W.C. No. 4-364-012Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
March 23, 2000
FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Hopf (ALJ) which determined the claimant failed to prove a compensable injury, and therefore, denied and dismissed the claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.
The claimant alleged she developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) as a result of extensive computer work required by her job as a Market Research Analyst for the respondent. On January 14, 1997, the claimant underwent a CTS release by Dr. Eric Britton. In December 1997, the claimant filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
Following a hearing on March 4, 1999, the ALJ found that the claimant’s employment required computer work, but that it was not constant or repetitive. The ALJ also found the claimant suffers from diabetes mellitus and has been insulin dependent for 25 years. On conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ found the claimant failed to sustain her burden to prove that the CTS is a proximate result of her employment. Consequently, the ALJ denied the claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
On review, the claimant contests the ALJ’s findings of fact. She contends the ALJ’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the ALJ confused the etiology of diabetes neuropathy and CTS. Further, the claimant alleges that she has CTS and not diabetes neuropathy. In support, the claimant has submitted several medical articles which are intended to “clarify statements” contained in the ALJ’s findings of fact. The claimant also argues that the record compels the conclusion she sustained CTS from the repetitive computer work required of her employment. We reject these arguments.
To establish a compensable injury, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that there is a causal connection between the employment and the medical condition for which benefits are sought. Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337 (Colo.App. 1997); Morrison v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 760 P.2d 654 (Colo.App. 1988). The failure to establish the requisite causal relationship is fatal to a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. § 8-41-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 1999.
The claimant is not required to prove causation by the presentation of medical evidence. However, to the extent such evidence is presented, it is for the ALJ to assess its weight and credibility. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182
(Colo.App. 1990).
The question of whether the claimant has sustained her burden of proof is a factual determination for resolution by the ALJ Coven v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 366 (Colo.App. 1984). Accordingly, we are bound by the ALJ’s factual determinations if supported by substantial evidence in the record. §8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 1999; City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496
(Colo.App. 1997).
Furthermore, our review is restricted to the record before the ALJ. City of Boulder v. Dinsmore, 902 P.2d 925 (Colo.App. 1995). Therefore, we cannot considered the medical documentation submitted by the claimant for the first time on appeal. Voisinet v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 757 P.2d 171 Colo. App. 1988).
In addition, the claimant has not provided a transcript of the hearing March 4, 1999. Accordingly, we must presume that the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Nova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 754 P.2d 800 (Colo.App. 1988). Insofar as the claimant may have implicitly requested an extension of time to make payment arrangements for the transcript, we construe the ALJ’s March 10, 2000 “green sheet” of the record to us for review as reflecting the ALJ’s decision to deny the request. See §§ 8-43-301(2); 8-43-213, C.R.S. 1999 (party requesting transcript responsible for making payment arrangements or obtaining waiver of payment) Raffaelo v. Industrial Commission, 670 P.2d 805 (Colo.App. 1983). It follows that we may not disturb the ALJ’s finding that the claimant’s employment did not require repetitive computer work.
The medical records also contain substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant suffers from peripheral neuropathy. Dr. Hopfenbeck reported on August 25, 1998, that the claimant suffers from “some degree of neuropathy.” In a report dated January 25, 1999, Dr. Hughes attributed the claimant’s CTS to poorly controlled diabetes mellitus with secondary peripheral neuropathy. Dr. Hughes also opined that upper extremity use is not a necessary factor in the development of CTS in the setting of poorly controlled diabetes. Dr. Roth agreed in his report dated December 23, 1997.
Neither Dr. Milburn nor Dr. James Britton were able to render an opinion on the cause of the claimant’s CTS, and Dr. Eric Britton reported that the CTS was “idiopathic in nature.” (James Britton April 2, 1998; Milburn April 20, 1998; Eric Britton December 2, 1997). Further, Dr. Hopfenbeck opined that it was difficult to assess how much of the claimant’s problem is due to her work and declined to opine whether the work “caused” the problem. (Hopfenbeck December 5, 1997; April 29, 1998). Therefore, the medical records also support the ALJ’s determination that the claimant failed to prove a causal connection between the claimant’s employment and her upper extremity problems.
The ALJ’s findings support the order, and the order is consistent with the applicable law. See § 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 199 ; Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra. Therefore, the claimant has failed to establish grounds which afford us a basis for disturbing the ALJ’s order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated April 19, 1999, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL ________________________________ Kathy E. Dean ________________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 1999. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed March 23, 2000 to the following parties:
Christine G. Dubs, P. O. Box 164, Hygiene, CO 80533
Nick Butler, Gates Rubber Company, P. O. Box 5887, Denver, CO 80217
Kurt Muehler, RSKCo., P. O. Box 5307, Denver, CO 80217-5307
Lynn P. Lyon, Esq., 999 18th St., #3100, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondent)
BY: A. Pendroy