W.C. No. 4-675-112.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
March 21, 2007.
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO REVIEW
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Broniak (ALJ) dated November 13, 2006 that denied the claimant’s request for an order finding that a communication between the parties was a settlement agreement and approving that putative agreement. We dismiss the petition to review without prejudice.
No hearing was held. The claimant filed a Motion to Conform General Admissions to Parties’ Agreement and Request for Approval of Agreement, in which she recited the following relevant facts. The claimant sustained a compensable injury and the respondents filed a notice of contest. The claimant filed an application for hearing on the issue of compensability and claimant’s counsel conferred with the respondents’ counsel regarding the hearing. The two reached agreement and the hearing was cancelled. The claimant attached an email transmission to the motion, purportedly memorializing the agreement. It stated in part that “[t]his email confirms that Respondents have agreed to file a General Admission of Liability admitting for medical and indemnity benefits. . . .” The respondents subsequently filed a general admission, which admitted liability only for medical benefits. The claimant filed an application for hearing on the issues of temporary total disability benefits and penalties and the respondents filed an amended general admission, admitting liability for temporary total disability benefits from October 4, 2005 through November 7, 2005. The Division of Workers’ Compensation requested from the respondents additional documentation supporting the termination of temporary total disability benefits and the
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respondents filed another general admission, admitting liability for temporary total disability benefits from October 4, 2005 until an undetermined date, designated in the admission by a series of question marks.
Following this recitation of facts, the claimant’s motion argued that an enforceable agreement had been entered into by the parties. The relief requested by the claimant in the motion was an order “compelling Respondents to conform Respondents’ general admissions filed in this claim to the agreement between Claimant and Respondents. . . .” The claimant also stated that, although the respondents “honored the compensability and medical benefits,” they “failed to pay TTD as agreed.”
The respondents contested the motion, conceding that they had filed a general admission admitting liability for temporary total disability benefits from October 5, 2005 through “an unspecified period.” They further contended that the confirmatory email transmission did not constitute an enforceable agreement and that, if it did, it could not be interpreted as admitting for temporary total disability benefits “from October 4, 2005 ongoing.”
The ALJ denied the claimant’s motion, finding that the email transmission was not an enforceable settlement agreement, but also finding that the respondents’ general admission filed September 12, 2006, “admitted for TTD from October 5, 2005 ongoing thus complying with Claimant’s interpretation of the e-mail with the exception of the one day discrepancy.” Accordingly, apparently on the basis that the respondents’ general admission provided the claimant all the relief she was seeking, the ALJ denied the motion.
The respondents appealed the denial of the claimant’s motion. Although the respondents did not file a brief in support of the petition to review, it recites that “[t]he Order addressed an issue not before the Court, namely, whether the September 12, 2006 General Admission of Liability should be construed as an admission for temporary total disability from October 5, 2005 ongoing.” Apparently the respondents draw a distinction between temporary total disability benefits that are admitted to “an unspecified date” and those that are admitted on an “ongoing” basis, presumably until terminated by operation of law. In any event, we conclude that the ALJ’s order is not presently final and reviewable.
Section 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 2006 provides that any dissatisfied party may file a petition to review “an order which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant any benefit or penalty.” An order which does not satisfy one of the finality criteria of this statute is interlocutory and not subject to immediate review. Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App. 1989). Under this statute, the order must be one that finally
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disposes of the issues presented. Bestway Concrete v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 984 P.2d 680 (Colo.App. 1999). An order may be partially final and reviewable and partially interlocutory. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo.App. 1989). Under these principles, our jurisdiction is purely statutory and may not be conferred by waiver, consent, or any other equitable principle Gardner v. Friend, 849 P.2d 817 (Colo.App. 1992). The absence of a final, reviewable order is fatal to our jurisdiction. Buschmann v. Gallegos Masonry, Inc., 805 P.2d 1193 (Colo.App. 1991).
Here, we do not understand the ALJ to have entered a final order requiring any party to pay benefits or denying the claimant any benefit or penalty. Although the ALJ entered findings of fact interpreting the respondents’ general admission, the ALJ’s order did not order benefits paid pursuant to that admission. Indeed, the claimant’s requested relief, which was denied, was merely to “conform” the general admissions to the agreement allegedly reached. It is clear from the claimant’s motion and from the ALJ’s order that the issue presented for her disposition was not whether the respondents should be compelled to pay benefits pursuant to their admission. Hence, there is no final order that is reviewable.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated November 13, 2006, is dismissed without prejudice.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL ____________________________________ John D. Baird
____________________________________ Curt Kriksciun
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Connie Derouin, 10571 Colorado Blvd., Thornton, CO, Alliance Data Systems, Jonathan Lee, Westminster, CO, Federal Insurance Company c/o Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, George Ochoa, Los Angeles, CA, Daniel W. Lang, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Claimant).
McElroy, Duetsch, Mulvaney Carpenter, LLP, Jonathan O. Wilson, Esq., 1700 Broadway Ave, Denver, CO, (For Respondents).
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