W.C. Nos. 4-327-138 AND 3-108-777Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
May 3, 1999.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Martinez (ALJ) which denied his claim for further medical benefits in W.C. No. 3-108-777 and dismissed W.C. No. 4-327-138. We affirm.
The claimant suffered a compensable spinal injury on June 7, 1993 while working as a mechanic for the Meeker School District RE 1 (Meeker). The Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority(CCIA) admitted liability in W.C. No. 3-108-777. On May 24, 1994, the CCIA filed a Final Admission of Liability which admitted liability for 2 percent whole person impairment due to a compression fracture. Indemnity Insurance Company subsequently became Meeker’s workers’ compensation carrier.
The ALJ found that prior to the 1993 injury, the claimant was diagnosed and treated for low back pain, bilateral knee pain, bilateral leg pain, mild carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), bilateral shoulder pain, and neck pain. In support, the ALJ relied on Dr. Nakano’s 1991 recommendation for a total knee replacement, a June 25, 1991 MRI which revealed multiple abnormalities in the cervical spine and a 1992 report in which Dr. Copeland suggested the claimant suffers from bilateral tunnel decompression. The ALJ also found the claimant suffered a myocardial infarction in 1988 and had a history of gout.
Following the industrial injury the claimant resumed his employment as a mechanic and performed his regular employment from October 1993 to July 1997. However, the claimant testified that his job duties caused a gradual worsening of his symptoms in the spine, wrist, and knees. In February 1997 the claimant filed W.C. No. 4-317-138 which alleged an occupational disease caused by the aggravation of his pre-existing conditions. Indemnity Insurance Company denied liability.
On conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ determined that the claimant failed to prove a causal connection between his employment and his need for further medical treatment. Instead, the ALJ found that the claimant’s deterioration is due to non-occupational factors resulting from a progression of the pre-existing maladies. Consequently, the ALJ determined the claimant failed to prove a compensable occupational disease in W.C. No. 4-327-138. The ALJ also rejected the claimant’s contention that the deterioration is a natural consequence of the 1993 injury. Therefore, the ALJ denied the claim for additional compensation in W.C. No. 3-108-777.
On review the claimant asserts general allegations of error, and contests the ALJ’s failure to award reimbursement for the medical expenses he incurred with Dr. Parks, Dr. Mihal and Dr. Odom. The claimant contends that he treated with these physicians on a referral from Dr. Steadman, and therefore, he argues the treatment was authorized. The claimant also contends that there is substantial medical evidence that the treatment was causally related to the 1993 injury or an occupational disease. Further, the claimant contends the ALJ erred in finding that he withdrew his claim for benefits to treat his knee problems. We perceive no reversible error.
The claimant bears the burden to prove his entitlement to medical benefits. See Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). To be compensable the claimant must prove that the disputed medical treatment is authorized and reasonably necessary to cure or relieve the effects of an industrial injury or occupational disease. Section 8-42-101 C.R.S. 1998; Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337
(Colo.App. 1997).
Whether the claimant sustained his burden of proof is a question of fact for resolution by the ALJ, which must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8); City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1997). Further, the ALJ is not held to a crystalline standard in articulating his findings of fact. George v. Industrial Commission, 720 P.2d 624 (Colo.App. 1986). Rather, the ALJ’s findings are sufficient if the basis of the order is apparent Riddle v. Ampex Corp., 839 P.2d 489 (Colo.App. 1992).
Contrary to the claimant’s arguments, the ALJ’s findings of fact are sufficient to permit appellate review. Relying on the opinions of Dr. Dwyer, the ALJ determined that the disputed medical treatment was not reasonably necessary to cure or relieve the effects of the 1993 injury or a subsequent occupational disease. Consequently, the ALJ denied the claimant’s request for reimbursement of the disputed medical expenses.
In a report dated September 10, 1997, Dr. Dwyer opined that the claimant’s symptomatologies pre-dated the 1993 industrial injury and that there was no evidence of any deterioration of the claimant’s degenerative disc disease or spondylosis following his return to work after the industrial injury. Dr. Dwyer also opined that the claimant’s pre-existing left knee problems were not aggravated by the industrial injury and that the subsequent deterioration of the claimant’s left knee is due to obesity, not his employment. Further, Dr. Dwyer reported that the claimant’s mild CTS was not aggravated by the industrial injury and did not deteriorate since his return to work. Thus, Dr. Dwyer’s report contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s pertinent findings of fact.
However, the claimant points out that Dr. Dwyer apportioned 15 percent of his spinal condition to an occupational aggravation between 1993 and 1997. Therefore, the claimant argues that Dr. Dwyer’s opinions do not support the ALJ’s order. We disagree.
