W.C. No. 4-148-045.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
May 12, 2004.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant and the respondents have each petitioned for review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Friend (ALJ Friend) which denied the claimant’s request for penalties under §8-43-304(1), C.R.S. 2003. We affirm.
This matter was before us previously. The claimant suffered a compensable injury in 1992. Following an evidentiary hearing, an ALJ issued an order dated March 31, 1998, which awarded permanent total disability (PTD) benefits and future medical benefits in accordance with Grover v. Industrial Commission, 759 P.2d 705
(Colo. 1988). Pursuant to § 8-42-111(4), C.R.S. 2003 (applicable to injuries between July 1, 1991 and July 1, 1994), the respondents filed a final admission of liability (FAL) dated August 1, 2001, which increased the claimant’s PTD rate to include a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). In the space provided on the respondents’ FAL form for the respondents to state a position on Grover medical benefits, the respondents inserted “Per ALJ’s order of 3/31/98.”
The claimant alleged the FAL violated the Rules of Procedure, Part IV(N)(1), 7 Code Colo. Reg. 1101-3 at 8, which requires that a FAL “specify and describe the insurance carrier’s position on the provision of medical benefits after MMI.” The respondents moved for summary judgment denying the claimant’s request for penalties.
ALJ Stuber determined the facts were undisputed. He also determined that if Rule IV(N)(1) is applicable, the respondents’ August 1, 2001 FAL complied with the requirements of rule. Therefore, in an order dated October 4, 2001, ALJ Stuber denied the request for penalties. No appeal was taken from that order.
In July 2003, the respondents filed a new FAL to reflect another COLA adjustment of PTD benefits. The July 2003 FAL contained the same language as the August 2001 FAL on the issue of Grover medical benefits. The claimant reapplied for penalties and again alleged a violation of Rule IV(N)(1).
In the order now on review, ALJ Friend determined the respondents violated Rule IV(N)(1). However, ALJ Friend further determined the respondents reasonably relied on the October 2001 order of ALJ Stuber to conclude that the challenged language was sufficient to comply with Rule IV(N)(1). Therefore, ALJ Friend refused to impose a penalty.
The claimant contends ALJ Friend erroneously found the respondents’ violation of Rule IV(N)(1) was objectively reasonable. In contrast, the respondents seek to preserve their contention that there was no violation of Rule IV(N)(1). The respondents also contend the claimant was collaterally estopped from litigating the penalty claim before ALJ Friend. We agree with the respondents’ latter argument.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is directed to “issue preclusion,” and is applicable when a party seeks to relitigate an issue of fact or law determined in a prior proceeding. Sunny Acres Villa Inc., v. Cooper, 25 P.3d 44 (Colo. 2001); M M Management Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 979 P.2d 574
(Colo.App. 1998). The doctrine bars relitigation of an issue previously determined if (1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to an issue actually determined in the prior proceeding; (2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted has been a party to or is in privity with a party to the prior proceeding; (3) there is a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Sunny Acres Villa Inc., v. Cooper, supra.
The claimant’s arguments notwithstanding, ALJ Stuber’s October 4, 2001 order involved the same parties, identical facts, and the same legal issue that was presented to ALJ Friend. Furthermore, it is immaterial that there was no “evidentiary” hearing before ALJ Stuber because the claimant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the legal issue by arguing that the undisputed facts supported the imposition of penalties under §8-43-304(1).
ALJ Stuber’s order determined that to the extent Rule IV(N)(1) is applicable, the respondents’ FAL which admitted liability fo Grover medical benefits in accordance with the March 31, 1998 order, satisfied the rule. Because the claimant did not appeal ALJ Stuber’s order, he is now estopped from collaterally attacking ALJ Stuber’s ruling by seeking a redetermination of the same issue before ALJ Friend. See O’Neill v. Simpson, 958 P.2d 1121 (Colo. 1998). Therefore, there was no error in ALJ Friend’s denial of the request for penalties.
In view of this disposition, the parties’ remaining arguments are moot. See Brown v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 915 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1996) (case is moot if relief sought, if granted, would have no practical legal effect).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated December 3, 2003, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
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Kathy E. Dean
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Bill Whitacre
Karen S. Malloy, Limon, CO, Lincoln Community Center, Hugo, CO, Colorado Hospital Association Trust, c/o Mary Anne Donelson, Support Services, Inc., Englewood, CO, Kat Pennucci, Subsequent Injury Fund, Division of Workers’ Compensation — Interagency Mail Steven U. Mullens, Esq., Colorado Springs, CO, (For Claimant).
Fred Ritsema, Esq. and T. Paul Krueger, II, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Respondents).