W.C. Nos. 4-206-103 4-223-956Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
August 23, 1995
FINAL ORDER
In these consolidated workers’ compensation claims, respondents Phillip Morris and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (Lumbermens respondents) seek review of a final order of Chief Administrative Law Judge Felter (ALJ), which held them liable for the claimant’s right wrist disease. We affirm.
At all relevant times, the claimant was employed by respondent-employer Phillip Morris. Phillip Morris was insured by respondent Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford) until May 1, 1994. Thereafter, Phillip Morris was insured by Lumbermens.
W.C. No. 4-206-103 concerns a November 12, 1993 injury to the claimant’s left wrist. As a result of this injury, the claimant underwent a “left wrist volar ganglionectomy” in March 1994. It is undisputed that respondent Hartford is liable for this injury.
Following her March 1994 surgery, the claimant returned to light duty work in June 1994, and ultimately, to full duty in August 1994. Shortly thereafter, the claimant developed right wrist pain which was ultimately diagnosed as carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) in October 1994. Significantly, the claimant’s CTS is diagnosed as being “bilateral.”
The issue in the case is whether the claimant’s right-sided CTS is causally connected to overuse resulting from the 1993 injury, or whether it constitutes a separate and unrelated occupational disease. In this regard, the ALJ noted that the claimant had a five-year history of pushing and pulling heavy racks of dough “hundreds of times per day.” The ALJ also noted Dr. Goldstein’s report of November 15, 1994, which states that the claimant has “an occupational injury.”
Under these circumstances, the ALJ concluded that the claimant sustained a “compensable occupational disease associated with overuse of the right wrist with onset in August of 1994.” Consequently, the ALJ determined that the Lumbermens respondents are liable for medical treatment associated with the claimant’s right wrist.
On review, the Lumbermens respondents contend that the ALJ erred, as a matter of fact and law, in failing to attribute the claimant’s right wrist condition to the 1993 industrial injury. In support of this proposition, the Lumbermens respondents argue that the “only evidence” concerning causation is the claimant’s testimony. The claimant testified that, in August 1994, her left wrist was still painful, and therefore, she was required to over utilize her right wrist. (Tr. pp. 14, 21). We reject this argument.
Generally, the question of whether one or another of multiple industrial injuries is the cause of a claimant’s disability is a question of fact for resolution by the ALJ. F. R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo.App. 1985). Because the issue is one of fact, we must uphold the ALJ’s determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1994 Cum. Supp.). In determining factual matters, it is the ALJ’s province to determine the weight, credibility and inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990).
The Lumbermens respondents’ argument notwithstanding, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that the claimant sustained a distinct occupational disease in August 1994. First, as the ALJ found, the claimant has a long history of performing heavy work involving both wrists. Further, Dr. Goldstein’s November 15, 1994 report can be construed as an opinion that the claimant’s CTS is separate “occupational injury” unrelated to her November 1993 injury.
Moreover, as the ALJ noted, the claimant is diagnosed as suffering from “bilateral” CTS. A plausible inference from this fact is that the claimant’s CTS is attributable to her work history of pushing heavy carts with both hands, and not the result of overuse of her right hand caused by the 1993 injury.
It is true, as the Lumbermens respondents argue, that the claimant testified to an opinion which might permit a contrary conclusion. See Standard Metals Corp. v. Ball, 172 Colo. 510, 474 P.2d 622 (1970). However, we are not free to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the weight to be attributed to the claimant’s testimony Martinez v. Regional Transportation District, 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo.App. 1992). Since there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s order concerning causation, there was no error in the order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order, dated March 14, 1995, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Bill Whitacre
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver,Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, withservice of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Officeand all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Orderwas mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed August 23, 1995 to the following parties:
Roxine Nixon, 8763 W. Cornell Ave., #4, Lakewood, CO 80227
Entenmanns, Inc., 5050 E. Evans Ave., Denver, CO 80222-5218
Roxanne Barnes, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., P.O. Box 5347 T.A., Denver, CO 80217
Laurie Iverson, Hartford Underwriters Ins., P.O. Box 22815, Denver, CO 80221
Ted A. Krumreich, Esq. John Lebsack, Esq., 1225 17th St., Ste. 2800, Denver, CO 80202
(For the Lumbermens Respondents)
John M. Connell, Esq. Kathleen J. Mowry, Esq., 1290 Broadway, Ste. 705, Denver, CO 80203
(For the Hartford Respondents)
Mark Simon, Esq., 501 S. Cherry St., Ste. 820, Denver, CO 80222 (For the Claimant)
By: _______________________