W.C. Nos. 4-304-858, 4-304-876Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
October 16, 1997
ORDER OF REMAND
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Erickson (ALJ), which dismissed his request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. We set the order aside and remand for further proceedings.
These consolidated workers’ compensation cases concern claims for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Hearings were held in March 1997 and April 1997, and were attended by the claimant’s first employer (Picture Warehouse), and its insurer, the Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority (CCIA respondents), and the claimant’s subsequent self-insured employer, Adams County. One of the defenses raised by the CCIA respondents and Adams County was the statute of limitations.
On May 23, 1997, the ALJ entered a written “Summary Order.” Copies of the order were mailed to the parties on May 24, 1997. In the Summary Order, the ALJ found that the “onset” of the claimant’s “disability for her right carpal tunnel syndrome was in October or November 1990.” The ALJ also found that the onset of disability for the claimant’s “left carpal tunnel syndrome was after July 1, 1991.” The ALJ went on to conclude that the claims for these injuries were barred by the statute of limitations because no claim for benefits was filed until July 26, 1996.
On June 10, 1997, the claimant mailed a pleading entitled “Request for Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” The pleading states that it is filed pursuant to § 8-43-215, C.R.S. 1997, and that the request is a “prerequisite to appeal.” The request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 11, 1997.
Thereafter, Adams County and the CCIA respondents moved to dismiss the claimant’s request for specific findings alleging that it was filed one day after the fifteen day time limit established by § 8-43-215. The ALJ initially granted the respondents’ motion on June 19, 1997. The order was reissued on June 27, 1997, after the ALJ considered the claimant’s response. On July 8, 1997, the claimant timely filed a petition to review the ALJ’s June 27 order.
I.
Adams County argues that the ALJ’s dismissal of the claimant’s request for specific findings of fact is interlocutory and not currently reviewable. We reject this argument.
Section 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 1997, provides that a party may file a petition to review an order “which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant any benefit or penalty.” Section 8-43-215 provides that an ALJ’s written summary order “shall be entered as the final award” unless a party timely seeks review as provided in the statute.
Here, the practical effect of the ALJ’s June 27 order is to deny the claimant any benefits based on her claims against Adams County and the CCIA respondents. Because the ALJ’s June 27 order dismisses the request for specific findings, the summary order became the “final award” of benefits. Thus, the ALJ’s summary order is final and reviewable for purposes of § 8-43-301(2) See BCW Enterprises, Ltd. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. 96CA1033, September 18, 1997) (parties entitled to judicial review of administrative agency’s decision that affects substantive statutory rights).
II.
On review, the claimant contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that the timeliness of her request for specific findings is governed by the fifteen day limit set forth in §8-43-215. The claimant argues that because she is seeking benefits for an occupational disease, and because at least a portion of the occupational disease manifested itself prior to July 1, 1991, she had twenty days to file the request under to § 8-43-215, C.R.S. (1990 Cum. Supp.). Because we conclude that the ALJ’s findings of fact are insufficient to resolve this contention, we set aside the June 27 order and remand for entry of a new order.
We have previously held that the time limit for filing a request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law is jurisdictional. We reached this conclusion because § 8-43-215
provides that the ALJ’s written summary order constitutes a “final award” unless review is timely sought, and because the statute provides that a request for specific findings is a “prerequisite to a petition to review under § 8-43-301.”Royce v. Bullwhackers Casino, W.C. No. 4-244-932 (July 25, 1996); cf. Hasbrouck v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 780 (Colo.App. 1984) (decided under prior law).
It is true, as Adams County argues, that changes in procedural law are usually applicable to ongoing claims. See Kinninger v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 758 P.2d 766, 767 (Colo.App. 1988). However, that rule does not apply where, as here, the General Assembly has expressed the intent to limit the procedural changes to claims for injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1991. Martinez v. Regional Transportation District, 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo.App. 1992).
The fifteen day time limit contained in the current version of § 8-43-215 was enacted as part of the 1991 amendments to the Colorado Workers’ Compensation Act (Act). Prior to those amendments, § 8-43-215 provided that parties had “twenty days after the certificate of mailing of a summary order” to request specific findings. See 1991 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 219 at 1320.
Moreover, the 1991 statute provides that the amendments “shall take effect July 1, 1991, and shall apply to injuries occurring on or after said date.” 1991 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 219 at 1342. It follows that, to the extent the claimant sustained an injury before July 1, 1991, her request for specific findings of fact is governed by the twenty day limit. Van Deursen v. U.S. Tobacco, W.C. No. 3-102-587 (February 23, 1993).
In cases where the claimant is alleged to have sustained an occupational disease, the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the date on which the claimant experienced the “onset of disability.” SCI Manufacturing v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 879 P.2d 470 (Colo.App. 1994) Henderson v. RSI, Inc., 824 P.2d 91 (Colo.App. 1991). Here, the ALJ’s summary order indicates that, at least with respect to the claimant’s “right carpal tunnel syndrome,” the onset of disability occurred prior to July 1, 1991. Therefore, the ALJ erred in concluding that the claimant’s request for specific findings was governed by the fifteen day limit rather than the twenty day limit established by the older version of § 8-43-215.
With respect to the claimant’s “left carpal tunnel syndrome,” the ALJ found that the “onset of disability” occurred after July 1, 1991. However, it is unclear to us from the June 27 order, or the May 23 Summary Order, whether the ALJ has determined that the left carpal tunnel syndrome constitutes an occupational disease entirely distinct from the right carpal tunnel syndrome, or whether he considers the left carpal tunnel syndrome a later manifestation of the occupational disease which first occurred in 1990. Without clarification based on specific findings, we are unable to determine whether the ALJ correctly ruled that the claimant’s June 10 request for specific findings was untimely with respect to the left carpal tunnel syndrome.
Under these circumstances, the matter must be remanded to the ALJ for application of the correct version of § 8-43-215. With respect to the right carpal tunnel syndrome, it is apparent that the claimant’s request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law was timely. With respect to the left carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ must specifically determine whether there is a separate occupational disease, or whether the left carpal tunnel syndrome is a later manifestation of the 1990 occupational disease. The ALJ shall then apply the correct provision of § 8-43-215 to the left carpal tunnel syndrome.
In light of this disposition, we need not consider the claimant’s argument that the ALJ’s “summary order” contains specific findings of fact, and that her request for specific findings constitutes a timely petition to review the summary order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated June 27, 1997, is set aside, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings and entry of a new order consistent with the views expressed herein.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
Copies of this decision were mailed October 16, 1997 to the following parties:
Linda J. Leonard, 6791 Highway 2, #25, Commerce City, CO 80022
Picture Warehouse, Inc., 10880 Leroy Dr., Northglenn, CO 80233-3614
Adams County, Jefferson Cnty School Dist., R-1, 1829 Denver West Dr., B27, Golden, CO 80401
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Curt Kriksciun, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
Adams County, Rodyne Roche, 450 S. 4th Ave., Brighton, CO 80601
Jack LeProwse, Esq., 3843 W. 73rd Ave., Westminster, CO 80030 (For the Claimant)
Matthew Tills, Esq., 1225 17th St., #2800, Denver, CO 80203 (For CCIA Respondents)
Pamela Musgrave, Esq. and Art Lee, Esq., 777 E. Speer Blvd., #210, Denver, CO 80203 (For the Adams County Respondent)
By: __________________________________________________