W.C. Nos. 3-889-101, 3-920-806, 3-966-582, 4-003-898, 4-205-807Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
July 13, 1995
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ). The respondents contend that the ALJ erred insofar as he determined that W.C. Nos. 3-920-806, 3-966-582 and 4-003-898 were not closed pursuant to the statutory language currently codified at §8-43-203(2), C.R.S. (1994 Cum. Supp.) [formerly § 8-53-102(2), C.R.S. (1989 Cum. Supp.)]. We disagree, and therefore, affirm.
Section 8-43-203(2) provides that:
“An admission of liability for final payment of compensation shall include a statement that this is the final admission by the workers’ compensation insurance carrier in the case, that the claimant may contest this admission if the claimant feels entitled to more compensation, to whom the claimant should provide written objection, and notice that if the claimant does not contest the final admission in writing within sixty days of the date of the final admission the case will be automatically closed as to the issues admitted in the final admission.”
These consolidated claims involve injuries sustained by the claimant during his employment with the Denver Broncos Football Club. In the pertinent claims, the respondents filed Final Admissions of Liability, and mailed copies of the admissions to the claimant at the Broncos headquarters. The claimant did not contest the admissions within 60 days. Therefore, the respondents took the position that the claims were closed
The ALJ found the claimant’s testimony that he never received the copies of the Final Admissions of Liability credible and persuasive. The ALJ further determined that the Final Admissions were most likely “retained by other personnel at Employer’s facility rather than delivered to Claimant.” Consequently, the ALJ determined that the claimant’s failure to object to the Final Admissions of Liability did not result in a closure of the claims.
The respondents contend, inter alia, that § 8-43-203(2) does not require the claimant’s receipt of a Final Admission of Liability to effect the closure of the claim. Therefore, the respondents argue that the ALJ’s findings of fact do not support a conclusion that the claims were not closed. Alternatively, the respondents contend that, insofar as notice is required, the claimant had constructive notice of the Final Admissions. We reject these arguments.
I.
Due process of law requires that all parties receive notice of administrative proceedings and determinations which could result in the deprivation of a significant property interest. See Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. Palmer, 157 Colo. 40, 400 P.2d 914 (1965). Where a claim is closed by the filing of a final admission of liability, no further benefits may be awarded on the issues addressed in the final admission unless the claim is reopened. See L.E.L. Construction v. Goode, 849 P.2d 876 (Colo.App. 1992) rev’d on other grounds 867 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1994); Brown Root, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 833 P.2d 780
(Colo.App. 1991);. Therefore, the filing of a Final Admission of Liability inherently affects the claimant’s property interests.
Furthermore, the court has held that due process of law requires that a workers’ compensation claimant be made “aware” of the effect of his failure to object to an admission. Hall v. Home Furniture Co., 724 P.2d 94
(Colo.App. 1986). It follows that the claimant’s right to further benefits cannot be foreclosed unless the claimant is aware that the respondents seek to close the claim by the filing of a final payment notice. See Smith v. Myron Stratton Home, 676 P.2d 1196 (Colo. 1984); Dalco Industries, Inc. v. Garcia, 867 P.2d 156 (Colo.App. 1993).
II.
Next, the respondents reliance upon Public Service v. Boatwright, 749 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1987), in support of their contention that the claimant had “constructive notice” of the Final Admissions is misplaced. Boatwright
involved an injured worker who did not receive a copy of the insurer’s general admission of liability for temporary disability benefits. However, the worker received temporary disability benefits paid in accordance with the general admission. Therefore, the court concluded that the worker had constructive notice of the insurer’s admission of liability for temporary disability benefits.
Here, the relevant Final Admissions of Liability did not provide for the payment of benefits subsequent to the date of the Final Admissions. In fact, the respondents terminated the payment of temporary disability benefits in W.C. Nos. 3-996-582 and 3-920-806 prior to the date of the Final Admissions, and denied liability for permanent partial disability benefits. Under these circumstances, the claimant did not receive payments which would serve to notify the claimant of the respondents’ position concerning further disability benefits including his claim for permanent partial permanent disability benefits. Cf. Johnson v. McDonald, 697 P.2d 810
(Colo.App. 1985) (decided under prior law). Therefore, Boatwright is factually distinguishable.
III.
The respondents further contend that they provided the claimant wit written notice of the Final Admissions of Liability by mailing copies of the admissions to the claimant at the Broncos headquarters. We disagree.
The law presumes that mail is received by its addressee “when there is proper evidence of its mailing to a named person at a correct address, with adequate prepaid postage.” Olsen v. Davidson, 142 Colo. 205, 350 P.2d 338
(1960). A properly executed certificate of mailing may create a presumption that a notice was received, but the presumption may be overcome by competent evidence. Allred v. Squirrell, 37 Colo. App. 84, 543 P.2d 110
(1975); Campbell v. IBM Corp., 867 P.2d 77 (Colo.App. 1993).
The determination of whether mail was “received” by the addressee is a question of fact for resolution by the ALJ. Campbell v. IBM Corp., supra.
Therefore, we must uphold the ALJ’s determinations if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1994 Cum. Supp.); Campbell v. IBM Corp., supra. In so doing, we are bound by the ALJ’s credibility determinations, his resolution of conflicts in the evidence and the probative weight he afforded the evidence he found persuasive. Monfort Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1993).
The ALJ was persuaded by the claimant’s testimony that he did not receive the Final Admissions of Liability which were mailed to the Broncos headquarters, and this testimony constitutes substantial evidence to rebut any presumption that the claimant received the Final Admissions of Liability. Tr. pp. 19, 20, 58; Savio House v. Dennis, 665 P.2d 141 (Colo.App. 1983). Moreover, the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not have notice of the admissions supports the conclusion that the claimant’s duty to object to the admissions was not triggered. Therefore, we must uphold the ALJ’s conclusion that the claims were not closed by the claimant’s failure to object to the Final Admissions of Liability.
In view of the ALJ’s finding that the claimant did not receive the admissions at the employer’s facility, and the undisputed fact that the respondents did not attempt to mail the admissions to the claimant’s home address, it is immaterial whether it was proper for the respondents to mail the admissions to the Broncos headquarters. Therefore, we need not address the respondents remaining arguments in this regard.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated October 14, 1994, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO80203, by filing a petition for review with the court, with service of acopy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and allother parties, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order ismailed, pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed July 13, 1995 to the following parties:
Marc Munford, 2917 S. 20th St., Lincoln, NE 68502
Patrick D. Bowlen, Denver Broncos Football Club, 13655 Broncos Parkway, Englewood, CO 80112
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: D. Thomas, Esq., (Interagency Mail)
Special Funds Unit, Attn: Barbara Carter (Interagency Mail)
Floyd M. Youngblood, Esq., 4465 Kipling, Ste., 102, Wheat Ridge, CO 80033 (For the Claimant)
BY: _______________________