by law and did not have the consent of his parents or guardian or judicial approval as provided by law.” However, § 14-10-111(2) provides that a declaration of invalidity under subsection (1) “shall be commenced within the time specified but in no event may a declaration of invalidity be sought after the death of either party to the marriage except as provided in subsection (3).” (Emphasis added). Further, § 14-10-111(2)(c) provides that a declaration of invalidity on the grounds set forth in “subsection (1)(c) of this section” may be sought by “the underaged party, his parent, or his guardian, if such action for declaration of invalidity of marriage is commenced within twenty-four months of the date the marriage was entered into.” Finally, § 14-10-111(3) establishes certain circumstances under which a declaration of invalidity may be sought after the death of a party, but those circumstances apply only in cases of “prohibited” marriages.
We glean from the entirety of § 14-10-111 that marriages by minors who have not obtained the requisite statutory consent are not legally void, but are subject to being declared invalid provided one of the listed individuals seeks a declaration of invalidity within the time prescribed by the statute. Indeed, in Estate of Fuller, supra, the Court of Appeals held that where the decedent’s children alleged their father’s marriage was invalid under subsection (1)(a) because the father lacked capacity to consent to the marriage, the marriage was considered merely “voidable” rather than “void” ab initio. The court reasoned that because the children failed to demonstrate the marriage was “prohibited” as opposed to “invalid,” their failure to seek a declaration of invalidity prior to the father’s death deprived the children of legal “standing” to challenge the marriage.
Here, no person with legal standing challenged the validity of the marriage between the claimant and Ramos prior to Ramos’ death. Thus, although the marriage might have been declared invalid at some point prior to the death of Ramos, no declaration of invalidity may now be entered. It follows the law of Colorado does not absolutely prohibit or invalidate marriages of the type between Ramos and the claimant, nor does the law require that we disregard the marriage. To disregard the marriage at this time would violate § 14-10-111(2) and 2(c), and would also frustrate the purpose of recognizing common-law marriage by failing to give effect to the intentions of Ramos and the claimant who, as the ALJ found, intended and lived together as man and wife.
We have considered the claimant’s argument that this issue was waived because it was not presented to the ALJ. However, the argument was discussed in the respondents’ Position Statement, and the ALJ considered the argument in her order. (Respondents’ Position Statement at p. 4). Thus, there was no waiver.
II.
The respondents next contend the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding the claimant proved a common-law marriage to Ramos. In fact, the respondents assert the only “objective evidence” demonstrates the contrary. We reject this argument.
As noted above, a common-law marriage is established by mutual consent or agreement of the parties, followed by mutual and open assumption of the marital relationship. This test contemplates the parties will exhibit conduct manifesting their agreement to become man and wife. The two most important factors demonstrating the parties’ agreement are cohabitation and reputation among persons in the community that the parties hold themselves out as man and wife. Numerous behaviors may be considered as evidence of the parties’ intention, including maintenance of joint bank accounts, ownership of joint property, use of the man’s surname by the woman and the filing of joint tax returns. However, none of these behaviors is determinative, and the court may consider any type of evidence which manifests the intentions of the party. People v. Lucero, supra. Thus, we have previously held that evidence the decedent provided financial support to the claimant and her child was relevant in determining whether there was a common-law marriage. Marquez v. LVI Environmental Services, Inc.,
W.C. No. 4-425-155
(April 5, 2001) aff’d. LVI Environmental Services, Inc., v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, (Colo.App. No. 01CA0731, November 1, 2001) (not selected for publication).
The determination of whether a common-law marriage existed is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. In re Custody of Nugent, supra. Consequently, we must uphold the ALJ’s determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2001. This standard of review requires us to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Metro Moving and Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo.App. 1995). Further, we note the ALJ is not obliged to enter findings concerning all the evidence in the record, but only that evidence which she finds dispositive of the issues involved Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385
(Colo.App. 2000).
The respondents’ argument notwithstanding, the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of a common-law marriage. The ALJ credited evidence that the Ramos and the claimant cohabited until a short time before the accident. Further, the ALJ credited evidence the separation was for financial reasons and did not demonstrate the parties lacked the intention to be married. Moreover, as the ALJ found, there was ample evidence in the record that Ramos and the claimant held themselves out as married, and were recognized as married by members of both families. Most significantly Ramos provided support to the claimant and the child from the inception of the marriage until the date of his death.
Admittedly, there was conflicting in evidence in the record, including the fact that Ramos occasionally represented to employers that he was not married, and he filled out an insurance application indicating that he was not married. There was also evidence the parties sought to formalize their marriage in a civil ceremony, but were prevented from obtaining a marriage license because they failed to present proof of consent by all the parents. However, the weight to be accorded this evidence in determining whether a common-law marriage existed was a matter for the ALJ and was to be balanced against all other facts in the case. See Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 108 Colo. 415, 118 P.2d 768 (1941). We cannot say the ALJ erred as a matter of law in concluding the evidence weighed in favor of finding a common-law marriage.
We have considered the respondents’ remaining arguments concerning the inferences to be drawn from the record. These arguments are factual in nature and we lack authority to interfere with the ALJ’s findings concerning this evidence. Section 8-43-301(8). Thus, we decline to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the conclusions to be drawn from this record.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated March 29, 2001, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
________________________________ David Cain
________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to §8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2001. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed January 31, 2002 to the following parties:
Raquel Ibarra and Jonathan Luis Ramos Ibarra, P. O. Box 40755, Denver, CO 80204
Colorado Hardscapes, 7803 E. Harvard Ave., Denver, CO 80231
Gayle Trottnow, Zurich American Insurance Co., P. O. Box 370308, Denver, CO 80237
Pepe Mendez, Esq., 700 Broadway, #1101, Denver, CO 80203 (For Claimant Raquel Ibarra)
Frank M. Cavanaugh, Esq., 1801 Broadway, #1500, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy