IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF JOANNE HEILBRON, Claimant, v. HOLIDAY RETIREMENT CORPORATION, and Employer, LIBERTY MUTUAL, Insurer, Respondents.

W.C. No. 4-770-478.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
July 27, 2009.

FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mottram (ALJ) dated April 24, 2009, that denied and dismissed the claimant’s claim for benefits. We affirm.

At the hearing, the issues for determination included compensability, and payment of medical bills. The claimant worked as a housekeeper. On August 25, 2008, while serving lunch the claimant noticed she was getting blurred vision and eventually she collapsed. The claimant was taken to an emergency room and was diagnosed as having had a seizure. Exhibit A at 5. The claimant was evaluated by Dr. Gilman who suspected that the claimant might have had a withdrawal seizure from barbiturates she was taking. Exhibit B at 2. The claimant saw Dr. Beinlich who indicated that “I don’t think it’s clear that her incident was unrelated to work.” Exhibit 1. Dr. Beinlich noted that she did not believe it could be said with certainty whether the claimant had a syncopal episode related to her work conditions or a seizure. Exhibit 1. The ALJ found that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment.

To prove a compensable injury, the claimant had the burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Section 8-43-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 2009; Madden v. Mountain West Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1999); Faulkner v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 12 P.3d 844 (Colo.App. 2000). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires the proponent to establish that the existence of a “contested fact is more probable than its

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nonexistence.” Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792, 800 (1979). The question of whether the claimant met the burden of proof is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Because the issue is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ’s determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8). This standard of review requires us to defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 989 P.2d 251 (Colo.App. 1999).

In our view, the ALJ’s findings are sufficient to permit appellate review and the ALJ resolved conflicts in the evidence based upon weighing of the evidence and his credibility determinations. Here the ALJ credited the reports from the emergency room and Dr. Gilman that explained that the claimant likely had a first time seizure on August 25, 2008. Exhibits A and B. Further, the record contains no transcripts of the hearing before the ALJ. As a general matter, we must uphold the ALJ’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2009. Where, as here, the appealing party fails to procure transcripts of the relevant hearings we must presume the pertinent findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Nova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 754 P.2d 800 (Colo.App. 1988). We conclude that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and these findings support the conclusion that the claimant failed to prove entitlement to compensation. Accordingly, we perceive no basis on which to disturb the ALJ’s order.

The claimant contends that she was forced to represent herself because eleven law firms had refused to represent her. The claimant argues this resulted in an unfair hearing. However, the claimant has only generally stated that her failure to procure representation resulted in “unfairness,” without specifically directing our attention to particular ways in which she was prejudiced by the absence of counsel. Our review of the record as it exists discloses no error resulting from the claimant’s acting on her own behalf. In any event, the claimant is presumed to know applicable statutes and is required to act accordingly. Paul v. Industrial Commission, 632 P.2d 638 (Colo.App. 1981). Therefore, the claimant’s lack of familiarity with the applicable procedural rules or the substantive law does not afford grounds for appellate relief. See Manka v. Martin, 200 Colo. 160, 614 P.2d 875 (1980) (pro se party is held to the same requirements as an attorney); Swanson v. Richard P. Henry D/B/A/ Steamboat Stoveworks, W.C. Nos. 4-589-465, 4-646-823, 4-646-825, 4-646-827, 4-646-828 and 4-646-829 (September 13, 2006).

The claimant next contends that the ALJ erred in not excluding from evidence certain medical reports, alleged to have been untimely exchanged. Section 8-43-210, C.R.S. 2009 states that all relevant medical records, vocational reports, expert witness reports, and employer records shall be exchanged with all other parties at least twenty

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days prior to the hearing date. The respondents contend that the reports in question were timely exchanged and that there was no objection to their introduction into evidence.

Here the order from the ALJ contains no reference to any dispute regarding whether there was timely exchange of medical reports. The absence of a transcript precludes us from determining if the issue was raised and if it was raised the arguments made by the parties and the ALJ’s resolution of the dispute. It is presumed the proceedings were regularly and fairly conducted unless the contrary appears from the record. Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186 (Colo.App. 1005). In the absence of a transcript, we decline to override the presumption of regularity. Further, the claimant has failed to provide a record sufficient to demonstrate that any error actually occurred Stephens v. Gary North Air Package Express Services, Inc., W. C. No. 4-492-570 (February 16, 2005).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated April 24, 2009 is affirmed.

INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL

____________________________________ Curt Kriksciun

____________________________________ Thomas Schrant

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JOANNE HEILBRON, GRAND JUNCTION, CO, (Claimant).

HOLIDAY RETIREMENT CORPORATION, Attn: SAMANTHA BUTLER, SALEM, OR, (Employer).

LIBERTY MUTUAL, IRVING, TX, (Insurer).

LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD P MYERS, Attn: DAVID G KROLL, ESQ, DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).

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