W.C. No. 4-197-352Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
April 28, 1997
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Rumler (ALJ) which denied her claim for temporary total disability benefits. We affirm.
The pertinent facts are undisputed. The claimant sustained a compensable injury in July 1991. The claimant was placed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) in July 1995, and assigned a medical impairment rating of twenty-four percent of the whole person. The respondent filed a Final Admission of Liability admitting liability for indemnity benefits in the amount of $62,472.09. Consequently, the respondent has paid benefits in excess of the $60,000 cap established by § 8-42-107.5, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
In late March or early April 1996, the respondent offered the claimant “job placement assistance” to be provided by a vocational rehabilitation firm. The claimant accepted the offer and attended two job interviews arranged by the vocational firm. Other services, including resume preparation, were also provided.
At the hearing, the claimant sought additional temporary disability benefits. The claimant argued that the job placement services constitute “vocational rehabilitation,” and therefore, she is entitled to reinstatement of temporary total disability benefits under § 8-42-105(1), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
However, regardless of whether the services constitute “vocational rehabilitation,” the ALJ concluded that the claimant is not entitled to additional temporary disability benefits because additional benefits would exceed the $60,000 cap. The ALJ reasoned that the benefits sought by the claimant were “necessarily temporary total disability benefits because rehabilitation benefits were no longer available” under the Act.
On review, the claimant again contends that the job placement services constitute “vocational rehabilitation” for purposes of §8-42-105(1). Then, relying on Donald B. Murphy Contractors v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 611 (Colo.App. 1995), the claimant argues that the $60,000 cap contained in § 8-42-107.5 does not apply where the claimant is receiving temporary disability benefits because of her acceptance of an offer of vocational rehabilitation. We need not consider the claimant’s first argument since we disagree with her contention that the cap does not apply.
Section 8-42-107.5 provides as follows:
“No claimant whose impairment rating is twenty-five percent or less may receive more than $60,000 from combined temporary disability payments and permanent partial disability payments . . .”
In interpreting this statute and applying it to the facts before us, we apply the established rule that words and phrases in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meanings. If no absurdity results, we need not resort to other rules of statutory construction to discern some novel meaning in the words. Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree, 862 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1993).
Section 8-42-105(1) provides for the cessation of “temporary total disability payments” unless vocational rehabilitation is offered and accepted as provided in § 8-42-111(3), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.). Thus, payments which are made to a claimant during the provision of vocational rehabilitation necessarily constitute “temporary disability payments” for purposes of § 8-42-107.5. Moreover, § 8-42-107.5 does not contain any exception for benefits paid on account of vocational rehabilitation, and we decline to read such an exception into the statute. See Kraus v. Artcraft Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1985) (court may not legislate remedies not expressly provided for in the statute).
We do not consider Donald B. Murphy Contractors v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office to be authority to the contrary. In Murphy, the court held that application of § 8-42-107.5 is premature where the claimant is not at MMI as defined by § 8-40-201(11.5), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.). This is true because a claimant’s impairment rating cannot be determined until she reaches MMI and the effects of the industrial injury become stable.
Here, it is undisputed that the claimant’s medical condition has become stable and that her medical impairment rating can be determined. Thus, Murphy is distinguishable and does not support the claimant’s interpretation of § 8-42-107.5. This is particularly true since the definition of MMI found in § 8-40-201(11.5) makes no reference to whether or not a claimant’s “vocational impairment” can be reduced through vocational rehabilitation.
Moreover, we are unpersuaded by the claimant’s assertion that there is a “qualitative difference” between temporary disability benefits paid on account of a claimant’s physical impairment, and those paid on account of vocational impairment. While the grounds for paying such benefits are somewhat different, the overall purpose for paying the benefits is to alleviate the claimant’s loss of earning capacity. Thus, there can be no basis for distinguishing between the two types of benefits for purposes of the $60,000 cap. Cf. Colorado AFL-CIO v. Donlon, 914 P.2d 396
(Colo.App. 1995) (temporary disability benefits and medical impairment benefits are both designed to compensate for a claimant’s lost earning capacity).
In light of this disposition, we have not addressed the claimant’s other arguments.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated September 9, 1996, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Bill Whitacre
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C. R. S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed April 28, 1997 to the following parties:
Vicki Grogan, 4932 E. Greenwich Dr., Highlands Ranch, CO 80126
Lutheran Medical Center, Inc., 8300 W. 38th Ave., Wheat Ridge, CO 80033-6005
Lutheran Medical Center, Sedgwick James of Colorado, P.O. Box 101268, Denver, CO 80250-1268
Neil D. O’Toole, Esq., 226 W. 12th Ave., Denver, CO 80204-3625 (For the Claimant)
Michael W. Sutherland, Esq., 1700 Broadway, Ste. 1910, Denver, CO 80290 (For the Respondent)
By: _______________________________