W.C. Nos. 4-384-045, 4-400-128Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
January 24, 2000
[1] FINAL ORDER
[2] This matter has been transmitted to us pursuant to the respondents’ petition for review an order of Administrative Law Judge Snider (ALJ) dated July 26, 1999, which determined the claimant suffered a compensable injury and required them to pay temporary partial disability benefits. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s order, and therefore, we dismiss the petition to review.
[3] Section § 8-43-215 C.R.S. 1999 provides that:
“Any party dissatisfied with a summary order may request specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing within fifteen days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the summary order. Such request shall be a prerequisite to a petition to review under section 8-43-301, and such request shall stay the time within which to file a petition to review until after the mailing of the specific findings and conclusions. Thereafter, time limits shall be governed by section 8-43-301. Specific findings of fact and conclusions of law requested pursuant to this section shall be completed within twenty-five days after such request.”
[4] The statutory time limits governing appellate review of workers’ compensation decisions are usually considered jurisdictional, and thus, such provisions are strictly enforced by the courts. Buschmann v. Gallegos Masonry, Inc., 805 P.2d 1193
(Colo.App. 1991). Accordingly, it has been held that failure timely to file a request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law bars review of a summary order because §8-43-215 provides that “such request shall be a prerequisite to a petition to review under section 8-43-301.” Reed v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. No. 99CA0084, January 20, 2000).
[5] Furthermore, in Fisher v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., W.C. No. 4-247-158 (May 6, 1999), we concluded that for purposes of §8-43-215 a request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law must be received by the Division of Administrative Hearings within 15 days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the summary order. Applying the principles of statutory construction, we expressly rejected an argument that a “request” for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law is complete on the date of mailing. This is true because, unlike § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 1998, section 8-43-215 does not contain any provision for filing a request for specific findings “by mail,” and we have no authority to read non-existent provisions into the statute. See Vaughn v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1997) (where plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous statute must be enforced as written); Best-Way Concrete Co. v. Baumgartner, 908 P.2d 1194
(Colo.App. 1995). We recognize that Fisher is currently pending review by the court of appeals (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 99CA963), however until reversed or modified, we adhere to our conclusions in Fisher.
[6] Applied here, we conclude that the ALJ’s summary order is final and the ALJ’s Specific Findings of Fact dated July 26 are not subject to review. The ALJ issued an Amended Summary Order on June 14, 1999. The Amended Summary Order contains a certificate of mailing to the parties dated June 15, 1999. Therefore, the respondents were required to file a request for specific findings of fact no later than June 30, 1999.
[7] On June 30, 1998, the respondents made a “Request for Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” The date stamp on the Request indicates that it was not received by the Division of Administrative Hearings until July 1, 1999. Under these circumstances, the request for specific findings was untimely and the ALJ’s Amended Summary Order is final. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s July 26 order. See Subsequent Injury Fund v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Colo.App. No. 92CA0556, February 25, 1996) (not selected for publication) (failure by the subsequent injury fund to follow proper sequence for review defeats jurisdiction of court to review appeal).
[8] In view of our disposition we need not consider the respondents’ requests that the matter be remanded for completion of the record and the filing of appellate briefs.
[9] IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents’ Petition to Review the ALJ’s order of July 26, 1999, is dismissed with prejudice.
[10] INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
[11] ___________________________________ David Cain
[12] ___________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
[13] This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1999.
[14] Copies of this decision were mailed January 24, 2000 to the following parties:
[15] Kimberly Gulley-Falzgraf, 930 Hanover St., Aurora, CO 80010
[16] American Medical Response, Inc., 2821 S. Parker Rd., #1005, Aurora, CO 80014-2711
[17] Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, AIG Claim Services, P.O. Box 32130, Phoenix, AZ 85064
[18] Elena Zepeda, Crawford Company, 12301 Wilshire Blvd., #302, Los Angeles, CA 90025
[19] John A. Steninger, Esq., 4500 Cherry Creek Drive South, #930, Denver, CO 80246 (For Claimant)
[20] W. Berkeley Mann, Jr., Esq., Pamela L. Mosher, Esq., P.O. Box 22833, Denver, CO 80222 (For Respondents)
[21] BY: A. Pendroy