IN RE ESPEY, W.C. No. 4-401-236 (03/14/01)


IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF LARRY ESPEY, Claimant, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., Employer, and CNA/CONTINENTAL INSURANCE, Insurer, Respondents.

W.C. No. 4-401-236Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
March 14, 2001

FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Jones (ALJ) which determined the claimant failed to prove he suffered a compensable injury and, therefore, denied and dismissed the claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.

The claimant began working for the respondent-employer as a millwright in March 1998. On May 19, 1998, the claimant tripped over an angle iron and fell on his right hand while carrying two large stainless steel nuts.

Based upon the evidence presented at a hearing on October 4, 2000, the ALJ found that, initially the claimant felt no pain in his right hand. However, the following day the claimant’s hand swelled, and his third and fourth fingers were immovable. On May 21, 1998, the claimant went to the Poudre Valley Hospital where he was treated by a certified physician’s assistant, Donald Allison (Allison). Allison diagnosed a fracture of the fifth metacarpal head. Allison testified that when he asked the claimant about the stiffness in his little finger, the claimant indicated it was due to a previous injury. Allison’s report noted the “Claimant has a chronic injury of his proximal interphalangeal joint of his little finger and is unable to bend it.” Allison also opined, “[T]his is not associated with” the May 19 injury.

Dr. Mordick diagnosed a flexor tendon rupture to the right little finger and opined that the mechanism of the May 19 industrial accident was inconsistent with the rupture injury. The claimant denied a pre-existing condition to the right little finger. However, the ALJ found Allison’s records and Dr. Mordick’s testimony persuasive. Therefore, the ALJ determined the claimant failed to prove a causal connection between the flexor tendon injury and the employment and denied the claim for benefits. The claimant timely appealed.

On appeal the claimant contends that the ALJ erred in finding a pre-existing condition that precluded his recovery of workers’ compensation benefits. However, the claimant did not file a brief in support of the petition to review. Consequently, the effectiveness of our review is limited. Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 734 P.2d 642 (Colo.App. 1986).

The claimant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. Section 8-43-201 C.R.S. 200 ; City of Boulder v. Streeb, 706 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1985). It is the ALJ’s sole prerogative to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the probative value of the evidence to determine whether the claimant has met his burden of proof. Monfort Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122
(Colo.App. 1993). We must uphold the ALJ’s order if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2000. Where the evidence is subject to conflicting inferences, we may not interfere with the ALJ’s determination of the inferences to be drawn. Gelco Courier v. Industrial Commission, 702 P.2d 295
(Colo.App. 1985).

We have reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings of fact. The ALJ’s findings are sufficient to permit appellate review, and the findings indicate that the ALJ resolved conflicts in the evidence based upon his credibility determinations. See Riddle v. Ampex Corp., 839 P.2d 489 (Colo.App. 1992). Further, the claimant has not provided a transcript of the October 4 hearing. Under these circumstances, we must assume there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant’s need for treatment of the right little finger is due to a pre-existing condition, and not the May 19 industrial accident See Nova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 754 P.2d 800
(Colo.App. 1988). The ALJ’s determination is also consistent with the deposition testimony of Allison and Dr. Mordick.

Finally, the ALJ’s findings support the conclusion that the claimant failed to prove a compensable injury. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in denying the request for workers’ compensation benefits. Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. 2000; Dover Elevator Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 961 P.2d 1141 (Colo.App. 1998).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated November 7, 2000, is affirmed.

INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL

____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean

NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2000. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.

Copies of this decision were mailed March 14, 2001 to the following parties:

Larry Espey, 1601 Taft St., Lakewood, CO 80215

Larry Espey, 1126 Emerson St., Denver, CO 80211

Westinghouse Electric Corp., Carolyn Burger, W.C. Coordinator, Siemans Westinghouse Power Corporation, 4400 Alafaya Trail, MC-640, Orlando, FL 32826-2399

CNA/Continental Insurance, Michele Washington, Gates McDonald
Company, P. O. Box 71000, Las Vegas, NV 89170

Steven J. Picardi, Esq., 777 E. Speer Blvd., #210, Denver, CO 80203 (For Respondents)

David W. Doyle, 4465 Kipling St., Suite 200, Wheatridge, CO 80033

BY A. Pendroy