It is the ALJ’s sole prerogative to resolve inconsistencies in an expert’s testimony. See Colorado Springs Motors, Ltd. v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 504, 441 P.2d 21 (1968). In so doing, the ALJ is free to credit all, part or none of the expert’s opinion. El Paso County Department of Social Services v. Donn, 865 P.2d 877 (Colo.App. 1993). Furthermore, the ALJ is not required to explicitly cite disputed evidence before rejecting it as unpersuasive. Jefferson County Public Schools v. Dragoo, 765 P.2d 636 (Colo.App. 1988).
Dr. Dwyer testified that there was no objective evidence of a causal relationship between the claimant’s work and his spinal problems. However, based solely on the claimant’s subjective complaints, Dr. Dwyer attributed 15 percent of the claimant’s spinal problems to an industrial aggravation of the pre-existing condition. (Dwyer report September 10, 1997).
As we read the ALJ’s order, he was not persuaded by the claimant’s testimony that his work aggravated his pre-existing condition. See Levy v. Everson Plumbing Co., Inc., 171 Colo. 468, 468 P.2d 34 (1970) (ALJ not required to credit claimant’s testimony). To the contrary, the ALJ credited evidence that the claimant was physically able to perform his regular employment duties between 1993 and 1997. Moreover, because the ALJ rejected the claimant’s subjective assessment of his condition, the ALJ implicitly rejected Dr. Dwyer’s apportionment which was based on the claimant’s subjective complaints.
The ALJ’s findings are further supported by evidence that as early as 1991 the claimant’s treating physician suggested he apply for social security disability benefits, that the claimant underwent a total knee replacement in December 1993, and that on October 7, 1993, Dr. Copeland advised the claimant against heavy work. In fact, Dr. Copeland opined that the claimant “will not hold up to any type of heavy work in the future.” Further, Dr. Steadman testified that the claimant’s condition is “incompatible” with his work as a mechanic. (Steadman depo. p. 11).
Because the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial albeit conflicting, medical evidence they must be upheld Postlewait v. Midwest Barricade, 905 P.2d 21 (Colo.App. 1995) (ALJ is sole arbiter of conflicting medical evidence); Delta Drywall v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 868 P.2d 1155
(Colo.App. 1993). Furthermore, the ALJ’s findings support the denial of benefits. Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. 1998. Accordingly, it is immaterial that the record contains medical evidence which, if credited, might support a contrary result. See Campbell v. IBM Corp., 867 P.2d 77 (Colo.App. 1993)
Finally, we assume arguendo, that the ALJ erred in finding the claimant withdrew his claim for benefits related his knee problems. See (Partial Transcript, first part of hearing p. 4; Partial Transcript second part of hearing p. 17). However, the ALJ’s order reflects his determination that the claimant failed to prove a causal connection between the knee problems and a compensable injury. The ALJ implicitly credited Dr. Dwyer’s opinion that none of the claimant’s knee problems were attributable to his employment or the 1993 injury. The ALJ also expressly found that the claimant failed to establish a causal connection between the 1993 injury and “any symptomology he suffered afterwards.” (Conclusions of Law 1). Therefore, the ALJ’s finding that the knee claim was withdrawn is harmless error. Section 8-43-210 C.R.S. 1998; A R Concrete Construction v. Lightner, 759 P.2d 831 (Colo.App. 1988) (error which is not prejudicial will be disregarded).
The claimant’s further arguments have been considered and do not alter our conclusions.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated October 28, 1998, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
____________________________________ Robert M. Socolofsky
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.
Copies of this decision were mailed May 3, 1999 the following parties:
Delton Gerloff, P. O. Box 835, Meeker, CO 81641
Meeker School District RE-1, P. O. Box 1089, Meeker, CO 81648-1089
Indemnity Insurance Company, P. O. Box 2941, Greenwood Village, CO 80150-0141
Jason Bealman, c/o CIGNA, P.O. Box 2940, Greenwood Village, CO 80150
Laurie A. Schoder, Esq., Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority I — interagency Mail (For Respondent Employer and CCIA)
Victor C. Devereaux, Esq., 400 Vega St., P. O. Box 40, San Luis, CO 81152 (For Claimant)
Carol A. Finley, Esq., 111 S. Tejon St., #700, Colorado Springs, CO 80903 (For Respondent Employer and Indemnity Insurance Company)
Thomas W. Blake, Esq., 415 Brach Dr., Grand Junction, CO 81503
BY: AP