W.C. No. 4-506-911Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
February 26, 2003
FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mattoon (ALJ) which denied the claim for benefits based on stress. We affirm.
The ALJ found the claimant, a loan processor, developed job-related stress in June 2001. The stress and consequent depression occurred approximately three months after the claimant came under the supervision of Dee Sandoval.
The claimant testified that Sandoval engaged in harassment and rude behavior. Specifically, the claimant alleged that Sandoval enforced bank policies regarding overtime and the length of lunch breaks. On one occasion, Sandoval mentioned the claimant was late returning from lunch, but no discipline was imposed.
In May 2001 Sandoval noted the claimant processed only 6 loans while the other processor completed 21 loans. The supervisor advised the claimant that if she did not have enough loans to process she could assist the co-worker. Shortly thereafter, the claimant left the employment due to stress and began receiving treatment for depression.
The ALJ found the claimant proved that her stress and consequent depression were caused by the circumstances of employment. However, the ALJ found the claimant failed to prove a compensable stress claim under the requirements of § 8-41-301(2)(a) and (2)(c), C.R.S. 2002. First the ALJ found the claimant failed to prove the stress was caused by a “psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside a worker’s usual experience and would evoke symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances.” The ALJ further found the alleged stressors resulted from circumstances common to all fields of employment.
On review, the claimant contests several findings of fact. However, we have reviewed the documentary evidence and the transcript of the hearing, and that evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. Although there was some conflict in the evidence, the ALJ resolved the conflicts in the respondents’ favor. We may not interfere with that assessment or the findings. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2002.
The claimant has attempted to supplement the record by attaching performance evaluations to her brief. However, documents attached to briefs are not evidence in the case and may not be considered on appeal Subsequent Injury Fund v. Gallegos, 746 P.2d 71 (Colo.App. 1987).
The claimant argues the evidence establishes that she proved the stress was outside a worker’s usual experience and would have evoked significant symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances. Section 8-41-301(2)(a). We first note the claimant was required to produce the “testimony” of a licensed physician or psychologist in support of these statutory elements. Davison v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, __ P.3d __ (Colo.App. No. 4-292-298, January 2, 2003). Our review of the record reveals no oral or written opinion from a licensed physician or psychologist which may reasonably be construed as supporting either of these elements. Although the claimant presented some professional opinions that her stress was caused by her experiences at work, none of the opinions specifically addresses the statutory elements. Consequently, the ALJ correctly ruled the claimant failed to satisfy her burden of proof.
Moreover, the ALJ was implicitly persuaded by Sandoval’s testimony that the claimant was not treated unfairly or singled out for discipline . (Conclusion of Law 3). This finding is supported by the record and justifies the ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant’s work environment was not outside a worker’s usual experience or so abusive as to cause significant symptoms of distress in a similarly-situated worker.
For the same reasons, the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the claim for stress was based on facts and circumstances common to all fields of employment. Section 8-41-301(2)(c). Facts and circumstances common to all fields of employment are those which are objectively present in all work situations, and are not shown to be uncommon because of arbitrary, unreasonable, or bad faith conduct by the employer. Riddle v. Ampex Corp., 839 P.2d 489 (Colo.App. 1992); Holme Roberts Owen, 800 P.2d 1332 (Colo.App. 1990). Each alleged stressor must be examined to determine if it is common to all fields of employment, and the issue is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Trujillo v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 957 P.2d 1052 (Colo.App. 1998).
Here, the ALJ found the alleged stressors were in part the result of good faith supervision. Substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence supports that determination. The claimant was counseled about returning late from lunch, and asked to assist a co-worker in light of the claimant’s low productivity. The ALJ was certainly not required to find this was bad faith or unreasonable supervision. Further, the ALJ was not required to find the claimant’s circumstances were not common simply because the supervisor had closer personal relations with other workers.
Insofar as the claimant makes other arguments, we find them to be without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated January 17, 2002, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
___________________________________
David Cain
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Bill Whitacre
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver,CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty(20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10)and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2002. The appealing party must serve a copy of thepetition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim AppealsOffice, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe Street, Tower 3,Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed ______February 26, 2003_______ to the following parties:
Patricia Davis, 550 Ardath Ln., Pueblo, CO 81005
Minnequa Bank of Pueblo, 401 W. Northern Ave., Pueblo, CO 81004-3111
Legal Department, Pinnacol Assurance — Interagency Mail
Douglas P. Ruegsegger, Esq., and Ryan A. McManis, Esq., 600 17th St., #1600N, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents)
By: ________A. Hurtado___________