W.C. No. 4-344-269Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
May 10, 1999.
FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Gandy (ALJ) which denied her claim for temporary disability and medical benefits allegedly caused by a work-related fall. The claimant contends many of the ALJ’s findings are not supported by the evidence. We affirm.
In January 1997 the claimant underwent surgery to repair a herniated disc in her lower back. The issue in the case is whether treatment for the disc, and temporary disability commencing in October 1996, are causally related to a work-related fall on April 17, 1996.
The ALJ found that the claimant failed to prove that the disability and need for treatment are related to the fall. In support, the ALJ found the claimant underwent lumbar back surgery in 1995, and continued treatment for ongoing back pain until the fall in April 1996. Moreover, the ALJ found that the claimant continued to report back pain after the April 1996 fall, but none of the subsequent medical records (until December 1996) indicate that the claimant reported the April 17 fall as the cause of the increased back pain. The ALJ also credited the reports of Dr. Primack and Dr. Dwyer who opined that the April 1996 fall was probably not the cause of the herniated disc. The ALJ explicitly discredited the contrary opinion of Dr. Janssen, and the claimant’s own testimony.
In her petition to review the ALJ’s order, the claimant attacks numerous findings of fact as unsupported by the evidence. Essentially, the claimant argues that the evidence compels a finding that the April 1996 fall aggravated her preexisting back condition and caused the disc herniation. The claimant also asserts the ALJ should have credited Dr. Janssen’s opinion concerning causation. We find no error.
The claimant had the burden to prove that the temporary disability and need for medical treatment are causally connected to the April 1996 work-related fall. Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 1998; § 8-43-201, C.R.S. 1998. The question of whether the claimant proved the requisite causal relationship is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Cooper v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.2d ___, (Colo.App. No. 98CA1343, March 18, 1999); City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1997).
Because the issue is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 1998. Substantial evidence is evidence which would support a reasonable belief in the existence of a fact without regard to conflicting evidence or inferences Ackerman v. Hilton’s Mechanical Men, Inc., 914 P.2d 524
(Colo.App. 1996). We particularly note that the weight and credibility of expert medical opinion concerning the issue of causation is solely within the province of the ALJ. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). Further, there is no requirement that the ALJ render a detailed explanation of his decision to credit the testimony of one witness over that of another. Wells v. Del Norte School District C-7, 753 P.2d 770
(Colo.App. 1987).
The claimant first takes issue with Findings of Fact 12 and 14, where the ALJ found that from April 1996 through December 1996 the claimant did not report to Dr. Towbin that the April 1996 fall aggravated her preexisting back pain. The claimant argues that she told Dr. Towbin that the fall aggravated her back pain, but he failed to document this fact. However, the ALJ’s findings of fact concerning Dr. Towbin’s notes are supported by the evidence, and the ALJ explicitly discredited the claimant’s conflicting testimony. Therefore, there is no basis for interfering with these findings.
The claimant next disputes Finding of Fact 18, where the ALJ found that the claimant last saw Dr. Stoiber on October 28, 1996. The claimant points out that her discussion with Dr. Stoiber concerning her claim for Social Security disability benefits occurred on August 28, 1996, not October 28, 1996. Although some of the ALJ’s statements concerning specific dates were erroneous, they do not change the essential import of Finding 18. The ALJ found that the claimant did not tell Dr. Stoiber that she fell on April 17, or that the fall caused increased back pain. Thus, any error concerning the precise dates that the claimant met with Dr. Stoiber is harmless.
The claimant next disputes Finding of Fact 19, where the ALJ observed that Dr. Lambden’s notes between May 8, 1996, and September 11, 1996, make no mention of the April 17 fall. The claimant asserts that she reported the fall to Dr. Lambden, but he failed to record the discussions. Again, the ALJ’s finding constitutes a plausible interpretation of the evidence, and the ALJ was not required to credit the claimant’s conflicting testimony.
The claimant also attacks Findings of Fact 21 and 22. In Finding 21 the ALJ noted that Dr. Janssen’s report of December 31, 1996, states that the claimant had a “fall down the stairs when she lost her balance.” The ALJ points out that the claimant testified that she actually fell forward onto her hands and knees. (Tr. p. 11). The inference to be drawn from this apparent inconsistency was a matter for the ALJ.
Further, the claimant states that she “needs an explanation” of Finding of Fact 22, in which the ALJ stated that Dr. Janssen’s opinion was not “persuasive or credible.” As we have pointed out, the ALJ is not required to explain credibility determinations so long as the basis of his order is clear from the findings as a whole. Cooper v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra. Here, it is apparent that Dr. Janssen’s opinion was discredited because the ALJ found it inconsistent with the history reflected in the medical records, and because the ALJ was persuaded by the conflicting expert opinions of Dr. Primack and Dr. Dwyer. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the credibility of the medical experts. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, supra.
Finally, the claimant disputes Finding of Fact 34 in which the ALJ found that the claimant did not tell her supervisor that the April 17 fall caused back pain until she filed a claim for benefits in June 1997. However, this finding is fully supported by the supervisor’s testimony, and the ALJ explicitly rejected the claimant’s conflicting testimony.
It follows that the ALJ’s order is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Insofar as the claimant has made other arguments they are purely factual in nature, and we find them to be without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated December 3, 1998, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.
Copies of this decision were mailed May 10, 1999 the following parties:
Kathryn L. Millner, 7504 Paul Pl., Loveland, CO 80537
International Rehabilitation Associates, 6 Inverness Cr., E., #100, Englewood, CO 80112-5518
CIGNA Property and Casualty, P.O. Box 2941, Greenwood Village, CO 80150-0141
Bernard Woessner, Esq., 3900 E. Mexico Ave., #1000, Denver, CO 80210 (For Respondents)
BY: le