IN RE ECKRICH, W.C. No. 3-780-348 (11/12/98)


IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF JOANNE (BUEHLER) ECKRICH, Claimant, v. CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, Employer, and SELF-INSURED and/or COLORADO COMPENSATION INSURANCE AUTHORITY, Insurers, Respondents.

W.C. No. 3-780-348Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
November 12, 1998

FINAL ORDER

The Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority (CCIA) and its insured, the City of Colorado Springs (collectively the respondents) filed a Petition to Review an order of Administrative Law Judge Wells (ALJ), which determined that Dr. Hall is an authorized treating physician. We dismiss the Petition to Review without prejudice.

It is undisputed that Dr. Singleton is an authorized treating physician. The ALJ found that in the normal progression of authorized treatment, Dr. Singleton referred the claimant to Dr. Hall for further treatment commencing December 1996. Therefore, the ALJ determined that Dr. Hall is an authorized treating physician and that the treatment provided by Dr. Hall after the referral is authorized.

We note that the claimant has moved to dismiss the Petition to Review on grounds that the ALJ’s order is interlocutory. The respondents contend the claimant’s motion is untimely. The respondents also assert that the ALJ’s order “implicitly requires the CCIA to pay for treatment already rendered by Dr. Hall.” Therefore, the respondents argue that the claimant’s motion should be denied.

Jurisdictional challenges may be raised at any time in a proceeding. Hasbrouck v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 780
(Colo.App. 1984). Therefore, the claimant’s motion is not untimely.

In any case, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or waiver. Neoplan USA Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 778 P.2d 312 (Colo.App. 1989). Consequently, we are obligated to determine whether we have jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s order regardless of the claimant’s motion.

Our appellate authority is limited to the review of “final” orders. See § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 1998; United States Fidelity and Guaranty, Inc. v. Kourlis, 868 P.2d 1158 (Colo.App. 1994). A final order is an order “which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant a benefit or penalty.” Furthermore, orders which determine liability for benefits, without determining the amount of benefits, do not award or deny benefits as contemplated by § 8-43-301(2), and consequently, are not subject to review. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo.App. 1989); CF I Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 144 (Colo.App. 1986); Great West Casualty Co. v. Tolbert, (Colo.App. No. 90CA0046, October 4, 1990) (not selected for publication) (order requiring payment of benefits “to which the claimant may be entitled” was not yet reviewable).

The respondents are liable for emergency and authorized medical treatment which is reasonably necessary to cure and relieve the effects of the industrial injury. Section 8-42-101(1), C.R.S. 1998; Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337 (Colo.App. 1997). “Authorization” refers to the physician’s legal authority to treat, and is distinct from whether treatment is “reasonable and necessary” within the meaning of § 8-42-101(1)(a). Mason Jar Restaurant v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 862 P.2d 1026 (Colo.App. 1993). Thus, a finding that treatment is “authorized” is not itself a “medical benefit.” One Hour Cleaners v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 914 P.2d 501 (Colo.App. 1995).

Here, the sole issue for adjudication was the authorization of Dr. Hall’s treatment. Contrary to the respondents’ argument, the ALJ’s order does not require the respondents to pay for any particular treatment by Dr. Hall. Neither does the order award any particular medical benefit. In fact no particular benefit was requested. Moreover, the record does not reflect any agreement that Dr. Hall’s treatment is reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve the effects of the industrial injury. Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s order is interlocutory and not currently subject to review. Director of Division of Labor v. Smith, 725 P.2d 1161 (Colo.App. 1986).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents’ Petition to Review the ALJ’s order dated August 20, 1997, is dismissed without prejudice.

INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL

____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
____________________________________ Robert M. Socolofsky

NOTICE
An action to modify or vacate this Order may be commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.

Copies of this decision were mailed November 12, 1998
to the following parties:

JoAnne (Buehler) Eckrich, 723 Paradise Lane, Colorado Springs, CO 80904

LaTrelle Miller, Esq., Self-Insured City of Colorado Springs, P.O. Box 1575, Colorado Springs, CO 80901

Laurie A. Schoder, Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, interagency mail

Jon C. Thomas, Esq., 1032 North Wahsatch Avenue, Colorado Springs, CO 80903 (For the Claimant)

BY: ______________________