W.C. No. 4-269-439Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
May 24, 1996
FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Rumler (ALJ) which awarded attorney fees to the respondents. We reverse.
The ALJ’s findings may be summarized as follows. The ALJ found that the claimant, who appeared without counsel, deliberately falsified her testimony “to make her case come within the already existing law.” Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the claimant had maintained a “frivolous” claim justifying an award of attorney fees to the respondents under §8-43-216(1), (1995 Cum. Supp.).
The claimant advanced numerous arguments in support of her position that the award of attorney fees was improper. We conclude that the award was improper, but for reasons somewhat different than those stated by the claimant.
Section 8-43-216(1) provides as follows:
“On and after January 1, 1992, in any claim for compensation, as part of the order pursuant to this part 2, the director or administrative law shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs, with interest, against the claimant’s attorney or the insurer’s or the employer’s attorney, if self-insured, if any attorney or party pursues or defends any claim for compensation or any part thereof that the administrative law judge determines lacked substantial justification.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 8-43-216(2), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.), goes on to provide that awards of attorney fees are to be reported to the director and requires an ALJ to state “whether the attorney fees and costs were awarded against the claimant’s attorney, the insurance company’s attorney, or the employer’s attorney, if self-insured.”
In Shepherd v. Briarwood Health Care Center, W.C. No. 4-133-867, August 11, 1993, we held that § 8-43-216(1) and (2) do not authorize awards of attorney fees against individual parties to a claim. Instead, we held that the language of the statute explicitly provides that awards of attorney fees must be made against the attorney who represents the party.
We see no reason to depart from our conclusion in Shepherd v. Briarwood Health Care Center, supra. If the General Assembly had wished to impose attorney fees against individual parties, it would have done so. Since it did not, we have no authority to create such a remedy. See Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App. 1989) (authority to award attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases is strictly a creature of statute, and no attorney fees may be awarded where no statutory authority exists).
Here, the claimant was pro se at the hearing. Although there is some indication she has some legal training, there is no evidence that she is authorized to practice law in Colorado. Therefore, there is no attorney against whom attorney fees can be assessed under the statute.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated February 15, 1996, is reversed and the claim for attorney fees is denied.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEAL PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver,Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, withservice of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Officeand all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Orderwas mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed May 24, 1996 to the following parties:
Sharon F. Daugherty, II, 3124 Scranton St., Aurora, CO 80011
Telecommunications, Inc., P.O. Box 5630, Denver, CO 80217-5630
Old Republic Insurance Company, % General Adjustment Bureau, 789 Sherman St., #100, Denver, CO 80203
Royce W. Mueller, Esq., 5353 W. Dartmouth Ave., Ste. 400, Denver, CO 80227 (For the Respondents)
By: _____________________