W.C. No. 4-655-539.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
October 10, 2006.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Martinez (ALJ) dated April 28, 2006 that dismissed the claim for compensation. We affirm.
The ALJ’s findings of fact include the following. The claimant worked for the employer for three years as a shop worker. The claimant testified that he injured himself at work in March 2005. The claimant did not report the injury to the employer until July 2005. The claimant made inconsistent statements regarding when and how he was injured. Dr. West opined that the etiology of the claimant’s back condition was not clear but speculated that it might be related to work activities. Dr. Gates opined that degenerative changes were present in the claimant’s right SI join and referred the claimant to Dr. Gebhard who performed a microscopic discectomy. The claimant did not submit into evidence a medical opinion that stated that the claimant’s injury was caused by his work. The ALJ determined that the testimony of the claimant was not credible. The ALJ concluded that the claimant failed to carry his burden of showing that he sustained a compensable injury. Accordingly, he denied and dismissed the claim. The claimant appealed and asserts numerous errors. We are unpersuaded by the claimant’s arguments that the ALJ erred.
The petition to review primarily contains general allegations of error, derived from § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2006. Under §8-43-301(8), we are precluded from disturbing the ALJ’s order unless the findings of fact are insufficient to permit appellate review, the ALJ has not resolved conflicts in the evidence, the record does not support the findings, the order is not supported by the findings, or the order is not supported by applicable law. The claimant has not filed a brief in support of his petition to review and, therefore, the effectiveness of our review is severely limited. Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 734 P.2d 642 (Colo.App. 1986).
It was the claimant’s burden to prove a causal relationship between an alleged industrial injury and the medical condition for which he seeks benefits. Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337 (Colo.App. 1997). The question of whether an industrial injury causes the need for medical treatment is largely one of fact for determination by the ALJ. City of Durango v. Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496 (Colo.App. 1997). Whether the claimant has proved disability, including proof that the injury has impaired the ability to perform pre-injury employment, is a factual question for the ALJ. Lymburn v. Symbios Logic, 952 P.2d 831 (Colo.App. 1997).
Because these questions are factual in nature, we are bound by the ALJ’s determinations in this regard if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2006 City of Durango v. Dunagan, supra. Substantial evidence is probative evidence which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences. See F.R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965
(Colo.App. 1985). The substantial evidence standard requires that we view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ’s assessment of the sufficiency and probative weight of the evidence. Thus, the scope of our review is “exceedingly narrow.” Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo.App. 2003). This narrow standard of review also requires that we defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1117
(Colo.App. 2003).
We note that, although the ALJ is not required to articulate the bases for his credibility determinations, Wells v. Del Norte School District C-7, 753 P.2d 770 (Colo.App. 1987), in this case he did so. The ALJ expressly relied upon the inconsistencies in the claimant’s reports to his personal physician and others regarding when and how he was injured. There is support in the record for these findings.
The claimant testified that he injured himself at work on an unknown date in March 2005 after he moved a large amount of angle iron with a co-worker. Tr. 18. However, the claimant completed an incident report in July, 2005 wherein he noted that on June 29, 2005, as he was walking through the shop, his right leg gave out and he felt pain in his thigh. Tr. at 41; Exhibit F. at 34. On October 28, 2005 the claimant filed an application for hearing noting that he was injured on June 29, 2005. The claimant first sought medical care on April 18, 2005 at which time he reported to his personal physician, Dr. West that he was unable to recall a specific event that triggered his pain. The report from Dr. West goes on to conclude that the etiology was not clear. Exhibit B at 18.
The claimant testified that he did not work between September 12, 2005 and January 2, 2006 and did not engage in any heavy lifting outside of his work activities. Tr. at 26. However, the medical report of Dr. Kao, dated November 18, 2005, revealed that the claimant had been engaging in some heavy lifting about two weeks prior to November 18, 2005. Exhibit B at 26. The claimant denied treatment from 2002 to 2005 for his back, but the medical record demonstrated he was seen by Dr. Luke dated January 2, 2002 for evaluation and management for his back for twelve months. Tr. at 31; Exhibit E at 33.
The assessment of the probative value of competing evidence is solely the province of the ALJ, and the grounds he articulated for reaching his conclusions are wholly legitimate ones. Here, it is clear that the ALJ resolved the conflicts in the evidence with ample support from the record in favor of the respondents’ position, and we may not reweigh the evidence and disturb his credibility determinations.
The claimant contends that the ALJ ignored certain unspecified inconsistencies in testimony present by the respondents from Marc Hoover. In this regard, it was solely the prerogative of the ALJ to assess the weight, the credibility, and the probative value of the testimony offered on the issue of causation. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). We may only interfere with the ALJ’s credibility determinations in extreme circumstances, such as where the testimony believed by the ALJ was rebutted by such hard, certain evidence that it would be error as a matter of law to credit it. Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1986). That is not the case here and we are not at liberty to disturb the findings. We have considered the claimant’s remaining arguments and they do not persuade us to reach a different result.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated April 28, 2006, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL __________________________________ John D. Baird ___________________________________ Thomas Schrant
Ronald G. Dekoevend, Grand Junction, CO, Poma of America, Inc., Marc Hoover, Grand Junction, CO, Pinnacol Assurance, Felicia Hall, Denver, CO, Killian, Guthro Jensen, P.C., Joanna Jensen, Esq., Grand Junction, CO, (For Claimant).
Ruegsegger, Simons, Smith Stern, Renee Casanova Lewis, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Respondents).