W.C. No. 4-447-658Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
April 16, 2002
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mattoon (ALJ) dated December 5, 2001, which was issued on remand. We affirm.
The claimant suffered a compensable injury on January 7, 2000, when a student fell against her. The claimant worked 3 hours on January 11. Commencing January 12, 2000, Dr. Pevoto removed the claimant from work.
On January 17, the claimant underwent right knee surgery. As a result of complications from the surgery the claimant was hospitalized for 11 days. The claimant returned to part-time, modified employment on March 1, 2000, and full-time modified employment on April 3, 2000.
In an order dated October 2, 2000, the ALJ ordered the respondents to pay temporary total disability benefits commencing January 10, 2000, and terminating January 14, 2000 (less wages earned by the claimant on January 11, 2000) based upon a determination that the claimant’s disability after January 14 was caused by the claimant’s nonindustrial medical problems.
In support, the ALJ found the claimant suffers from “pain in the shoulders, neck, upper back, lower back and both legs” which is not related to the industrial injury. (Finding of Fact 9). The ALJ also found “the only symptoms which occurred as a result of the industrial accident were the right chest, right shoulder, lower back and left leg muscle strain, and that Claimant’s work restrictions after January 14, 2000, were due solely to non-work- related conditions.” (Finding of Fact 11). Both parties appealed the ALJ’s order.
On review of the October 2 order we concluded Findings of Fact 9 and 11 were inconsistent as to whether the industrial accident caused a compensable injury to the claimant’s low back. Consequently, we remanded the matter for a new order which resolved the inconsistency between Finding 9 and Finding 11.
The October 2 order also found that the nonindustrial knee problems constituted an efficient intervening cause of the claimant’s disability which severed the causal connection between the industrial disability and the claimant’s wage loss after January 14. (Finding of Fact 10). However, because the claimant was already temporarily totally disabled by the industrial injury at the time she suffered the disabling knee problems on January 15, we concluded that the claimant’s inability to return to work after January 14 was at least “to some degree” a product of the industrial injury. See PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1995); Horton v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1209 (Colo.App. 1996) (industrial disability need not be the sole cause of the wage loss to recover temporary disability benefits. Rather, it is sufficient if the claimant proves that the wage loss is to “some degree” attributable to the industrial injury). Therefore, we concluded the ALJ erroneously terminated temporary disability benefits effective January 15, 2000, based upon a finding that the claimant’s right knee or pre-existing medical problems constituted an efficient intervening cause of the claimant’s wage loss.
Furthermore, the applicable law provides that once the claimant’s entitlement to temporary disability benefits is established, benefits must be paid until the first occurrence of one of the events listed in § 8-42-105(3)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2001 Burns v. Robinson Dairy, Inc., 911 P.2d 661 (Colo.App. 1995). We concluded the ALJ erroneously relied on the opinions of an independent medical examiner to terminate temporary disability benefits by operation of § 8-42-105(3)(c). Therefore, we set aside the ALJ’s order insofar as it terminated temporary disability benefits effective January 15, 2000, and remanded the matter for the entry of a new order on the issue of temporary disability benefits after January 14, 2000.
On remand the ALJ issued the December 5 order. The ALJ found the industrial accident caused injuries to the claimant’s right chest, right shoulder, lower back, and left leg. The ALJ also found none of the events listed in § 8-42-105(3) occurred prior to March 1, 2000. Therefore, the ALJ ordered the respondents to pay temporary total disability benefits from January 10, 2000 through February 29, 2000, with credit for wages earned by the claimant on January 11, 2000. The ALJ also awarded temporary partial disability benefits from March 1, 2000, through April 3, 2000. The respondents timely appealed the December 5 order.
The respondents’ Petition to Review contains only general allegations of error. See § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2001. Further, the respondents have not filed a brief in support of the Petition. Consequently, the effectiveness of our review is limited. Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 734 P.2d 642 (Colo.App. 1986).
We have reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings of fact. The ALJ’s findings are sufficient to permit appellate review, and the findings indicate that the ALJ resolved pertinent conflicts in the evidence. The ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and plausible inferences drawn from the record and the findings support the ALJ’s conclusions of law and award of benefits. See § 8-42-105(3); Horton v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra. Therefore, the claimant has failed to establish grounds which afford us a basis to grant appellate relief.
We note the ALJ incorporated Finding of Fact 10 from the October 2 order. Reading the ALJ’s December 5 order in its totality, we understand the ALJ to have incorporated Finding 10 insofar as she found the claimant returned to part-time, modified work on March 1, and then returned to full-time, regular employment on April 3, 2000. However, we do not read the order as incorporating any part of Finding 10 which is inconsistent with her finding of a causal connection between the industrial injury and the claimant’s wage loss after January 14, 2000. See Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385
(Colo.App. 2000) (ALJ not held to standard of absolute clarity in expressing findings of fact and conclusions of law as long as basis of the order is clear).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated December 5, 2001, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2001. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed April 16, 2002 to the following parties:
Eleanor Johnson, 30730 Highway 50 East, Pueblo, CO 81006
Pueblo County School District 70, 213 Highway 50 East, Avondale, CO 81022-9704
Curt Kriksciun, Esq., Pinnacol Assurance — Interagency Mail (For Respondents)
Michael W. Seckar, Esq., 402 W. 12th St., Pueblo, CO 81003 (For Claimant)
Craig R. Anderson, Esq., 101 N. Tejon St., #410, Colorado Springs, CO 80918
BY: A. Hurtado