W.C. No. 4-492-819Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
April 5, 2002
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Coughlin (ALJ) which awarded temporary disability and medical benefits. The respondents contend neither the law nor the evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment when she fell in an alley behind the employer’s place of business. We affirm.
The ALJ’s findings may be summarized as follows. The claimant was employed at a laundry. The laundry had a rear entrance, not generally used by the public, which abutted an alley. Laundry employees regularly parked in the alley and entered and left work through the rear door. However, the employer “objected” to employees parking in the alley. (Finding of Fact 13).
On November 17, 2000, the claimant slipped and fell in the alley while waiting for her son to pick her up and take her home from work. The ALJ explicitly found the claimant “was on the employer’s premises waiting for a ride home during a reasonable interval after working hours.” Under the circumstances, the ALJ concluded the claimant sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and awarded benefits accordingly.
On review, the respondents dispute the ALJ’s finding that the alley may be equated to the employer’s “premises.” In any event, the respondents assert the findings concerning the alley are incorrect and irrelevant since, on the date of the injury, the claimant actually left through the employer’s front door. Finally, the respondents contend the ALJ improperly analogized the facts of this case to cases holding that injuries sustained in employer parking lots are compensable. We perceive no error.
The claimant was required to prove that she sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. 2001. In order for an injury to occur in the “course of employment,” the injury must have occurred within the time and place limits of the employment during an activity having some connection with work-related functions. For an injury to “arise out of” employment, the claimant much show a causal connection between the employment and the injury which demonstrates the injury had its origins in the employee’s work-related functions and is sufficiently related thereto to be considered part of the employment contract. Madden v. Mountain West Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1999).
Here, the respondents dispute the ALJ’s determination that the injury arose out and in the course of the claimant’s employment. In this regard, an injury may arise out of employment even if occurs during an activity which is not a strict obligation or duty of the employment. Rather, an injury arises out of employment if it occurs during an activity which may reasonably be characterized as an “incident” of the employment. Price v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 919 P.2d 207
(Colo.App. 1996); City of Boulder v. Streeb, 706 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1985).
Colorado has a well-established line of cases which hold that injuries sustained in parking lots which are owned, maintained, or provided by the employer for the benefit of employees arise out of the employment because they are incident to the employment relationship. Eg. Woodruff World Travel, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 38 Colo. App. 92, 554 P.2d 705
(1976) (causal connection between injury and employment established where claimant fell in parking lot provided by the employer’s landlord, and was provided as an “obvious fringe benefit” for employees). Indeed, the doctrine has been extended to apply to injuries sustained when the claimant was crossing a public way in order to reach a parking lot provided or maintained by the employer. See State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Walter, 143 Colo. 549, 354 P.2d 591 (1960). Significantly, th Walter court cited with approval the following language from a Massachusetts case:
These facts require as a matter of law a decree for the employee. Although the employee was not obliged to come to work in an automobile, and the employer was not obliged by contract to furnish the “parking lot”, yet it is plain that it did furnish the lot as an incident of the employment, and that the employee, while actually on his employer’s premises and on his way to the place where his day’s work was to be performed by a route which he was permitted and expected to take, fell and was injured.
Ultimately, the question of whether the claimant established the requisite causal relationship or “nexus” between her employment and the injury is one of fact which must be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances. Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638
(Colo. 1991). Because the issue is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ’s pertinent findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2001. This standard of review requires us to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Metro Moving and Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411
(Colo.App. 1995). Further, an ALJ is not held to a standard of absolute clarity in expressing findings of fact. Rather, it is sufficient for the ALJ to enter findings concerning that evidence which she finds dispositive of the issues involved, and contrary evidence and inferences are considered to have been implicitly rejected. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo. 2000).
The respondents first dispute Findings of Fact of 6 and 14, arguing that the ALJ “confused” the alley, a public away, with the employer’s premises. However, Finding of Fact 14 and Conclusion of Law 1 persuade us the ALJ recognized the distinction between the employer’s premises and the public alley itself. Further, this distinction is supported by the claimant’s testimony that she was waiting for a ride in a car parked on the employer’s premises, which abutted the public way, and that the fall itself occurred on the employer’s premises. (Tr., September 13, 2001, pp. 7, 9; Exhibit 18). Indeed, the employer’s witness admitted the fall, if it occurred in the place indicated by the claimant, occurred on the employer’s premises. (Troy Depo. p. 11).
