W.C. No. 4-508-725Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
December 24, 2002
CORRECTED ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ) dated June 27, 2002. We affirm.
The claimant suffered a compensable injury to her right upper extremity. Ultimately, the claimant underwent a Division-sponsored independent medical examination (DIME). The DIME physician assigned 12 percent impairment to the upper extremity, which he converted to 7 percent whole person impairment. The DIME physician also recommended maintenance treatment consisting of occupational hand therapy, physical therapy, chiropractic treatment, a trial of acupuncture and an evaluation for nerve entrapment if the claimant’s condition worsened.
The respondents filed a Final Admission of Liability for a scheduled disability award and denied liability for future medical treatment. The claimant objected and requested medical impairment benefits based on 7 percent whole person impairment. The claimant also sought an award of future medical benefits as provided by Grover v. Industrial Commission, 759 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1988).
The ALJ found the claimant suffered functional impairment to the wrist and thumb. Therefore, the ALJ determined the claimant’s impairment is fully compensated by the scheduled disability award for 12 percent loss of use of the arm at the shoulder. Further, the ALJ determined the claimant failed to establish entitlement to future medical benefits. The claimant timely appealed.
The record transmitted to us on appeal did not contain evidence the claimant timely filed a brief in support of her petition to review. However, after the claimant filed a Request for Reconsideration of our order dated December 3, 2002, the parties stipulated that the claimant’s brief was timely filed. Therefore, we granted the claimant’s Request for Reconsideration and have considered the claimant’s brief.
The claimant’s sole contention in her brief in support of the petition to review is that the ALJ erred in finding the claimant failed to prove entitlement to future medical benefits. In support, the claimant argues that her testimony and the DIME physician’s recommendation for future medical treatment compel an award of future medical benefits. We reject these arguments.
Grover v. Industrial Commission, supra, allows an ALJ to award medical benefits after maximum medical improvement (MMI) where there is substantial evidence in the record to support a determination that future medical treatment will be reasonable and necessary to relieve the effects of the industrial injury or prevent a deterioration of the claimant’s condition. Whether the claimant sustained her burden of proving a need for Grover-type medical benefits is a question of fact for resolution by the ALJ. Stollmeyer v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 609
(Colo.App. 1995). Accordingly, the ALJ’s determinations must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2002. “Substantial evidence” is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. City of Colorado Springs v. Givan, 897 P.2d 753 (Colo. 1995).
We have previously concluded that the ALJ is not required to afford special weight to the DIME physician’s recommendation for future medical treatment. Bond v. Penrose Home Care, W.C. No. 4-275-808(April 16, 2001), aff’d., Bond v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, (Colo.App. No. 01CA0831, November 23, 2001) (not selected for publication); Henderson v. Eastman Kodak, Inc., W.C. No. 4-256-823 (February 24, 2000), aff’d., Henderson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, (Colo.App. No. 99CA1532, February 24, 2000) (not selected for publication). We adhere to our prior conclusions. Furthermore, it is well established that even uncontroverted medical evidence is not binding on the ALJ. Casa Bonita Restaurant v. Industrial Commission, 624 P.2d 1340 (Colo.App. 1981).
Here, the ALJ found that the DIME physician’s opinion, which was based on a single evaluation, was not entitled to as much weight as the opinions of the authorized treating physicians who did not recommend future medical treatment. The claimant’s arguments notwithstanding, the ALJ reasonably inferred from the medical records of Dr. Ogrodnick and Dr. Patterson that the claimant’s treating physicians did not recommend further treatment after MMI. Specifically, in his report dated May 22, 2001, Dr. Ogrodnick placed the claimant at MMI without recommending any further treatment. In fact, he “released” the claimant from all treatment. Insofar as it may be argued that Dr. Ogrodnick only served as a central referral source and did not provide direct care, his failure to recommend future medical treatment when he placed the claimant at MMI reflects his determination that none of the physicians who provided direct care recommended future medical treatment either.
The claimant’s remaining arguments essentially request that we reweigh the evidence on review. We have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ concerning the credibility of the various medical experts and therefore, decline the claimant’s invitation to do so. City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1997). Moreover, the medical evidence was subject to conflicting inferences concerning the claimant’s need for future medical treatment. Consequently, we cannot say the ALJ erred as a matter of law in failing to credit the DIME physician’s recommendation for future treatment. See Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1986) (ALJ’s credibility determinations are binding unless the testimony is so rebutted by hard, certain evidence that as a matter of law the ALJ would err in crediting the testimony). Therefore, we perceive no basis to disturb the ALJ’s order denying future medical benefits.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated June 27, 2002, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to §8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2002. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed December 24, 2002 to the following parties:
Diane M. Duplissis, 6130 Rangeland Pl., Colorado Springs, CO 80918
Shepard’s, 555 Middle Creek Pkwy., Colorado Springs, CO 80921
Zurich Insurance Company, c/o Crawford Co., P. O. Box 6502, Englewood, CO 80155-6502
Steven U. Mullens, Esq., P. O. Box 2940, Colorado Springs, CO 80901-2940 (For Claimant)
BY: A. Hurtado