The respondents next dispute Finding of Fact 13 because, according to the respondents, it indicates “the only way the claimant could have exited the building was through the regular use of the back door,” and on the night of the injury the claimant left through the front door. The respondents’ assertions notwithstanding, Finding of Fact 13 does not state the claimant and other employees were required to use the back entrance, it merely states they regularly walked through the alley and used the back entrance. The obvious purpose of this finding is to establish that the employer was aware employees were in the habit of parking in the alley, and on private property abutting the alley, and entering the business through the rear door. This evidence tends to establish that the claimant’s presence in the alley was “incident” to her employment, and, therefore, arose out of and in the course of her employment. Further, this finding is amply supported by the claimant’s testimony, as well as the testimony of co-employee Corral. (Tr. August 13, 2001, pp. 11, 20, 40, 41). Indeed, Witness Corral testified for the entire year she worked for the employer she parked on the employer’s premises adjacent to the alley. (Tr. pp. 40-41).
The respondents next dispute the ALJ’s reliance on the “parking lot cases” discussed above. According to the respondents, the parking lot cases involve employees walking through parking lots on their way to work or on their way home. The respondents reason that because the claimant was waiting for her son to pick her up, the parking lot cases are distinguishable. The respondents also place reliance on the ALJ’s finding that the employer expressed “objections” to employees parking in the alley. We are not persuaded.
These arguments apparently implicate both the arising out of and the in the course of employment elements of compensability. As recognized by the ALJ, the “course of employment” includes a reasonable interval before and after work for the purpose of engaging in activities which are preparatory to the employment, or reasonably incident to the work. See Industrial Commission v. Hayden Coal Co., 113 Colo. 62, 155 P.2d 158
(1944); Ventura v. Albertson’s, Inc., 856 P.2d 35, 38 (Colo.App. 1992). The question of what constitutes a reasonable interval is factual and depends on not only the length of time involved, but also “on the circumstances occasioning the interval and the nature of the employee’s activity.” 2 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 21.06 [1] [a]. Reasonable delays have been found to include hour delays because of transportation problems. Id.
Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the claimant, she was waiting in a co-employee’s car for her son to pick her up and take her home from work. At the time of the fall, it was dark and snowing. The claimant could not have remained inside the employer’s building because the employer was closing and the building needed to be cleaned. The claimant fell when she got out of the car to check and see if her son had arrived to give her a ride. The fall occurred no more than one hour after the employer’s business closed. (Tr. pp. 10, 21, 41). Thus, substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant’s presence on the employer’s premises was reasonably incident to her employment and occurred within course of employment. The fact the claimant was not going to her own car does not negate the ALJ’s findings that the injury occurred on the employer’s premises, and during an activity reasonably incident to employment, and within a reasonable time after the conclusion of work.
Similarly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding the injury arose out of the employment because there was a sufficient causal connection to the circumstances under which the work was usually performed, and the claimant’s injury was incident to those circumstances. Although the employer testified that he “objected” to employees parking in the alley way, the record is replete with evidence the employer condoned this practice. Indeed, the claimant testified employees parked in the alley for 12 years, and Corral testified she parked there for one year. Thus, the ALJ could plausibly infer that, although the employer did not approve of parking in the alley, the employer was aware of the practice and permitted it. Thus, the totality of the circumstances is sufficient to establish the applicability of principles discussed in the “parking lot cases,” and to establish a “nexus” between the injury and the claimant’s employment. See 1 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 13.04 [2] [a] (parking lot considered part of employer’s premises when lot, although not owned by the employer, was exclusively used, or used with employer’s special permission, or just used”).
Insofar as the respondents make other arguments, we find them to be without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED the ALJ’s order dated October 26, 2001, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
________________________________ David Cain
________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to §8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2001. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed April 5, 2002 to the following parties:
Lidia Estrada, 6648 Irving, Denver, CO 80221
The Shirt Laundry, 2863 Welton St., Denver, CO 80205-3019
Cathleen Newell, Truck Insurance Exchange, P. O. Box 378230, Denver, CO 80237
Elsa Martinez Tenreiro, Esq., 700 Broadway, #1101, Denver, CO 80203 (For Claimant)
Matthew W. Tills, Esq., 950 17th St., 21st Floor, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy